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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 October 1982

Lebanon: Problems Facing President Jumayyil

Summary

Lebanese President Amin Jumayyil faces an up-hill struggle in his attempt to reestablish Lebanon's political and territorial integrity after seven years marked by civil war, anarchy, violence and foreign meddling. Following the assassination of his brother Bashir, Amin was elected president with the unprecedented backing of nearly all of Lebanon's confessionally-based factions. The conflicting interests of these groups, especially the demands of those who supported his late brother, means that the newly forged political consensus is fragile and much of his energies will be diverted into maintaining and strengthening his political support.

In the month since assuming office, Jumayyil has made modest gains in returning war-ravaged Beirut to normal. The greater task still lies ahead, however, as 90 percent of the country is occupied by Israeli and Syrian forces, pockets of Palestinian fighters continue to operate in the north and east, extralegal militias function throughout the country, and interfactional violence rages only a few miles from the capital.

During Jumayyil's visit to Washington, he hopes to further crystallize the extent of US commitment, both to Lebanon and to himself as its leader. He will want US moral and material support for the rebuilding of his country's institutions, especially the army, as well as extensive involvement in Lebanon's reconstruction effort. More importantly, he needs US diplomatic leverage to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and a continuing commitment to its territorial and political integrity.

CA 3.5(c)
OSD 3.5(c)

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Levant Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near East South/Asia Analysis. Information as of 15 October 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, [redacted]

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Fragile Political Consensus

Lebanon's political landscape was changed dramatically by Israel's invasion on 6 June, and again by the assassination of president-elect Bashir Jumayyil on 14 September. The political leadership, shocked into cooperation by these events, has forged a consensus supporting Amin Jumayyil that appears to be the strongest in Lebanon since before the 1975-76 civil war.

The new spirit of accomodation is, nevertheless, fragile. Recent eruptions of interfactional violence in various parts of the country is indicative of the continued ascendancy of confessional and clan loyalties over Lebanese national identity.

Maintaining and strengthening this consensus will be a problem for Amin, who is not yet the master of his own house. His most pressing problem is to establish control over the powerful Phalange militia, especially hardcore militants put into powerful positions by Bashir. These elements have little use for Amin, who they see as representing the bankrupt politics of the old guard. Fears that Amin will not carry through on Bashir's policies may lead these hardliners to consider a coup.

Other Christian and Muslim factions have expressed a willingness to work with Amin. This is not the result of personal loyalty or particular confidence in his leadership, but rather because they view him as more reasonable than his late brother and more open to their influence. If Amin does not satisfy their often conflicting interests, they can be expected to withdraw their support.

The Tasks Ahead

Events since his inauguration have illustrated the magnitude of the challenges facing Amin and the narrow confines within which he must work. After extensive consultations on the composition of his government, during which he was unable to reconcile conflicting pressures, Jumayyil was forced to carry over former Prime Minister Wassan and install a cabinet of academics, lawyers, and other professionals, none of whom have had much political experience.

This arrangement is probably only a transitional one, aimed at postponing a decision on power-sharing among confessional groups while Jumayyil tackles more pressing diplomatic and security problems. Most of the political factions seem content to go along with this for now. US officials believe Jumayyil favors the formation of a strong central government under Maronite hegemony as a means of overcoming the internal inertia that he sees contributing to the country's problems. He has publicly stated that the longterm security interests of Lebanon's Christians lie not in the continuation of de facto partition, but in a united Lebanon.

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OSD 3.5(e)

Expanding Central Authority

Meanwhile, Lebanon lacks the kind of strong government needed to expand central authority throughout the country. The army is also weak, having never really recovered from the civil war when it fragmented along confessional lines. Although it has since been reformed as an integrated Christian-Muslim force, the rebuilding process has been slow and Lebanese leaders have been reluctant to test it in situations where ethnic loyalties might again divide it.

As a first step, the army has been sent in to demilitarize Beirut. In part a confidence-building measure, the move has not been without controversy. Search operations and arrests, initially limited to predominantly Muslim West Beirut, have led to charges that the army has acted like an occupation force and served Christian interests. While Muslims generally favor the goal of disarming extralegal militias that have controlled West Beirut since the civil war, they insist that the Christian Phalange military force must also be disarmed. Jumayyil has promised that this will be done. His delay in carrying through on this commitment, however, probably reflects an inability to assert control over the militia leadership, which is determined to preserve its strong role in Lebanon.

Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

Jumayyil is committed to securing the withdrawal of Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli forces from Lebanon. Because of the weakness of Lebanon's institutions, especially the army, this goal can only be achieved through a combination of international political pressure and a strong military peacekeeping presence. While Lebanon can work toward negotiated settlements with Syria and Israel, Amin has no leverage with them. Nor has it any way to evict Palestinian fighters in the north, a problem Damascus insists must be resolved directly by the Lebanese government and the PLO. In the south, Jumayyil is up against the Israeli insistence on iron-clan security arrangements in which the Israelis want the forces of their agent Major Saad Haddad to play a key role.

The presence of the multinational force has been critical for the Lebanese Army to succeed in the pacification of Beirut. Jumayyil recognizes that the multinational force will be essential in order to extend the authority of the central government beyond Beirut. During the period required to rebuild the armed forces, Jumayyil will want an expanded mandate for the multinational force, or for Unifil if need be, to accomplish this task. The government is hesitant to test the army in confessional-based rivalries, let alone against foreign elements, that might result in its being routed or possibly lead to its disintegration as a unified force.

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Relations with Syria and Israel

Israel has dropped for now its insistence on a peace treaty, but still wants a written security agreement covering the 40 kilometer zone in the south. It may be difficult to formulate an agreement that will be satisfactory to the Israelis and at the same time not alienate the Lebanese Muslims whose support Jumayyil is trying to retain. Israel is contemptuous of the Unifil forces stationed in the south, and may be cool to any other international force unless its mandate for maintaining order is broader and it includes US troops. Defense Minister Sharon has made it clear that only forces Israel controls or in which the Israelis have complete confidence can be counted on to adequately patrol the security zone.

The Israelis will probably keep up pressure for a statement or agreement on non-belligerency, looking ultimately toward a treaty.

Syria is displaying a cautious but positive attitude toward Amin.

Syria now appears willing to normalize its relations with Lebanon, so long as Syrian interests are taken into account. Syria has agreed to proposals adopted in Fez to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. It is insisting that Israel must withdraw first, but in the end would probably accept a simultaneous pullout.

Jumayyil's Goals in the US

Amin Jumayyil will be seeking both material and symbolic returns from his Washington visit. He hopes for tangible achievements in order to establish his legitimacy, especially with hardline elements of the Phalange militia.

Amin would like to bind the US to Lebanon through a continuing commitment to his country's unity and sovereignty. He has repeatedly told US officials in Beirut that Lebanon will become America's best Middle East ally.

This attitude is generated not only by his desire for material assistance from the US, but also by his need for a strong political buffer against the internal and external forces that traditionally have compromised the initiatives of the central government.

Rebuilding the Lebanese Army

Essential to Amin's hopes for the future is a vastly strengthened Lebanese Army. Jumayyil will ask the US to

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underwrite his plans to create a force large enough to present a modest deterrent to Lebanon's neighbors and to control its borders. In the short-term he envisions the expansion of Lebanon's 23,000 man army to 43,000, plus supporting elements. In the longer-term he has in mind a 60,000 man force.

Recruitment poses the major obstacle to the expansion of the LAF. Since the civil war the Lebanese government has attempted to maintain a balance between Christians and Muslims in the armed forces. Although the Defense Law of 1979 provided for national conscription, this provision has never been implemented. As a result, the army relies upon volunteers. Recruits are easily obtained from among the poorer Muslim community, particularly the Shi'a. Competition from the private sector and the fairly well organized Christian militias, however, has reduced the number of Christian recruits available to the army.

Economic Assistance and Reconstruction

Jumayyil's ability to rebuild Lebanon's economy will be an important test of his political strength. reconstruction will cost roughly \$24 billion. Jumayyil will be accompanied on his visit by his newly appointed ministers for housing, and development and reconstruction. While they will be appealing to the World Bank and other donors for reconstruction aid, Jumayyil can be expected to make further overtures to the US to expand its current \$110 million commitment.

American Security Guarantees

In addition to looking for a reaffirmation of the US commitment to secure the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon, Jumayyil would like to create the aura of a quasi-US protectorate fully committed to Lebanon's political and territorial integrity. Moreover, Jumayyil hopes the US will prove to be an effective interlocutor with states such as Saudi Arabia from which he will need both political and economic support.

Jumayyil believes that if he can claim success in moving toward these goals he will be in a stronger position to handle the internal obstacles which still confront him.

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CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
OSD 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

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APPENDICES

Page determined to be Unclassified
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Date: **SEP 24 2019**

Israeli, Palestinian, and Syrian Troop Deployments in Lebanon


Syrian Forces

	Troops	Tanks	Artillery
Bekaa Valley	29,000	674	319
Main Area	4,500	10	18
Northern Area (Security duties)	6,400	40	18
Total	39,900	724	355

Palestinian Fighter*

	Troops	Tanks	Artillery
Regular Forces	5-8,000	-	-
Militia	5-8,000	-	-
Total	10-16,000	-	-


*Palestinian fighters are scattered throughout Northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley/Main areas



Israeli Forces

	Troops	Tanks	Artillery
Beirut Area/ Central Sector	4,500	180	48
Bekaa Valley	10,500	300	84
Southern Area (Security duties)	2,000	-	-
Total	17,000	480	132

OSD 3.5(c)
 CIA 3.5(c)



The National Pact

At the time of independence in 1943, Lebanese leaders formulated a National Pact to guarantee the sectarian rights within the diverse population of Lebanon. An unwritten agreement, the Pact allocates political and administrative offices equitably among the recognized confessional groups according to the percentage of each in the total Lebanese population. Using the 1932 census as a base (none has been taken since then), the Presidency traditionally goes to a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership to a Sunni Muslim and the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shia Muslim. The 99 seats of the Chamber are also allocated proportionately among the religious communities.

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Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1982

	Thousand Persons	Percent of Population
Lebanese		
Arab Muslims	1,150	44
Sunni	550	
Shia	600	
Arab Christians	750	28
Maronite	390	
Greek Orthodox	240	
Greek Catholic (Melkite)	52	
Protestant	68	
Druze	190	7
Non-Arabs	151	6
Armenian Orthodox/Catholic	150	
Jewish	1	
Palestinians (roughly one-third Arab Christian and two-thirds Arab Muslim)	400	15
Residents in Lebanon	2,641	100
Lebanese expatriates (people holding Lebanese citizenship or dual citizenship abroad, mostly in Western Hemisphere)	1,250	
Total	approximately 3.9 million	

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THE MAIN LEBANESE POLITICAL GROUPS

Independent Muslims

- Al Amal
Iman Musa Sadr; missing since September 1978 and Nabih Barri; Shia
- Islamic Coalition
Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karawi; Sunni
- Islamic Grouping
Shafiq Wazzan; Sunni
- Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia

"National Movement"

- (Primarily Muslim Left)
- Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
 - Independent Nasirite Movement (Nasrabitum)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
 - Communist Action Organization
Nuhsein Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
 - Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR
Greek Orthodox Christian
 - South Party-Iraqi Wing
Abd al-Majid Rafai; Sunni
 - Nasirite Corrective Movement
Issam al-Arab; extreme left Sunni
 - Syrian Social Nationalist Party (FPM or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Christian
 - Popular Nasirite Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
 - South Party-Syrian Wing
Assan Qansu; Sunni, pro-Syrian
 - Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Warad; Sunni

National Front

- (Pro-Syrian Left)
- Nasirite Organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces)
Kamal Shatila; Sunni
 - Arab Democratic Party
Nassib al-Khatib; Tripoli-based Alawites

Moderate Christians

- Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sin'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite

Pro-Syrian Christians

- Sgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative
northern Maronite

"Lebanese Front"

- (Primarily Christian Right)
- Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Amin Jumayyil
Maronite and Greek Catholic
 - National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
 - Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bulus Ma'man, Maronite
Clergy, extreme right
 - Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Ars; extremist Maronite
 - Al Fanzim
George Adwan; extremist Maronite

Independent Christian Right

- Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
- National Bloc
Raymond Bde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
- Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad, Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli

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President Jumayyil's Reconstruction Program

Goals: Jumayyil wants to prove he can run a strong and effective central government. His ability to rebuild the economy will be an important test of strength.

Costs: [redacted] reconstruction will cost roughly \$24 billion. Although Lebanese banks can finance a large part of this, they cannot go it alone.

Government role: Jumayyil must: maintain law and order so that Lebanon's vigorous private sector can get on with rebuilding; restore essential public services—roads, water, etc; help rebuild homes and commercial buildings. One guess is that 25 percent of the buildings in West Beirut are damaged or destroyed.

Progress: The private sector is already clearing rubble and reopening for business. Government reconstruction efforts have not yet begun. Jumayyil is asking for money from the US, World Bank, Arabs and others to get started. (U)

Obstacles: Lebanese bankers will be reluctant to lend to the private sector unless they are confident that their investments will not be destroyed in more fighting. A World Bank role will be important in persuading other countries to donate. But the Bank will only lend if Lebanon already has a strong central government that controls the entire country. The Arabs are long on promises but short on delivery. They do not want Beirut to compete with their own financial centers.

US concerns: Jumayyil wants the Palestinians to leave Lebanon altogether, and is reluctant to rebuild the shattered refugee camps. However, we have insisted that our aid go to Palestinians as well as Lebanese. Winter is coming in Lebanon and thousands of Palestinians are still homeless.

US Aid: We have committed \$110 million, including \$30 million in guaranteed housing loans and \$10 million reserved for reconstruction in West Beirut. (U)

CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
OSD 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

Lebanese Crisis Chronology:

- April 1975 Civil War begins. Shooting of a Christian Phalangist by Palestinian and retaliatory Phalangist ambush of Palestinian school bus triggered full scale fighting in Lebanon.
- May 1976 Elias Sarkis elected President of Lebanon to succeed Sulayman Franjiyah; he was not installed in office until September 23, 1976 because Franjiyah would not step down early.
- June 1976 Syrian troops intervened in Lebanon as peacekeeping force.
- October 1976 Riyadh and Cairo Summits of heads of Arab states arranged an end to hostilities in Lebanon and created 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force to police ceasefire.
- March 1978 Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian terrorist attacks--"Litani operation".
- June 1978 UNIFIL arrived to take up position in southern Lebanon under the agreement for Israeli withdrawal.
- July 1978 Israelis withdraw from Lebanon.
- July 1980 Phalange defeats Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party militia; virtually eliminates rival Christian militias and allows Phalange to emerge as dominant Christian force in Lebanon.
- May-July 1981 Israeli shelling of Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian rocketing of northern Israel.
- July 24 1981 Ceasefire arranged by Ambassador Habib.
- April 3, 1982 Israeli diplomat assassinated in France by unknown assailant.
- May 9, 1982 Israeli aircraft make first airstrikes against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon since ceasefire. Palestinians retaliate by shelling northern Israeli settlements.
- June 3, 1982 Attempted assassination against Israeli Ambassador to London.
- June 6, 1982 Israeli ground forces invade southern Lebanon.

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SUBJECT: 18 October 1982 IG on Lebanon (U)

~~(S)~~ At 18 October 1982 IG on Lebanon, Ambassadors Draper and Dillon briefed the group. Draper, who had seen Gemayel in New York 17 October, said Gemayel wants a MNF for a period of twelve months in the north Bekaa and northern Lebanon except in the Tripoli area (presumably because there it would come in contact with the PLO). Gemayel also said that it was necessary to have the MNF along the Beirut/Damascus highway.

~~(S)~~ At the IG, Ambassador Dillon added that the MNF would have to be prepared to engage in fire fights.

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