The Iranian Revolution at 30

Viewpoints Special Edition 

The Iranian Revolution at 30 

The Middle East Institute 

Washington, DC

Middle East Institute 

The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in America 

and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and governments of the 

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a vital forum for honest and open debate that attracts politicians, scholars, government officials, and policy 

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with the region. 

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Cover photos, clockwise from the top left hand corner: Shahram Sharif photo; sajed.ir photo; sajed.ir photo; ? redo photo; sajed. 

ir photo; Maryam Ashoori photo; Zongo69 photo; UN photo; and [ john ] photo. 

2 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org

Viewpoints Special Edition 


The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org 

3

The year 1979 was among the most tumultuous, and important, in the history of the modern Middle East. The Middle 

East Institute will mark the 30 th anniversary of these events in 2009 by launching a year-long special series of our ac- 

claimed publication, Viewpoints, that will offer perspectives on these events and the influence which they continue to 

exert on the region today. Each special issue of Viewpoints will combine the diverse commentaries of policymakers and 

scholars from around the world with a robust complement of statistics, maps, and bibliographic information in order 

to encourage and facilitate further research. Each special issue will be available, free of charge, on our website, www. 

mideasti.org. 

In the first of these special editions of Viewpoints, we turn our attention to the Iranian Revolution, one of the most im- 

portant — and influential — events in the region’s recent history. This issue’s contributors reflect on the significance of 

the Revolution, whose ramifications continue to echo through the Middle East down to the present day. 

February 

Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution 

August 

Viewpoints: Oil Shock 

Viewpoints: 1979 

March 

Viewpoints: The Egyptian-Israeli 

Peace Treaty 

November 

Viewpoints: The Seizure of the 

Great Mosque 

Don’t miss an issue! 

Be sure to bookmark www.mideasti.org today. 

4 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org 

July 

Viewpoints: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 

Fall and Pakistan’s New Direction 

December 

Viewpoints: The Soviet Invasion of 

Afghanistan

Dedication 


A Special Edition of Viewpoints 

by Andrew Parasiliti 10 

Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy, 

by R.K. Ramazani 12 

I. The Revolution Reconsidered 

After the Tehran Spring, by Kian Tajbakhsh 16 

The Iranian Revolution of February 1979, by Homa Katouzian 20 

The Iranian Revolution 30 Years On, by Shahrough Akhavi 23 

The Three Paradoxes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 

by Abbas Milani 26 

The Revolutionary Legacy: A Contested and Insecure Polity, 

by Farideh Farhi 29 

The Iranian Revolution at 30: Still Unpredictable, by Charles Kurzman 32 

The Islamic Revolution Derailed, by Hossein Bashiriyeh 35 

The Revolution’s Mixed Balance Sheet, by Fereshtehsadat Etefaghfar 39 

Between Pride and Dissapointment, by Michael Axworthy 41 

II. Inside Iran 

Women 

Women and 30 Years of the Islamic Republic, by Nikki Keddie 46 


5

Women and the Islamic Republic: Emancipation or Suppression? 

by Fatemeh Etemad Moghadam 49 

Where Are Iran’s Working Women? 

by Valentine M. Moghadam 52 

Social Change, the Women’s Rights Movement, and the Role of Islam, 

by Azadeh Kian 55 

New Challenges for Iranian Women, by Elaheh Koolaee 58 

Education, Media, and Culture 

Educational Attainment in Iran, by Zahra Mila Elmi 62 

Attitudes towards the Internet in an Iranian University, 

by Hossein Godazgar 70 

Literary Voices, by Nasrin Rahimieh 74 

Communication, Media, and Popular Culture in Post-revolutionary Iran, 

by Mehdi Semati 77 

Society 

Iranian Society: A Surprising Picture, by Bahman Baktiari 80 

Iranian Nationalism Rediscovered, by Ali Ansari 83 

Iranian “Exceptionalism”, by Sadegh Zibakalam 85 

Energy, Economy, and the Environment 

Potentials and Challenges in the Iranian Oil and Gas Industry, 

by Narsi Ghorban 89 

Iran’s Foreign Policy and the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline, 

by Jalil Roshandel 92 

Environmental Snaphots in Contemporary Iran, 

by Mohammad Eskandari 95 


Back to the Future: Bazaar Strikes, Three Decades after the Revolution, 

by Arang Keshavarzian 98 

Iranian Para-governmental Organizations (bonyads), by Ali A. Saeidi 101 

Poverty and Inequality since the Revolution, by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 104 

Government and Politics 

Elections as a Tool to Sustain the Theological Power Structure, 

by Kazem Alamdari 109 

Shi‘a Politics in Iran after 30 Years of Revolution, by Babak Rahimi 112 

Muhammad Khatami: A Dialogue beyond Paradox, 

by Wm Scott Harrop 115 

Minorities 

Religious Apartheid in Iran, by H.E. Chehabi 119 

Azerbaijani Ethno-nationalism: A Danger Signal for Iran, 

by Daneil Heradstveit 122 

III. Regional and International Relations 

Sources and Patterns of Foreign Policy 

Iran’s International Relations: Pragmatism in a Revolutionary Bottle, 

by Anoush Ehteshami 127 

Culture and the Range of Options in Iran’s International Politics, 

by Hossein S. Seifzadeh 130 

The Geopolitical Factor in Iran’s Foreign Policy, 

by Kayhan Barzegar 134 

Iranian Foreign Policy: Concurrence of Ideology and Pragmatism, 

by Nasser Saghafi-Ameri 136 


7

Iran’s Tactical Foreign Policy Rhetoric, by Bidjan Nashat 139 

The Regional Theater 

The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations, by Nader Entessar 143 

Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite Relations, 

by Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr 146 

The Syrian-Iranian Alliance, by Raymond Hinnebusch 149 

Twists and Turns in Turkish-Iranian Relations, 

by Mustafa Kibaroglu 152 

The Dichotomist Antagonist Posture in the Persian Gulf, 

by Riccardo Redaelli 155 

Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council, by Mehran Kamrava 158 

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal “Gamecocks?”, by Henner Fürtig 161 

The Global Arena 

The European Union and Iran, by Walter Posch 165 

Iran and France: Shattered Dreams, by Pirooz Izadi 168 

The Spectrum of Perceptions in Iran’s Nuclear Issue, 

by Rahman G. Bonab 172 

Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Its Future, 

by Abbas Maleki 175 

Maps 178 

Statistics 

Demographics 188 


Economy 191 

Energy 196 

Gender 199 

Political Power Structure 201 

From the Pages of The Middle East Journal’s “Chronology:” 

Iran in 1979 205 

Selected Bibliography 223 


9

Dedication 

Andrew Parasiliti 

It is only fitting that “The Iranian Revolution at 30” begin with an introductory essay 

by R.K. Ramazani and that this project be dedicated to him. For 55 years, Professor Ramazani 

has been a teacher and mentor to many scholars and practitioners of the Middle 

East. His body of work on Iran is unrivalled in its scope and originality. Many of his 

articles and books on Iranian foreign policy are standard works. 

For over a quarter century, Dr. Ramazani also has written with eloquence and conviction 

of the need for the United States and Iran to end their estrangement and begin direct 

diplomatic talks. Ramazani has no illusions about overcoming three decades of animosity, 

but he believes that reconciling US-Iran differences is vital to resolving America’s 

other strategic challenges in the Middle East — including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict — and to bringing sustainable peace and security to the 

region. 

Professor Ramazani’s service to both the Middle East Institute and to the University of 

Virginia has been recognized time and again. As one of Dr. Ramazani’s former students, 

and as a former director of programs at MEI, I can personally attest to his deep commitment 

to both institutions. His life-long contribution to the Middle East Institute was 

recognized at MEI’s Annual Conference in October 1997, when he was presented with 

the Middle East Institute Award. Currently, Dr. Ramazani serves with distinction on 

The Middle East Journal’s Board of Advisory Editors. At the University of Virginia, his 

teaching and scholarship embodied Thomas Jefferson’s precept for the University that 

“Here we are not afraid to follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor tolerate any error so 

long as reason is left free to combat it.” 

It is in that spirit that this volume is dedicated to R. K. Ramazani. 

Andrew Parasiliti is Principal, 

Government Affairs- 

International, at The BGR 

Group in Washington, DC. 

From 2001-2005, he was 

foreign policy advisor to US 

Senator Chuck Hagel (R- 

NE). Dr. Parasiliti received a 

Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze 

School of Advanced International 

Studies, Johns Hopkins 

University, and an MA from 

the University of Virginia. He 

has served twice as director 

of programs at the Middle 

East Institute. 


Dedication... 

A Chronology of Dr. Ramazani’s articles in The Middle East Journal 

“Afghanistan and the USSR,” Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 1958) 

“Iran's Changing Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Discussion,” Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970) 

“Iran's Search for Regional Cooperation,” Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 1976) 

“Iran and The United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship,” Vol. 30, No. 3 (Summer 

1976) 

“Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978) 

“Who Lost America? The Case of Iran,” Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 1982) 

“Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations,” Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 

“The Islamic Republic of Iran: The First 10 Years (Editorial),” Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 

“Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South,” Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992) 

“The Shifting Premise of Iran's Foreign Policy: Towards a Democratic Peace?” Vol. 52, No. 2 

(Spring 1998) 

“Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy,” Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2004) 


Former MEI President 

Roscoe Suddarth 

presents Dr. Ramazani 

with the 1997 Middle 

East Institute Award. 

11

Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy 

R.K. Ramazani 

Understanding Iran’s foreign policy is the key to crafting sensible and effective policies 

toward Iran and requires, above all, a close analysis of the profound cultural and 

psychological contexts of Iranian foreign policy behavior. 

For Iran, the past is always present. A paradoxical combination of pride in Iranian cul- 

ture and a sense of victimization have created a fierce sense of independence and a culture 

of resistance to dictation and domination by any foreign power among the Iranian 

people. Iranian foreign policy is rooted in these widely held sentiments. 

THE RooTS oF IRANIAN FoREIGN PolICy 

Iranians value the influence that their ancient religion, Zoroastrianism, has had on Judaism, 

Christianity, and Islam. They take pride in 30 centuries of arts and artifacts, in 

the continuity of their cultural identity over millennia, in having established the first 

world state more than 2,500 years ago, in having organized the first international society 

that respected the religions and cultures of the people under their rule, in having 

liberated the Jews from Babylonian captivity, and in having influenced Greek, Arab, 

Mongol, and Turkish civilizations — not to mention having influenced Western culture 

indirectly through Iranian contributions to Islamic civilization. 

At the same time, however, Iranians feel they have been oppressed by foreign powers 

throughout their history. They remember that Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and most 

recently Saddam Husayn’s forces all invaded their homeland. Iranians also remember 

that the British and Russian empires exploited them economically, subjugated them 

politically, and invaded and occupied their country in two World Wars. 

The facts that the United States aborted Iranian democratic aspirations in 1953 by over- 

throwing the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddeq, returned the autocratic 

Shah to the throne, and thereafter dominated the country for a quarter century is 

deeply seared into Iran’s collective memory. Likewise, just as the American overthrow of 

Musaddeq was etched into the Iranian psyche, the Iranian taking of American hostages 

in 1979 was engraved into the American consciousness. Iran’s relations with the United 

States have been shaped not only by a mutual psychological trauma but also by collective 

memory on the Iranian side of 70 years of amicable Iran-US relations. 

R.K. Ramazani is Professor 

Emeritus of Government 

and Foreign Affairs at the 

University of Virginia. He 

has published extensively on 

the Middle East, especially 

on Iran and the Persian Gulf, 

since 1954, and has been 

consulted by various US administrations, 

starting with 

that of former President Jimmy 

Carter during the Iranian 

hostage crisis in 1979-1981. 


Ramazani... 

In spite of these historical wounds, Iranians remember American support of their first attempt to establish a democratic 

representative government in 1905-1911; American championing of Iran’s rejection of the British bid to impose a protectorate 

on Iran after World War I; American support of Iran’s resistance to Soviet pressures for an oil concession in 

the 1940s; and, above all else, American efforts to protect Iran’s independence and territorial integrity by pressuring the 

Soviet Union to end its occupation of northern Iran at the end of World War II. 

A TRADITIoN oF PRUDENT STATECRAFT 

Contrary to the Western and Israeli depiction of Iranian foreign policy as “irrational,” Iran has a tradition of prudent 

statecraft that has been created by centuries of experience in international affairs beginning with Cyrus the Great more 

than 2,000 years ago. 

To be sure, Iran has made many mistakes in its long diplomatic history. In the postrevolutionary 

period, and particularly in the early years of the Islamic revolution, Iran’s 

foreign policy was often characterized by provocation, agitation, subversion, taking 

of hostages, and terrorism. Most recently, Iran’s international image was tarnished by 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s imprudent rhetoric about Israel and the Holocaust 

in disregard of the importance of international legitimacy and the Iranian-Islamic dictum 

of hekmat (wisdom). 

Yet it is also important to acknowledge instances where post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy has been moderate 

and constructive. Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, President Mohammad Khatami, vehemently denounced violence and 

terrorism, promoted détente, pressed for “dialogue among civilizations,” improved Iran’s relations with its Persian Gulf 

neighbors, reversed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fatwa against author Salman Rushdie, bettered relations with Europe, 

softened Iran’s adversarial attitude toward Israel, and, above all, offered an “olive branch” to the United States. His 

foreign policy restored the tradition of hekmat (wisdom) to Iran’s statecraft. 

lESSoNS To BE lEARNED 

There are valuable lessons to be learned by countries that deal with Iran, especially those powers that are quarreling with 

Iran over the crucial nuclear issue. 

First, Iran’s statecraft is inextricably linked to the expectation of respect. In attempting to negotiate with Iran, pressures 

and threats, direct or indirect, military, economic or diplomatic, can prove highly counterproductive. When the United 

States says “all the options are on the table” in the nuclear dispute, for example, Iran views this as a threat of military 

force that must be resisted. Or when the six powers issued their joint proposal to Iran for discussion, as they did in Geneva 

on July 19, 2008, with an August 2 deadline for an Iranian response, Iran understood it as an ultimatum that could 


In attempting to 

negotiate with 

Iran, pressures and 

threats, direct or 

indirect, military, 

economic or diplomatic, 

can prove 

highly counterproductive. 

13

Ramazani... 

be followed by the imposition of greater sanctions. 

While Iran’s reaction to the Geneva meeting, which included the United States for the first time, was generally positive, 

Iranian leaders said enough to demonstrate that they expect respect and reject threats. In addressing the Iranian people 

on the critical nuclear issue on July 17, 2008, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, rejected threats 

from the United States, saying that “[t]he Iranian people do not like threats. We will not respond to threats in any way.” 

Yet he specifically praised the European powers because “they respect the Iranian people. They stress that they respect 

the rights of the Iranian people.” 

Following Khamene’i, on July 28, 2008 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the anchor 

of NBC Nightly News, “You know full well that nobody can threaten the Iranian 

people and pose [a] deadline they expect us to meet.” He rejected the August 2 deadline 

on the same day and said on August 3, “Iran has always been willing to solve the longstanding 

crisis over its disputed nuclear program through negotiations.” Reportedly, 

Iran would make its own proposal in its own time, perhaps on August 5. 

Second, Iran’s interlocutors would benefit significantly if they also understood Iran’s 

negotiating style. Created, molded, and honed by long diplomatic experience, Iranian 

diplomats combine a range of tactics in dealing with their counterparts: testing, probing, 

procrastinating, exaggerating, bluffing, ad-hocing, and counter-threatening when 

threatened. 

Third, foreign powers such as the United States should recognize the fierce sense of independence and resistance of 

the Iranian people, regardless of political and ideological differences, to direct or indirect pressure, dictation, and the 

explicit or implied threat of force. With these points in mind, American leaders can still draw creatively on the historic 

reservoir of Iranian goodwill toward the United States to craft initiatives that will be well received in Iran. 

THE WAy FoRWARD FoR THE UNITED STATES 

Created, molded, 

and honed by long 

diplomatic experience, 

Iranian diplomats 

combine 

a range of tactics 

in dealing with 

their counterparts: 

testing, probing, 

procrastinating, 

exaggerating, bluffing, 

ad-hocing, and 

counter-threatening 

when threatened. 

The United States should recognize the legitimacy of the Iranian Revolution unequivocally. The United States should 

also assess realistically Iran’s projection of power in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, where Iran seeks 

acknowledgment of its role as a major player. Thirdly, the US administration should reconsider its reliance on more 

than three decades of containment and sanctions, which have not weakened the regime, but have grievously harmed the 

Iranian people, whom America claims to support. Finally, the United States should also talk to Iran unconditionally. On 

the nuclear issue in particular, the United States should take up Iran on its explicit commitment to uranium enrichment 

solely for peaceful purposes, and President Ahmadinejad’s statement that “Iran has always been willing to resolve the 

nuclear dispute through negotiations.” 


I. The Revolution Reconsidered 


15

After the Tehran Spring 

Kian Tajbakhsh 

Ten years ago, in the summer of 1998, I arrived in Tehran after an absence of more 

than two decades. Three vignettes describe some of what I experienced and why I decided 

to stay. 

The Mayor. I am in a shared taxi with an architect friend who is pointing out some re- 

cent developments in the city. We are squeezed in the front passenger seat, three men in 

the back. The taxi’s radio is on, and all are listening intently to the live broadcast of the 

trial of Tehran’s high profile and dynamic mayor, Gholamhosein Karbaschi, the Robert 

Moses of Tehran, was on trial on thin charges of embezzlement, although most believed 

it was political retribution for contributing to Muhammad Khatami’s 1996 presidential 

election victory. Judge: “Is it not true that you controlled a number of personal accounts 

and moved money around them thereby violating financial laws?” Taxi Driver breaks 

in: “Agghhh! That Karbaschi! He’s lining his pockets just like all the others. What has he 

done for this city all these years? Nothing! Absolutely nothing!” 

We break through some gnarled traffic and enter a wide urban highway winding down 

around several hillocks, all bright green, full of flowerbeds, sprinklers busy, a big clock 

sculpted into the face in rocks and plants. My architect friend: “This is a brand new road 

system opened only a few months ago. It has finally connected two parts of the city 

and eased the flow from the west to the north of the city. The landscaping? Oh that’s 

standard for almost all urban redevelopment.” On hearing this, the Taxi Driver broke in 

again: “Are you kidding me? (so to speak). That Karbaschi is a genius! I should know. I 

drive all day. Before him this city was a mess, it was unlivable. All these new roads are 

great and the city has turned a new leaf.” Later when I had decided to write a book on 

urban policy and local government in Iran I always reminded myself that pinning down 

what ordinary people thought about their city would not be straightforward! 

The Park. An old friend calls at about 10 pm: “want to go for a spin? You’ll see something 

of the city too.” “Well, ye s… but isn’t it late?” Friend arrives at 11:30. By midnight 

we are at Park-e Mellat (the People’s Park) the largest in the city. With difficulty we find 

a parking space, the entire area is jammed with cars and people. “We’re going into the 

park now?” (Anyone who lived in New York in the 1980s would understand the incredulity.) 

But of course we entered — like the hundreds, yes hundreds of large extended 

families with small children carrying blankets, gas cookers, huge pots of food, canisters 

of tea. The weather is superb. Families are laying around, children playing ball or bad- 

Kian Tajbakhsh works as an 

international consultant in 

the areas of local government 

reform, urban planning, social 

policy, and social science 

research. Dr. Tajbakhsh has 

consulted for several international 

organizations such 

as the World Bank, the Netherlands 

Association of Municipalities 

(VNG-Int.) and 

the open Society Institute. 

He received his M.A. from 

University College, london 

in 1984, and a Ph.D. from 

Columbia University, New 

york City in 1993. 


Tajbakhsh... 

minton, boys and girls easily straying from their parents, each feeling safe enough with all the “eyes on the street.” The 

night is warm. Young couples are holding hands on benches slightly out of sight, in the row boats on the little artificial 

lake. And me? My mouth wide open in disbelief at this idyllic urban scene: a public space supplied by a conscientious 

municipality and dedicated designers, used civilly and politely by huge numbers of people from many classes. Many, 

judging by their chadors and rougher clothes, were from the poorer parts of the city — this was a family outing, perhaps 

the next day was a holiday. “But when — in fact how — would they go to work?” I ask. The city is dotted with smaller 

parks, just as much used. 

People have nothing else to do! We decide to see the movie everyone is talking about, 

Tahmineh Milani’s Two Women. But every theater we try is sold out. We have to wait 

two weeks to get a ticket. “This is amazing,” I say, “such a vibrant cultural life.” “Oh,” M 

replies, “because of the government restrictions people don’t have anything else to do, 

so they all pour into the cinemas.” (mardom tafrih-e digeh nadarand.) (I do finally see 

the film — it is powerful and important.) It is suggested instead that we go to the traditional 

local restaurants in the foothills of Darband. The description seems too good to 

be true: Persian carpets spread among trees and running streams in a mountain village 

20 minutes north of the city, serving Persian food and tea amidst the cool mountain 

air; elegant women reclining on large cushions and so on. The orientalist in me thoroughly 

(and unashamedly) awakened, we head off … to a traffic jam about a mile long. 

The road entering the village is backed up with cars, some ordinary, some expensive. 

We hear that restaurants have waits of over an hour. (The New Yorker in me groans “not here too?”) Defeated we turn 

back. “I would never have imagined anything like this,” I say. “Oh,” M replies, “it’s because people don’t have any other 

opportunities for recreation.” Next: the theater. Only a friend who has connections can swing, with great difficulty, some 

tickets for the first of Mirbagheri’s play cycle. The stately City Theater is full of people who have come to see the plays, 

some also to see and be seen, a perfectly acceptable objective. I want a ticket for the next play, but we have to join a long 

waiting list and may not make it. (We don’t in fact succeed.) “That’s the way it is, unfortunately,” M observes, “people just 

don’t have any other distractions, so they have to come to the theater.” 

At this point I fall in love with the city. I decide to find a way to come back and, if possible, stay. So I did move to Tehran, 

first and foremost for personal reasons. I studied Persian classical music, met my current wife — we now have a little 

baby girl. I made many deep and meaningful friendships, which means, when we converse I feel that it is about something. 

At the same time, the conversation is always embedded in very human relations, about the interaction in ways I 

never learned in New York. I soon became involved in intellectual debates raging during the reform period, and once or 

twice got into trouble with the authorities. 

Professionally, for the last ten years I have been working, teaching, and researching the newly emerging world of Iranian 

cities and local governments. Unlikely though it sounds, elected city councils several years ago emerged as a key 


My mouth wide 

open in disbelief 

at this idyllic urban 

scene: a public 

space supplied by 

a conscientious 

municipality and 

dedicated designers, 

used civilly and politely 

by huge numbers 

of people from 

many classes. 

17

Tajbakhsh... 

battleground for new visions for society and governance. I quickly became involved in the work of newly established 

councils, worked on the laws, was asked for advice (occasionally, I was able to give some), engaged in international public 

diplomacy, organizing several exchanges between European and Iranian mayors. Most fulfilling was learning about 

Iran’s cities and towns and peoples through traveling to dozens of cities across the country. Only now, ten years on, do 

I feel I have something to say about the hopes for local democracy that were part of the reform agenda — arguably the 

most important institutional legacy of the reform period. 

Ten years later, the “Long Tehran Spring” is over. What I initially thought was the beginning 

of the “Spring” when I arrived to stay in 2001, was, in retrospect, the downturn 

towards its end. What I didn’t realize at the time was that the Tehran that I experienced 

represented for another group of Iranians a negative and unwelcome image of social 

life. By 1990, with the grueling war with Iraq over, reconstruction was underway. Every 

Tehrani will tell you that Karbaschi transformed the capital from a morbid monument 

to the war dead — in the somber idiom of Shi‘a martyrdom — into a city in which life 

was affirmed through parks full of flowers and entertainment, where young couples 

could, discretely, entwine fingers and feel the pleasures of being alive, bookshops were accessible where one could 

browse the books, music cassettes, and CDs unavailable in the previous decade; a city which tried to be a more efficient 

and user friendly place for getting to work, for producing goods and services of everyday and banal use; in which brand 

new street lights would be efficient as well as a boost to the morale of residents, who could feel that that they were no 

longer living in a war-affected place. All this was desperately needed, especially by young middle class Tehranis who 

had lived through a decade of war and were now young university students and wanted to stretch their legs in a city 

connected to global currents and excitements. 

These two groups 

— the urban young 

middle class and 

the lower-class war 

veterans — clashed 

on the streets of 

Tehran in the 1990s. 

But then millions of others had been involved directly in fighting the war, and tens of thousands of poor, mostly rural, 

families had counted their children among the war dead. They also came to Tehran, because after all, it was also their 

city. They brought with them a more burdened conscience; conservative, small town beliefs and values; sometimes Puritan 

morality as a means of honoring the memory of those who had died as well as their own experience; most of those 

who had volunteered, often without pay, to fight to defend their families, friends and country — and survived — they 

had suffered a decade of lost education, material progress, and savings. 

These two groups — the young urban middle class and the lower-class war veterans — clashed on the streets of Tehran 

in the 1990s. The former wanted to put the war behind them; the latter surely could not so soon. Besides the memories, 

there was the sense on one side that the veterans deserved help in return for protecting the country and thus providing 

the tranquility that it appeared some younger Tehranis now took for granted. On the other side, there emerged a sense 

of resentment against the affirmative action for the families of veterans, who some viewed as cynically exploiting their 

status to cash in on free refrigerators and guaranteed college admission. This conflict was daringly portrayed in the film 

Glass Agency. Complicating matters, hostility and resentment latched easily onto the matter of sexuality, especially in 


Tajbakhsh... 

public, and particularly around women. By the end of the post-war decade, the second group had obtained their degrees, 

gained professional experience in the bureaucracy, and was finally able to demand a seat at the table. Of course, 

some want the table itself, and are even making a bid for all the other chairs! 

So the capital city is one, perhaps the arena in which an important set of challenges for 

the future of Iran is being played out. The Tehran municipality has been a disappointment, 

as have all elected local governments, who with the waning of national reform 

energies, have settled into being another sub-office of the governmental bureaucracy. 

With significant and ostensibly non-governmental resources, it has missed a chance to 

be the forum for Tehran’s residents. This challenge is at bottom a cultural and a national 

one — what will be the values that define the nation, who will we be? As yet, the city 

contains multitudes only numerically. The challenge is to transform the city from the 

battleground it often feels like, to a canvass on which a moral vision that can accept the 

conflicting values can form themselves into some kind of pattern that all, or at least 

most, can recognize and understand. We still occasionally go to the movies, the theater, 

and the hills. But more and more time is spent inside our homes. What the city needs 

most is the élan I felt that summer ten years ago. 


The challenge is to 

transform the city 

from the battleground 

it often feels 

like, to a canvass on 

which a moral vision 

that can accept 

the conflicting values 

can form themselves 

into some 

kind of pattern that 

all, or at least most, 

can recognize and 

understand. 

19

The Iranian Revolution of February 1979 

Homa Katouzian 

The revolution of February 1979 was a revolt of the society against the state. In some 

of its basic characteristics, the revolution did not conform to the usual norms of Western 

revolutions, because the state did not represent just an ordinary dictatorship but an 

absolute and arbitrary system that lacked political legitimacy and a social base virtually 

across the whole of the society. 

This became a puzzle to some in the West, resulting in their disappointment and disillusionment 

within the first few years of the revolution’s triumph. For them, as much 

as for a growing number of modern Iranians who themselves had swelled the street 

crowds shouting pro-Khomeini slogans, the revolution became “enigmatic,” “bizarre,” 

and “unthinkable.” 

In the words of one Western scholar, the revolution was “deviant” because it established 

an Islamic republic and also since “according to social-scientific explanations for revolution, 

it should not have happened at all, or when it did.” That is why large numbers of 

disillusioned Iranians began to add their voice to the Shah and the small remnants of 

his regime in putting forward conspiracy theories — chiefly and plainly that America 

(and / or Britain) had been behind the revolution in order to stop the shah pushing for 

higher oil prices. It was even said that the West had been afraid that economic development 

under the Shah would soon rob it of its markets. 

Before the fall of the Shah’s regime, this “puzzle” of the Iranian Revolution was somewhat 

closed to the eyes of Western observers. All the signs had been there, but they were 

largely eclipsed by the massive peaceful processions, the solidarity and virtual unanimity 

of the society to overthrow the state, and the blood sacrifice. They were eclipsed also 

by the phenomenon of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, every one of whose words was 

received as divine inspiration by the great majority of Iranians — modern as well as 

traditional. 

It is certainly possible to make sense of Iranian revolutions by utilizing the tools and 

methods of the same social sciences that have been used in explaining Western revolutions. 

However, explanations of Iranian revolutions that are based on the application of 

such tools and methods to Western history inevitably result in confusion, contradiction, 

and bewilderment. As Karl Popper once noted, there is no such thing as History; there 

Homa Katouzian, St Antony’s 

College and Faculty of 

oriental Studies, University 

of oxford 


Katouzian... 

are histories. The most obvious point of contrast is that in Western revolutions, the societies in question were divided, 

and it was the underprivileged classes that revolted against the privileged classes, who were most represented by the 

state. In both the traditional and the modern Iranian revolutions, however, the whole society — rich and poor — revolted 

against the state. 

From the Western perspective, it would certainly make no sense for some of the richest classes of the society to finance 

and organize the movement, while a few of the others either sit on the fence or believe that it was America’s doing and 

could not be helped. Similarly, it would make no sense by Western criteria for the entire state apparatus (except the 

military, which quit in the end) to go on an indefinite general strike, providing the most potent weapon for the success 

of the revolution. Nor would it make sense for almost the entire intellectual community and modern educated groups 

to rally behind Khomeini and his call for Islamic government. 

The 1979 revolution was a characteristically Iranian revolution — a revolution by the 

whole society against the state in which various ideologies were represented, the most 

dominant being those with Islamic tendencies (Islamist, Marxist-Islamic and democratic-Islamic) 

and Marxist-Leninist tendencies (Fada’i, Tudeh, Maoist, Trotskyist, and 

others). The conflict within the groups with Islamic and Marxist-Leninist tendencies 

was probably no less intense than that between the two tendencies taken together. Yet 

they were all united in the overriding objective of bringing down the shah and overthrowing 

the state. More effectively, the mass of the population who were not strictly 

ideological according to any of these tendencies — and of whom the modern middle 

classes were qualitatively the most important — were solidly behind the single objective 

of removing the Shah. Any suggestion of a compromise was tantamount to treason. 

Moreover, if any settlement had been reached short of the overthrow of the monarchy, 

legends would have grown as to how the liberal bourgeoisie had stabbed the revolution 

in the back on the order of their “foreign [i.e. American and British] masters.” 

The most widespread and commonly held slogan that united the various revolutionary parties and their supporters 

regardless of party and program was “Let him [the Shah] go and let there be flood afterwards” (In beravad va har cheh 

mikhahad beshavad). Many changed their minds in the following years, but nothing was likely to make them see things 

differently at the time. Thirty years later, Ebrahim Yazdi, a leading assistant of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Paris 

and later Foreign Minister in the post-revolutionary provisional government, was reported in Washington as speaking 

“candidly of how his revolutionary generation had failed to see past the short-term goal of removing the Shah...” 

Those who lost their lives in various towns and cities throughout the revolution certainly played a major part in the 

process. But the outcome would have been significantly different if the commercial and financial classes, which had 

reaped such great benefits from the oil bonanza, had not financed the revolution; or especially if the National Iranian 


It would make no 

sense by Western 

criteria for the entire 

state apparatus 

(except the military, 

which quit in the 

end) to go on an 

indefinite general 

strike, providing 

the most potent 

weapon for the success 

of the revolution. 

21

Katouzian... 

Oil Company employees, high and low civil servants, judges, lawyers, university professors, intellectuals, journalists, 

school teachers, students, etc., had not joined in a general strike; or if the masses of young and old, modern and traditional, 

men and women, had not manned the huge street columns; or if the military had united and resolved to crush 

the movement. 

The revolutions of 1906-1909 and 1977-1979 look poles apart in many respects. Yet they 

were quite similar with regard to some of their basic characteristics, which may also 

help explain many of the divergences between them. Both were revolts of the society 

against the state. Merchants, traders, intellectuals, and urban masses played a vital role 

in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909, but so did leading ‘ulama’ and powerful 

landlords, such that without their active support the triumph of 1909 would have been 

difficult to envisage — making it look as if “the church” and “the feudal-aristocratic 

class” were leading a “bourgeois democratic revolution”! In that revolution, too, various 

political movements and agendas were represented, but they were all united in the aim 

of overthrowing the arbitrary state (and ultimately Muhammad ‘Ali Shah), which stood 

for traditionalism, so that most of the religious forces also rallied behind the modernist 

cause, albeit haphazardly. 

Many of the traditional 

forces 

backing the 

Constitutional 

Revolution regretted 

it after the 

event, as did many 

of the modernists 

who participated 

in the revolution 

of February 1979, 

when the outcome 

ran contrary to 

their own best 

hopes and wishes. 

Many of the traditional forces backing the Constitutional Revolution regretted it after the event, as did many of the 

modernists who participated in the revolution of February 1979, when the outcome ran contrary to their own best 

hopes and wishes. But no argument would have made them withdraw their support before the collapse of the respective 

regimes. There were those in both revolutions who saw that total revolutionary triumph would make some, perhaps 

many, of the revolutionaries regret the results afterwards, but very few of them dared to step forward. Sheikh Fazlollah 

in the earlier case and Shahpur Bakhtiar in the later are noteworthy examples. But they were both doomed because they 

had no social base, or in other words, they were seen as having joined the side of the state, however hard they denied it. 

In a revolt against an arbitrary state, whoever wants anything short of its removal is branded a traitor. That is the logic 

of the slogan “Let him go and let there be flood afterwards!” 


The Iranian Revolution 30 Years On 

Shahrough Akhavi 

In assessing the progress of the revolution in Iran, it might be useful to recall how other 

revolutions of the 20 th century fared at the 30-year interval. Using their commence- 

ment rather than the actual seizure of power as the baseline, the 30 th anniversaries of 

major 20 th century revolutions were 1940 for Mexico, 1947 for the Soviet Union, 1964 

for China (using the “Long March” as the year), 1975 for Vietnam, 1983 for Cuba (dating 

its beginning with the attack on the Moncada Barracks), 1984 for Algeria, and 2008 

for Nicaragua. 

It was only with Lazaro Cardenas’s tenure (1934-1940) that the early land reforms demanded 

by the Zapatistas were finally pushed through. Meanwhile, many of the revolution’s 

leaders had been assassinated. In the Soviet case, Josef Stalin’s grip on power 

became so suffocating that many argue that by 1947 the promises of the Russian Revolution 

not only had not been fulfilled, but the country had even retrogressed. For China, 

1964 came shortly after the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” of 1958 and the concomitant 

radical People’s Communes policies, which were harbingers of the coming excesses 

of the Cultural Revolution launched in 1966. In Vietnam, 1975 marked the pullout of 

the American military and the unification of the country under the post-Ho Chi Minh 

(d. 1969) leadership. This marked a major political victory, but economically the country 

was in a shambles. In 1983, Cuba, despite very impressive achievements in areas 

such as health care and education, faced a precarious economic situation, thanks in 

large measure to the American embargo but also internal mismanagement. In Algeria, 

as 1984 dawned, the state’s reputation was mainly as a leader of the non-aligned movement 

and of the Group of 77 in the United Nations. But serious economic troubles accompanying 

the regime’s version of socialism undermined these diplomatic successes. 

Nicaragua was a seeming exception to these cases, as contested elections took place 

in 1990, with the Sandinista regime voluntarily relinquishing power to a coalition of 

bourgeois political parties. In 2006 Daniel Ortega was elected President, marking the 

return of the Sandinista leader to power. The Citizen Power Councils introduced under 

his leadership proved controversial, but on the whole the society seemed to be moving 

away from the politics of violence. 

What about the Islamic Republic of Iran? Regionally, it has become a leading power, but 

this is not due to the efforts of the leadership. It has instead resulted from the Americanled 

invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which removed the Iranian government’s two 

major regional enemies: the Ba‘th and the Taliban. So far, Iran’s nuclear program has 


Dr. Shahrough Akhavi, University 

of South Carolina 

23

Akhavi... 

rattled the West and Israel, and the Arab states also are unhappy about it. So far, threats from the United States and Israel 

have not resulted in armed conflict, but internal sabotage through the infiltration of “black ops” detachments and 

unmanned aircraft strikes are frequently rumored to have occurred or to be in store. 

However, it is in internal developments that the Iranian Revolution faces its major shortcomings and failures on its 30 th 

anniversary. The ever-widening gap between state and society is no secret to observers. This gap was a serious problem 

in the late Pahlavi period. Although it was temporarily narrowed in the early post-revolutionary period (due in significant 

measure to Iraq’s invasion of Iran, which caused regime opponents to “rally to the flag”), it grew dramatically when 

the Khomeinists launched a kulturkrieg against the intellectuals and the universities after June 1981, a struggle that 

continues today. This has led to serious defections not only on the part of the secular-but-religious-minded intellectuals 

— such as ‘Abd al-Karim Surush, Akbar Ganji, and Sa‘id Hajjarian — but also by leading thinkers of the traditional 

seminaries, such as Muhsin Kadivar and ‘Abdallah Nuri among lower ranking seminarians, and Mahdi Ha‘iri (d. 1999), 

Sadiq Ruhani, and Husayn ‘Ali Muntaziri among senior clerics. As for secular-oriented intellectuals, they too have faced 

intimidation, though some, such as film directors, have been given a surprising degree of latitude. 

The several governments since 1979 have failed in their promises to diversify the econ- 

The several governomy 

and thus end the country’s over-dependence on oil. Over time, the economy has ments since 1979 

performed poorly. The current regime had staked its reputation on improving the lives have failed in their 

of the masses, but, if anything, it has proven itself more incompetent than its predeces- promises to diversors. 

The Khomeinists have reacted by clinging even more tightly to power. The leader, sify the economy 

‘Ali Khamane‘i, in advance of the next presidential elections (now scheduled for June and thus end the 

2009), has tried to pre-empt the outcome by telling the current incumbent, Mahmud country’s over-dependence 

on oil. 

Ahmadinejad, to prepare for another term in office. The June 2009 voting will mark the 

tenth presidential election since 1980, suggesting a degree of institutionalization. But in 

fact it seems that the pre-determining of the outcome of such elections remains an abiding issue. This is not to suggest 

that sometimes presidential outcomes do appear to be the result of an open electoral process, but this is the exception 

(for example, the presidential elections of 1997 and 2001). 

However, dramatic improvements have been shown in literacy; advances in health care are evident, and in principle, 

women are not barred from high office. In the early 1980’s Khomeini issued a fatwa against factory owners who were 

trying to deny female employees maternity leave and thus sided with women’s economic rights. Recently, it has been 

noted in the press that the judicial authorities have ruled that, at least for now, the capital sentence of stoning be suspended 

until exemplary justice becomes not just the norm but the reality, so that its violation would be inexcusable. 

Nevertheless, the balance sheet in regard to human rights is strongly negative. An estimated 150 newspapers have been 

shut down since the revolution, leading public figures are routinely harassed and imprisoned, the authorities arbitrarily 

reject candidates for office (even those whom they permitted to run in earlier campaigns), and they send armed thugs 


Akhavi... 

into people’s homes, places of work, classrooms, and open assembly venues to wreak havoc in defense of the absolute 

mandate of the jurist (Velayet-e Faqih). Perhaps, despite certain achievements, it is the fate of all revolutions to suffer 

Thermidorean reactions, as Crane Brinton once noted. 1 This could be said to varying 

degrees of the Mexican, Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Algerian, and Nicara- The Iranian 

guan revolutions. Although a hallmark of Thermidor is the end of the extreme brutality Revolution is 30 

years old, but it still 

of the reign of terror and virtue, another characteristic is the return to the authoritarian 

suffers a plethora 

excesses of the past. For its part, the Iranian Revolution is 30 years old, but it still suffers 

of “infantile disor- 

a plethora of “infantile disorders.” Thermidor is “alive and well” in the Islamic Republic ders.” 

of Iran. It is its society that is the loser. 

1. The term “Thermidor” refers to the revolt against the excesses of the French Revolution. See Crane Brinton’s classic study 

The Anatomy of Revolution, revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1965). 


25

The Three Paradoxes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 

Abbas Milani 

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is an event defined as much by its ironies and paradoxes 

as by its novelties and cruelties. 

It was, by scholarly near-consensus, the most “popular revolution” in modern times — 

almost 11% of the population participated in it, compared to the approximate 7% and 

9% of the citizens who took part in the French and Russian revolutions. As a concept, 

revolution is itself a child of modernity, in that it revolves around the idea that legiti- 

mate power can emanate only from a social contract consecrated by the general will of 

Abbas Milani is the Hamid 

a sovereign people. Before the rise of modernity and the idea of the natural rights of and Christina Moghadam 

human beings, “revolution” as a word had no political connotation and simply referred Director of Iranian Studies 

to the movement of celestial bodies. The word took on its new political meaning — the 

at Stanford University where 

he is also a Research Fellow 

sudden, often violent, structural change in the nature and distribution of power and at the Hoover Institution. 

privilege — when the idea of a citizenry (imbued with natural rights, including the right His most recent book, Emi- 

to decide who rules over them) replaced the medieval idea of “subjects” (a passive popunent Persians: The Men and 

Women who Made Modern 

lace, bereft of rights, deemed needful of the guardianship of an aristocracy or royalty). 

Iran, 1941-1979 (two volumes) 

was just published by 

In Iran, despite the requisite popular agency of a revolution, events in 1979 paradoxi- Syracuse University Press. 

cally gave rise to a regime wherein popular sovereignty was denigrated by the regime’s 

founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as a colonial construct, created to undermine 

the Islamic concept of umma (or spiritual community). In Ayatollah Khomeini’s 

treatise on Islamic government, the will of the people is subservient to the dictates of 

the divine, as articulated by the Supreme Leader. In this sense, his concept of an Islamic 

Revolution is an oxymoron and its concomitant idea of Islamic government — velayate 

faqih, or rule of the Jurist — is irreconcilable with the modern democratic ideal of 

popular sovereignty. On the contrary, velayat-e faqih posits a population in need of a 

guardian, much as minors need guardians. The people are, in other words, “subjects,” not 

citizens. On the other hand, he called the same populace to a revolution —historically, 

the defiant act of a citizenry cognizant of its ability and right to demand a new social 

contract. The most popular of all “modern revolutions” then led to the creation of a state 

whose constitution places absolute power in the hand of an unelected, unimpeachable 

man, and whose basic political philosophy posits people as subjects and pliable tools of 

the Faqih. If this constitutes the philosophical paradox of the Islamic Revolution, there 

is also a stark historic paradox evident in its evolution. 

The Islamic Revolution was in a sense a replay of Iran’s first assay at a democratic con- 


Milani... 

stitutional government, one that took place in the course of the 1905-07 “Constitutional Revolution.” At that time, a coalition 

of secular intellectuals, enlightened Shi‘ite clergy, bazaar merchants, the rudiments of a working class, and even 

some members of the landed gentry came together to topple the Oriental Despotism of the Qajar kings and replace it 

with a monarchy whose power was limited by a constitution (Mashruteh). Indeed, the new constitution emulated one 

of the European models of a liberal democratic polity, one that allowed for elections and separation of powers, yet had 

a monarch as the head of the state. In those years, the most ideologically cohesive and powerful opposition to this new 

democratic paradigm was spearheaded by Ayatollah Nouri — a Shi‘ite zealot who dismissed modern, democratically 

formulated constitutions as the faulty and feeble concoctions of “syphilitic men.” Instead, he suggested relying on what 

he considered the divine infinite wisdom of God, manifest in Shari’a (Mashrua’). So powerful were the advocates of the 

constitutional form of democracy that Nouri became the only ayatollah in Iran’s modern history to be executed on the 

order (fatwa) of fellow ayatollahs. For decades, in Iran’s modern political discourse, Nouri’s name was synonymous with 

the reactionary political creed of despots who sought their legitimacy in Shi‘ite Shari’a. 

In a profoundly paradoxical twist of politics, almost 70 years later, the same coalition 

of forces that created the constitutional movement, coalesced once again, this time to 

topple the Shah’s authoritarian rule. Each of the social classes constituting that coalition 

had, by the 1970s, become stronger, and more politically experienced. Nevertheless, 

they chose as their leader Ayatollah Khomeini, a man who espoused an even more 

radical version of Shari’a-based politics than the one proposed by Nouri. While Nouri 

had simply talked of a government based on Shari’a (Mashrua’), Khomeini now advocated 

the absolute rule of a man whose essential claim to power rested in his mastery 

of Shari’a, and for whom Sharia was not the end but a means of power. In the decade 

before the revolution, some secular Iranian intellectuals like al-Ahmad, imbued with 

the false certitudes of a peculiar brand of radical anti-colonial politics paved the way 

for this kind of clerical regime by “rehabilitating” Nouri and offering a revisionist view 

of Iranian history wherein the clergy emerged as leaders of the all-important, over-determined 

anti-colonial struggle. It mattered little to these intellectuals that some forms 

of anti-colonialism — like that of Nouri and his later cohorts — were rooted in pious 

xenophobia and not progressive nationalism. 

Finally, the “Islamic Revolution” and the ultimate creation of clerical absolutism instead 

of a democratic policy was paradoxical in light of the fact that it took place in the 1970s, 

when the Third and Fourth Waves of Democracy had begun. The late 19th Century 

witnessed the first democratic wave, and the years after the Second World War and the 

collapse of the British Empire ushered in the Second Wave. The gradual decline of authoritarian regimes like those of 

Spain and Portugal, and the lost luster of Soviet totalitarianism embodied the Third and Fourth Waves. Some promised 

the “End of History,” or at least the End of Ideology, while others celebrated the claim that the age of liberal democ- 


In the decade before 

the revolution, 

some secular 

Iranian intellectuals 

like al-Ahmad, 

imbued with the 

false certitudes of 

a peculiar brand of 

radical anti-colonial 

politics paved the 

way for this kind 

of clerical regime 

by “rehabilitating” 

Nouri and offering 

a revisionist view 

of Iranian history 

wherein the clergy 

emerged as leaders 

of the all-important,over-determined 

anti-colonial 

struggle. 

27

Milani... 

racy was inevitably and irrevocably upon us. But Ayatollah Khomeini fought against this tide of history and erected a 

pseudo-totalitarian state founded on the divine edicts of God and the absolute wisdom of the Faqih. This last, and still 

lasting paradox of the “Islamic revolution,” will also bring about its end. The century-old coalition for democracy still 

awaits the realization of its dream. 


The Revolutionary Legacy: A Contested and Insecure Polity 

Farideh Farhi 

Islamic Iran will enter its 30th year with almost as much political noise as it generated at 

its inception. On the one hand, Iran’s nuclear program and the confrontation it has engendered 

are daily reminders of the regional and global dimensions of Iran’s revolution. 

On the other hand, the incessant squabbling among various branches of the government 

as well as among different political factions point to the fact that, more than anything 

else, the revolution was about an end to a one-man dominated political system. 

The noise persists because of domestic quarrels over the nature of Iran’s relationship to 

the world, particularly to its sole remaining superpower, as well as to itself. The revolution 

of 1979 was for most Iranians a double-edged affair, involving aspirations for 

freedom (azadi) and national sovereignty or independence (esteqlal). These aspirations 

continue to shape and haunt the Islamic Republic. No matter how one looks at Iran 

today, there can be no denying that they remain at best partially fulfilled. More importantly, 

they continue to be played against each other. In the name of external threats, 

national security, and sovereignty, critical expressions are silenced while unhindered 

and, at times, unhinged political competition has turned democratic institutions such as 

elections into instruments of intra-elite rivalry rather than expressions of national will. 

The shaping of post-revolutionary Iran through its search for independence is manifestly 

reflected in its almost pathological insistence on national sovereignty and being 

treated with respect in the face of international pressures. The haunting comes in the 

form of “strategic loneliness.” Tehran is indeed betrothed to “neither West nor East,” as 

its founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini insisted nearly 30 years ago, but does not rest 

easily in that position. 

This does not mean that it is denied a seat at the table. In fact, as recently as July 2008 

Tehran was host to the 15th annual ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. 

But its desire to receive support for its noncompliant posture received half-hearted support 

from other non-aligned countries worried about their names being too closely 

identified with a country in direct confrontation with a rather unforgiving superpower. 

Tehran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy is repeatedly reaffirmed as “the basic and inalienable 

right of all states, to develop [and] research, [the] production and use of atomic 

energy for peaceful purposes,” 1 but only a few countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, 

and Syria are willing to condemn the three standing UN Security Council resolutions 

1. Final Document of the XV Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Movement held in 

Tehran, July 27-30. 


Farideh Farhi is an Independent 

Scholar and Affiliate 

Graduate Faculty at the University 

of Hawai’i at Manoa. 

29

Farhi... 

against Iran. 

Regional developments — including the removal of Saddam Husayn and the Taliban, challenges facing the United 

States in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the increased clout of Hizbullah in its domestic environment — have improved the 

chances of finding natural allies in the region and, as such, have led to enhanced Iranian confidence. Yet Iran continues 

to wear its independence or non-alignment uneasily. Rather, Iran’s leaders insist on telling their domestic audience and 

proclaiming to the world repeatedly that Iran is indeed a sovereign nation and a poke in the eye of the powerful. Almost 

30 years after the proclaimed “victory” of the Islamic Revolution, the need to reiterate that, “the only path to victory is 

through resistance and steadfastness” persists. 2 

Why this is so certainly has much to do with the external pressures that continue to 

be exerted on Iran in order to contain its regional influence. It is true that the United 

States has never been able to come to terms with the loss of one of its most important 

pillars of support in the region, and US policies since the revolution have aimlessly 

and not very effectively vacillated between containment and regime change, with occasional 

minor and unsuccessful forays into engagement. But the reality is that Iran 

also remains conflicted internally over the direction of the country because, along with 

its anti-Americanism, the revolution also brought into existence a polity based on contestation 

and pluralism, regulated through a system of controlled and yet competitive 

elections. 

To be sure, Iran continues to demonstrate amply that the presence of meaningful intra-elite struggles for power is not 

sufficient to make democracy sustainable, even if transfers of power occur through elections. The absence of rule of law 

and corruption among the elite have in fact turned political contestation into instruments that undermine democratic 

institutions such as elections, which are transformed into mechanisms of intra-elite competition rather than an expression 

or projection of popular will. Nevertheless it is significant that this political competition continues to keep the 

aspirations of the revolution alive and part of Iran’s contemporary political discourse. 

Thirty years after the revolution, Iran is not a consolidated democratic state as the revolution promised. Neither is it a 

consolidated authoritarian one. And in this unconsolidated authoritarian environment, the search for national sovereignty 

and independence is a revolutionary legacy that cannot be simply wished away. This is so not merely because the 

idea still occupies the minds of a good segment of the Iranian elite. It is more so because it is a frame that can be utilized 

as a driving force for a more assertive security-oriented and nationalistic disposition that is then used as a means to 

silence or sideline domestic rivals by accusing them of being members of a fifth column or soft on enemies. 

It should be noted, however, that in Iran’s contested political environment, this security orientation is merely a policy al- 

2. Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, speech given to Iranian officials on July 30, 2008. 

Almost 30 years after 

the proclaimed 

“victory” of the 

Islamic Revolution, 

the need to reiterate 

that, “the only 

path to victory is 

through resistance 

and steadfastness” 

persists. 

30 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org

Farhi... 

ternative framed by the historical aspiration for complete independence. As witnessed 

during the presidencies of both ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, 

this policy alternative can be tempered or even partially abandoned in the direction 

of a more conciliatory approach, emphasizing dialogue and détente, but only if the 

Islamic Republic does not feel directly threatened. As such, in its rightward or securityoriented 

reaction to the external threats of the past few years, the Islamic Republic is 

not acting any differently than other countries with contested political environments. 

On revolutionary Iran’s 30 th anniversary, it must then be considered truly unfortunate 

that Washington’s aggressive interest in isolating Iran came after several years of attempted 

conciliatory foreign policy on the part of Khatami’s government. In Iran’s contested 

political environment, the failure to show results effectively paved the way for the 

ascendance of the belief that the more conciliatory foreign policy practiced during the 

reformist era was perceived as weakness by “enemies” and led to calls for more, not fewer 

Iranian concessions. Hence, the common refrain among current decision-makers in 

Iran these days that enemies only understand the language of power and strength. The 

reality, though, is that despite the contemporary currency or pretense of a muscular foreign policy, Iran’s politics remain 

underwritten by both contestation and insecurity. 


The failure to show 

results effectively 

paved the way for 

the ascendance of 

the belief that the 

more conciliatory 

foreign policy practiced 

during the 

reformist era was 

perceived as weakness 

by “enemies” 

and led to calls for 

more, not fewer 

Iranian concessions. 

31

The Iranian Revolution at 30: Still Unpredictable 

Charles Kurzman 

How is it possible that the Islamic Republic of Iran has lasted 30 years? Some of the 

revolutionaries themselves are probably surprised by this longevity. In 1979, they wrote 

a constitution that enshrined Imam Ruhollah Khomeini as the leader of the Islamic Republic. 

Surely they didn’t expect him to live another 30 years, past age 100, but their insistence 

on Khomeini’s unique characteristics made it unlikely that anybody else would 

be qualified to succeed him. 

Sure enough, after Khomeini’s death, the constitution had to be rewritten to allow Hojjat 

al-Islam ‘Ali Khamene’i to serve as head of state. He did not have the scholarly credentials 

to serve as a top-ranking cleric (marja‘-e taqlid), much less to overrule other topranking 

clerics, as Khomeini had been constitutionally permitted to do, yet the Islamic 

Republic survived. 

Most international observers didn’t expect the Islamic Republic to last this long. They 

have been talking about the regime being in crisis since the first year of the revolution, 

and with good reason. The regime has weathered innumerable crises, from the assassination 

of much of the top leadership in 1981 to Khamene’i’s recent stare-down with 

President Mahmud Ahmadinejad over interim cabinet ministers. 1 

The most ardent supporters of the Islamic Republic have encouraged this discourse of 

permanent crisis. Every month, hard-line propagandists denounce some new, unpleasant 

economic or political development as an indication of a global conspiracy against 

Islam that must be prevented at all costs from undermining the Iranian people’s fervent 

support of their Islamic Republic. All opposition figures, even the mildest liberals, are 

said to pose an imminent threat to the survival of the regime. If the regime is so easily 

threatened, it seems hard to imagine how it could have survived so long. 

Of course, paranoids are sometimes correct. The Islamic Republic of Iran has faced 

and survived a concerted campaign for “regime change” by the world’s greatest superpower, 

the United States. In late 1995, Newt Gingrich, then the Speaker of the US House 

of Representatives, insisted on $18 million for “covert” operations against the Islamic 

1. According to political scientist Farideh Farhi, Ahmadinejad tried to keep several interim 

appointees past the constitutional limit of three months, in order to avoid having them 

rejected by parliament — Khamene’i told him to obey the constitution. 

Charles Kurzman, author of 

The Unthinkable Revolution 

in Iran (Harvard University 

Press, 2004), teaches sociology 

at the University of North 

Carolina, Chapel Hill. 


Kurzman... 

Republic. 22 If journalist Seymour Hersh is to be believed, the Bush Administration increased this funding to $400 mil- 

lion in late 2007. Thus far the American campaign has stopped short of invasion, but it would not be surprising to 

discover when relevant US government documents are declassified that some funding found its way to the secessionist 

groups responsible for recent terrorist attacks in Iran’s farthest provinces. The Islamic Republic has survived this too. 

In addition, the Islamic Republic has survived the failure of some of its most cherished 

goals to come to fruition. For example, it failed to export its revolution to other Muslim 

societies, despite the wave of international Islamic support that Khomeini enjoyed 

for having overthrown the Shah. Muslim activists visited Iran from around the world, 

eager to replicate the miracle of the Islamic Revolution back home. Within a decade, 

these activists viewed their trips with embarrassment. It is difficult now to imagine that 

many Sunni Muslims once looked on the Iranian experience as a model to reproduce. I 

recall walking past the Iranian community center in Sarajevo some years ago and seeing 

posters of an aged Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Chairman of the Guardian Council — 

showcasing a distinctly un-hip spokesperson for the Islamic Republic. “Have you even 

been in there?” I asked a devout young Bosnian Muslim. He scrunched up his face at 

the absurdity of the suggestion. Iran had provided crucial weapons to keep Sarajevans 

from being slaughtered in the civil war a few years earlier, but even that did not win 

the Islamic Republic many fans. 

The Islamic Republic also failed to overthrow Saddam Husayn, a goal to which it devoted several years and tens of thousands 

of martyrs in the late 1980s. Numerous regimes have fallen as a result of lesser military misadventures, but the 

Islamic Republic survived. Even more galling than their failure to depose Saddam, Iranians watched the United States 

make quick work of the Iraqi military in the wars of 1991 and 2003. 

The Islamic Republic even was forced to acknowledge the failure of Islamic governance, one of its primary reasons for 

existence, with the formation of the Council for the Discernment of the Expediency of the System, more commonly 

known as the Expediency Council. The purpose of the Council, as stipulated in a constitutional amendment in 1989, 

is to overrule the Guardian Council when necessary for the interests of the state. Since the Guardian Council’s constitutional 

role is to assess the Islamic propriety of parliamentary legislation, the Expediency Council’s oversight of the 

Guardian Council means that judgments about Islam no longer have the final word. Expediency —maslahat, in Persian, 

meaning public welfare — has the final word. In Asghar Schirazi’s account of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, 

this amendment was not the first time that the principle of public interest was permitted to trump acknowledged Islamic 

principles, but it was the first time that this move had been announced and permanently institutionalized. Khomeini 

prepared Iranians for the change in a famous open letter of 1988 that identified the interests of the Iranian state as the 

primary obligation of Islamic faith, above such secondary obligations as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage. The Islamic 

2. The funding was publicized before it was signed into law. 


Khomeini prepared 

Iranians for the 

change in a famous 

open letter of 1988 

that identified the 

interests of the 

Iranian state as the 

primary obligation 

of Islamic faith, 

above such secondary 

obligations as 

prayer, fasting, and 

pilgrimage. 

33

Kurzman... 

Republic has survived this official downgrading of its commitment to Islamic principles. 

It also has survived the failure of its promotion of popular piety. A 1975 survey found that 56% of Iranians attended 

communal prayers at least once a week; by 2000, the rate had declined to 40% (among young adults born after the revolution, 

the rate was 31%). The same poll in 2000 found that less than half of the sample felt that the religious establishment 

gives answers to social problems — one of the lowest ratios in any of the 14 Muslim societies polled by the World 

Values Survey over the past decade. This survey and others show that Iranians are generally devout, but their devotion 

seems to be more personal than political, contrary to the efforts of the Islamic Republic. 

In sum, Iran has become just another partly-industrialized, partly-democratic, partlycorrupt 

Third World country that has unusually tense relations with the United States 

and Europe. Its Islamic Republic has survived in part because regimes often survive for 

decades after their initial mandate and ideals have disappeared. When offered an alternative, 

such as the reform movement that held such promise in the late 1990s, a large 

majority of Iranians displayed an eagerness for political change. Even then, Iranians 

were hardly revolutionary — in 2000, the Iranian sample for the World Values Survey 

rated their own political system relatively positively, averaging 5.84 on a scale of 1 to 10. 

Among young adults, the average for the survey was virtually the same (5.76). 

Iran has become 

just another partlyindustrialized,partly-democratic,partly-corrupt 

Third 

World country that 

has unusually tense 

relations with the 

United States and 

Europe. 

I published a book several years ago arguing that the Iranian Revolution had been inherently 

unpredictable. There are no prerequisites for revolution that would allow us to anticipate its occurrence — it 

can happen at any time, whenever dissatisfied people come to believe that their compatriots will join them in protest. 

Soon after the book was published, a colleague asked me whether I would help make a new revolution in Iran. You never 

know when an entrenched dictator might be overthrown, he told me excitedly, citing my book as evidence. Khamene’i 

could go the way of Romania’s Ceausescu, who was abandoned and executed in a matter of weeks after a relatively minor 

event triggered a massive uprising. Apart from the ethical problems of the proposition — who am I to get involved 

in Iranian politics? — I drew a different conclusion. Revolutions may occur at any moment, but they are very rare. Betting 

on a regime’s survival is almost always a safer wager than betting on it being overthrown. And if my bet is wrong, 

and the regime is overthrown, then that only confirms my analysis that revolutions are unpredictable. 


The Islamic Revolution Derailed 

Hossein Bashiriyeh 

The execution of the original project of the Islamic Revolution in Iran has been repeatedly 

deferred for various reasons. More recently it is the increasing secularization 

of society under theocratic rule that is hindering the implementation of the original 

project despite a monopolization of political power by core elite factions. No doubt the 

clerical and non-clerical fundamentalist groups and cliques have more or less dominated 

the political scene since the revolution, but the ideological aim of the revolution 

was not just to usurp political power at any price but to try to build an “Islamic” state 

and society. It is something to use religion as a political tool for capturing power, but 

quite another to seek to implement the principles of that religion. More often however, 

in real life, the weapon of religion proves to be very useful for gaining power, although 

its principles create trouble for “religious” politicians. 

The original project of the Islamic Revolution as laid out in Ayatollah Khomeini’s works 

and speeches aimed at a thorough Islamicization of politics, state, society, culture, law, 

and economy. However, the revolution was derailed from this projected course for a 

number of reasons including power struggles, internal conflicts, inability of core Islamic 

elites to establish their hegemony, the war with Iraq, attempts at postwar reconstruction, 

and the ascendancy of reformist or moderate factions. 

The period of the Provisional Government led by Mehdi Bazargan (1979 to early 1981) 

was marked by an uneasy alliance between extremist-Islamic and moderate-liberal factions. 

The former favored a fusion of religion and politics and a theocratic state ruled by 

the clergy, while the latter advocated liberal democracy and separation of religion from 

government. The dual and somewhat contradictory nature of the constitution adopted 

in 1979 reflected that uneasy alliance. The specific conditions under this situation led to 

a transition to theocracy rather than to democracy. 

Between 1981 and 1988, the ruling elite was much more unified, but the government 

was preoccupied with the war effort requiring ad hoc policies and decision-making. Although 

the project of Islamification continued, there were other more urgent issues for 

the government to attend to. As before, the clerical ruling elite differed over a number 

of important issues ranging from cultural and economic policies to how to interpret the 

laws of Islam. The clerical-fundamentalist rightist faction, which predominated in the 

Council of Guardians, supported capitalist economic policies along with strict cultural 


Dr. Hossein Bashiriyeh is 

Professor of Political Science 

at Tehran University and 

Visiting Professor of Political 

Science at the Maxwell School 

of Syracuse University. 

35

Bashiriyeh... 

and social control. The clerical Left, which had the majority in the Third Majlis, supported state control of the economy 

and limited cultural and social freedom. Given the war conditions, Ayatollah Khomeini had to shift his support from 

the right to the left and back again. 

The postwar reconstruction period (1989-97) witnessed yet another derailment from the original course of the Revolution 

and the virtual marginalization of the core fundamentalist elite. As a result, the first signs of fundamentalist opposition 

to the regime appeared in this period. While the traditionalist rightist factions were dominant in the Council 

of Guardians and the Majlis, a new modernist rightist faction emerged and dominated the executive. The Kargozaran 

(Reconstructionists) supported and implemented neo-liberal policies of privatization and during the Fifth Majlis elections 

competed with the Traditional Rightists. Neo-liberal policies paved the way for a degree of social secularization 

and liberalization, which was obviously disliked by the fundamentalist and extremist factions. 

At the same time, the end of war mobilization and neo-liberal policies led to a decrease 

in state subsidies, greater unemployment, working class unrest, higher inflation, a decline 

in ideology, the political activation of various social forces, such as intellectuals, 

journalists and students, and the outbreak of a number of popular mass rebellions 

(especially in Mashad, Islamabad, and Qazvin). All this paved the way for the victory 

of the reformist factions (the older leftist factions and a number of newly rising new 

middle class political parties) who supported Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential 

elections. 

From the perspective 

of the core fundamentalist 

elite, 

the period of the reformist 

government 

(1997-2005) was the 

sharpest deviation 

from the supposedly 

original project 

of the Revolution. 

From the perspective of the core fundamentalist elite, the period of the reformist government (1997-2005) was the 

sharpest deviation from the supposedly original project of the Revolution. During this period, the reformist parties 

succeeded in gaining control of the executive and the Parliament in three consecutive elections (1997 presidential, 1999 

parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections). On the other hand the core elite retained control of the Office of Leadership, 

the Council of Guardian, the Council of Expediency, the Judiciary, and the Revolutionary Guards. In the conflict 

that ensued between the two blocs, the Council of Guardians vetoed 111 out of 297 bills passed by the reformist Sixth 

Majles in support of civil liberties, political participation, women’s rights, ban on torture, press freedom, labor rights, 

public welfare policies, and so on. 

However, no structural change in the political system occurred during this period for a number of reasons. First, there 

was not much real elite ideological disunity; the hegemonic elite faction continued to control the system. Second, the 

reformist factions failed to develop strong social organizations despite widespread popular support. The nascent civil 

society, rising after a long period of social atomization, was itself under constant pressure from the hegemonic factions. 

Third, the armed forces were united and loyal to the hegemonic faction in power. 

The inability of the reformist Khatami government to bring about change led to increasing disillusionment and dis- 


Bashiriyeh... 

satisfaction among its mainly urban educated middle class popular support base, especially intellectuals, students and 

government employees. Meanwhile, the right-wing, hard-line factions associated with the core elite were seeking to mobilize 

the lower classes in town and country, promising them better living conditions than the reformists had been able 

to provide. Already in 2003, they had managed to win in the city council elections and replace the fractious reformists. 

The core elite dominant in the Office of Leadership and the Council of Guardians had already made its mind not to let 

the main reformist parties enter the Majlis again. 

ToWARDS THE IMPlEMENTATIoN oF THE oRIGINAl PRoJECT? 

The presidential elections of 2005 ensured the complete ascendancy of the core elite 

factions and the ousting of the reformists from the political system. This marked the 

first time that a high degree of structural and ideological unity within the ruling elites 

had emerged since the revolution. All three branches of government as well as the major 

clerical institutions were now occupied by a coalition of conservative, hard-line 

factions. The degree of harmony between the executive and the legislative branches of 

government was unprecedented. A new configuration of revolutionary extremist factions 

came into existence, forming a “Third Force,” i.e. the Abadgaran coalition, clearly 

distinct from the older conservative factions. The political presence of the Revolutionary 

Guards (IRGC) and the Basij militia as part of the social base of the new political 

elite has been quite noticeable since. Deputies with backgrounds in the IRGC won a 

third of the parliamentary seats. Extremist and ultra-conservative groups such as the 

Hojjatiyeh and Haqqani Seminary School factions as well as the Ansare Hezbollah and 

Society for the Defense of Revolutionary Values supported the new elite configuration. 

To a considerable degree, a militarization of theocracy has since taken place with the 

increasing political involvement of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij. 

The positions and policies adopted by the new ruling group since 2005 can be described as attempts to implement the 

will and testament of Ayatollah Khomeini, which clearly embodies the original project of the Islamic Revolution. The 

new policy positions such as attempts at the disruption of neo-liberal economic policies and the banking system, increasing 

cultural control, restrictions imposed on civil society, and greater militancy in foreign policy can be interpreted 

as attempts to implement the original project of the revolution. 

But power consolidation, elite unification, and the attempt at reconsolidation of the revolution and implementation of its 

project are taking place under socio-cultural conditions and circumstances very much different from those existing in 

the early years of the revolution. The major difference lies in the demise of the politically mobile and active mass society 

of the 1980’s and the rise of an immobile and passive mass society resulting from growing anomie and a widening gap 

between public opinion and the official ideology. Various factors have been responsible for the erosion of ideology and 


But power consolidation, 

elite 

unification, and the 

attempt at reconsolidation 

of the 

revolution and implementation 

of its 

project are taking 

place under sociocultural 

conditions 

and circumstances 

very much different 

from those existing 

in the early years of 

the Revolution. 

37

Bashiriyeh... 

the development of a passive and anomic mass society, including the increasing secularization of society, the conclusion 

of the war with Iraq, the new turns in economic policy, and the disappointing results of the Reform Movement. 

Some field research and surveys recently carried out by a number of public and private research organizations clearly 

demonstrate the widening gap between official-religious ideology and public opinion and practices. In particular, the 

National Survey of Values and Attitudes conducted by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, on the basis of a sample of 

16,824 people, found: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

a decline in religious beliefs and practices especially among the new generation; 

growing secularization of private life; 

increasing use of cultural products prohibited by the ruling clergy; 

growing political distrust and cynicism; 

decline in the feelings of social solidarity; and 

widespread feelings of political inefficacy; 

Thus the most important characteristic of the present time can be described as an increasing secularization of society 

under a theocratic regime, the most unfavorable grounds for the implementation of the revolutionary project. It seems 

that the social secularization trend is expanding as a result of increasing development in terms of education, communication, 

and modernization. Thus, like all ideological revolutionary projects, the Islamic ideological project has found it 

very difficult to reconstruct culture and identity in a society undergoing a fast process of change and secularization. 


The Revolution’s Mixed Balance Sheet 

Fereshtehsadat Etefaghfar 

Each year during the anniversary of the revolution, which in Iran is called Dahe-ye 

Mobarakeh Fajr (The Sacred Ten Days), the Islamic regime leaves no doubt in Iranians’ 

minds about the causes of the Islamic Revolution. The ten-day celebration starts on 

January 31, the day that the late Imam Khomeini flew from Paris to Tehran and ends on 

February 10 when the powerful Pahlavi regime was destroyed by a huge popular uprising. 

Among many national and international events, including the arrival of hundreds 

of foreign visitors to Iran to observe the general mood of happiness and excitement, the 

Islamic leaders are full of praise for the Iranian people because they have successfully 

strived towards achieving the revolution’s objectives. But many Iranians, particularly 

the younger generations, do not necessarily agree that the revolution’s objectives have 

been attained. 

The principal motto of the revolution was Esteghlal, Azadi e Jumhury Islami (indepen- 

dence, freedom, and the establishment of an Islamic republic). Based on that, Iranian 

leaders regard the main objectives of the Revolution as fulfilled. After all, Iranians were 

opposed to the ex-Shah’s close ties with the West and in particular with the United 

States and Israel. They wanted a regime which was much more independent of the 

United States. They also demanded freedom and opposed the ex-Shah’s autocratic and 

repressive style of government. Finally, they believed that Islam was capable of delivering 

a more humane, egalitarian, and democratic political system; hence they supported 

the idea of an Islamic Republic as opposed to the Shah’s dictatorship. 

But is present Iranian society more open and more democratic than during the Pahlavi 

period? Opponents of the Islamic Republic, particularly the royalists, perceive the current 

regime to be undemocratic, authoritarian, and brutal. They condemn its human 

rights record as one of the worst in the world. In contrast, the leaders of the Islamic 

Republic and their supporters boast about Islamic Iran’s democratic achievements as 

well as its human rights record. Apart from the Islamic Revolution’s “achievements” or 

“failures” there are other areas where the same dispute arises. Among the most intensely 

disputed issues are female participation and women rights. Again, opinions are deeply 

divided between the opponents and supporters of the regime. Some women’s rights 

campaigners maintain that Iran has actually moved backward. 

One mistake which both the supporters and the opponents of the Islamic Revolution 

make is that they do not consider the changes in the context of Iranian society. Instead, 


Dr. Fereshtehsadat Etefaghfar, 

lecturer, Islamic 

Azad University, Shar-e Rey 

Branch 

39

Etefaghfar... 

they maintain a purely political orientation. Any changes, including democratic changes or changes in the status of women, 

must be considered within the social background of Iranian society itself. One of the most impressive achievements 

of the revolution has been the spread of the education. On the eve of the revolution in 1979, there were some 100,000 

students attending the country’s universities, out of which 17.5% were females. 1 Thirty years later, the number has reached 

2 million. What is even more impressive is the rise in the number of female students. In some subjects, such as Arts and 

Social Sciences, there are more female students than males. In total, female students have exceeded the number of male 

students by 54% to 46%. 2 However, the country suffers from chronic unemployment, particularly among university graduates; 

and admittedly, female graduates find it more difficult than their male counterparts to find employment. 

Nevertheless, given that more than half the country’s graduates are female, there must be a large number of women who man- 

age to find employment in the tight Iranian job market despite the various social, traditional, and legal barriers and forms of 

discrimination. In other words, as a leading female Iranian sociologist has argued, “the younger generation Iranian female 

university graduates have managed to break a number of traditional as well as institutional barriers against the women.” 3 

A similar analysis can be offered on the more sensitive issue of Iran’s human rights record and democratic development. 

Islamic Iran’s record on human rights and civil society standards are far from ideal. In 

both areas, Iran lags behind neighbors such as Turkey and Pakistan, let alone countries 

such as India, Japan, and those in the West. But at the same time, Iran compares very 

favorably with many of the countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the Persian 

Gulf states, Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and others. 

More relevant still is the comparison with pre-revolutionary Iran. It is true that the Islamic authorities close newspapers 

at their will, without much respect for legal procedures. But the degree of press freedom which Iran enjoys today is 

unprecedented. There are a few daily newspapers that can broadly be described as independent from the government. 

They criticize the hardline Ahmadinejad policies on almost every important domestic as well as international issue. 

This is indeed an unprecedented development in Iran and must be regarded as one of the most important achievements 

of the Islamic Revolution. By the same token, while it is true that elections in Iran in comparison to those held in developed 

countries cannot be described as free and fair, they represent substantial progress over those held during the 

Pahlavi era. The same is true for many other aspects of modern political development, such as freedom of expression, 

rule of law, and checks and balances on the state. 

In short, while there are serious shortcomings on a number of fundamental sociopolitical issues, there can be little 

doubt that there have been impressive achievements as well. However, it remains to be stated that the Islamic Revolution 

should have achieved far more during the past three decades. 

1. Ministry of Science and Higher Education Statistical year Book, 1978-79. 

2. Ministry of Science and Higher Education Statistical year Book, 2007-08. 

3. Jaleh Kazemi, “On the Achievements of the Iranian Female Graduates,” Goftego, Vol. 47 (July 2007). 

Is present Iranian 

society more open 

and more democratic 

than during 

the Pahlavi period? 


Between Pride and Disappointment 

Michael Axworthy 

The term revolution has become a cliché — it is in such common usage that we have 

forgotten it started its linguistic life as a metaphor. The metaphor was that of a wheel 

turning upon its axis. The idea, derived from that, is of sweeping change, reminding perhaps 

of the older, medieval idea of the wheel of fortune (to be found on the tarot card 

with that name, for example); bringing the mighty low and raising the lowly up on high. 

Like earlier revolutions, this is precisely what the Iranian Revolution did — it raised 

some up, some dramatically, who had been socially lowly before; and it brought many 

down, some catastrophically, who previously had enjoyed privileged positions. This is 

what Dickens meant when he wrote of the French Revolution that it was the best of 

times, and the worst of times. In consequence, the Iranian Revolution prompts extreme 

opinions from its critics and defenders. Is it possible to strike a balance between such 

widely varying experiences? 

When Ayatollah Khomeini returned from Paris to Tehran on February 1, 1979, he was 

greeted by enormous crowds, and a few months later, a referendum gave overwhelming 

support for his project of an Islamic republic. For those short few months of euphoria 

after the Shah’s departure, the revolution was genuinely a popular revolution, and appeared 

to be an authentic expression of the people’s will. But within a short time, as the 

reality of what Khomeini intended under the heading of the Islamic Revolution began 

to emerge, many became disillusioned. Within the country, many middle class supporters 

fell away, as newspapers were closed down, women’s rights were curtailed, and liberal 

politicians were marginalized and exiled. Outside the country, initial support for the 

removal of the Shah’s regime fell away, as the execution of the former Shah’s courtiers 

and officers continued week after week. 

Since then, for critics of the revolution, the record has grown only blacker. In the Iran- 

Iraq War (1980-88), Iranian casualties were enormous, partly because young conscripts 

were sent in waves in attacks on entrenched Iraqi forces that were normally better 

equipped. At the end of the war, thousands of political prisoners were murdered in 

prison. In more recent years, after an experiment with reform (1997-2005), the hardline 

elements of the regime have re-imposed the rigidities of the revolution’s youth, limiting 

and eroding ever more skillfully the democratic elements in the constitution. The 

economy is weak, unemployment is high, and hundreds of thousands of young Iranians 

leave the country each year (including some of the most intelligent and well educated), 

to join the millions that have left since 1979. Accusations of corruption are common, 


Michael Axworthy is a lecturer 

and Director of the 

Centre for Persian and Iranian 

Studies at the University 

of Exeter, and is the author 

of Iran: Empire of the 

Mind (Penguin). 

41

Axworthy... 

and feature in politics. The regime continues to abuse human rights and to bully and intimidate those who bravely still 

try to defend them, including dissidents like Akbar Ganji and the Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi. The regime 

has such a bad image in the West that almost anything can be laid at its door. For some, it is the prime supporter of terrorism 

in the world, an agent for destabilizing the Middle East as a whole, the hidden hand behind the insurgency in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and on track to acquire nuclear weapons. Not all these accusations are fair or well-judged, but the 

extremism of some of Iran’s politicians seems to legitimate them. 

Many Iranians, and 

even some exiles 

that bitterly oppose 

the Islamic regime, 

acknowledge that 

Iran, finally, has 

achieved real independence. 

For some Iranians at least, there is another side to the story. The revolution gave many 

people opportunities that would probably never otherwise have come their way. It removed 

one elite and replaced it with another. It placed many clergy in powerful positions, 

and reconfirmed their authority as a class — an authority that had been steadily 

eroded over the previous hundred years as their responsibilities as teachers, arbitrators, 

and judges had been removed by Westernizing reforms. The influential bazaar traders 

and artisans, often very pious and closely linked as an urban elite with the clergy, also 

benefited greatly from the revolution; in fact, some have suggested that the country has 

been largely run for their benefit. But others benefited too. Pious families from poor backgrounds, if they were lucky, 

might find that the regime trusted their fathers and sons and put them in good jobs. This was particularly the case for 

some veterans from the Iran-Iraq War. This phenomenon was also facilitated by the success of the regime in spreading 

education, finally, to all — even to the remotest villages and to women. 

For women the outcome of the revolution has been particularly paradoxical. Khomeini’s imposition of the veil meant 

that Iranian fathers felt able to let their daughters go to school. Those girls fed through the system and took to their 

educational opportunities to such an extent that over 65% of university entrants are now female, and many Iranian universities 

humanities classes are 80% or more female. Many of these educated women go on to take important jobs in the 

Iranian economy. Indeed, Iranian women are more active and visible in offices and businesses than their counterparts 

almost anywhere else in the Middle East (though many women graduates struggle, like other young Iranians, to find 

jobs). So women suffer restrictions in the dress code and at law (particularly over divorce and child custody), and are 

still kept out of many more important jobs, especially in government and in politics; but overall their position has improved 

in important ways since the revolution. Despite the many necessary caveats, the development in the social and 

economic role of women and their progress in education, in a country with a strong and deep-seated cultural respect 

for learning and intellectual attainment, is one of the positive aspects of contemporary Iran. 

Despite the many failures, disappointments, and disillusionments since the revolution — especially with respect to economic 

development, given that large numbers of Iranians still languish in poverty — many Iranians, and even some exiles 

that bitterly oppose the Islamic regime, acknowledge that Iran, finally, has achieved real independence. To appreciate 

the importance of this achievement to Iranians, one has to have some sense of the past humiliations heaped on Iran in 

the 19th century by Britain and Russia, and in the 20th century by Britain and the United States (most notably, the British 


Axworthy... 

and American-inspired coup that removed the nationalist and constitutionalist Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq 

in 1953). An important part of the revolution was the feeling that the country needed once and for all to rid itself of 

foreign influence and manipulation. In the Iran-Iraq War (the significance of which in the contemporary Iranian psyche 

can hardly be overstated), imposed on Iranians by the Iraqi invasion of September 1980, that determination was tested 

almost to destruction. But (despite feeling with some justification that it was not fighting just Iraq, but almost the whole 

world) Iran emerged from that war undefeated, with her borders upheld. There was, 

and is, a pride in this accomplishment, irrespective of support for the regime, or an 

objective judgement about whether the regime ran the war sensibly. 

The revolution and the Iran-Iraq War put Iran in a different place, and that is something 

separate and more important than the foolish confrontational populism of Mahmud 

Ahmadinejad or the cynical manipulation of politics by the ruling clique. If the West is 

to resolve its problems with Iran, whatever the difficulties of dealing with the regime, its 

representatives will have to recognize that Iran has grown up, and accord it the respect 

that they would give other serious interlocutors. If applied seriously and consistently, 

in public utterances as well as in private, that respect alone could help enormously to 

improve the situation for the better. 


If the West is to resolve 

its problems 

with Iran, whatever 

the difficulties of 

dealing with the regime, 

its representatives 

will have to 

recognize that Iran 

has grown up, and 

accord it the respect 

that they would give 

other serious interlocutors. 

43

II. Inside Iran 


Women 


45

Women and 30 Years of the Islamic Republic 

Nikki R. Keddie 

To write briefly about women in Iran since 1979 (and say something different from 

what is in my recent books Modern Iran and Women in the Middle East and my article 

on women in the December 2008 issue of Current History) is a challenge. Here I will 

stress the importance of the “two cultures” of 20th century urban Iran, the popular-bazaar 

culture and the educated elite culture, regarding women, and also the reasons for 

the unfortunate, but not unique, association of governmental reforms regarding women 

with autocratic rulers seen as tools of the United States. 

As in most countries, early and even later proponents of women’s rights in Iran came 

overwhelmingly from among the elite and educated, and saw popular class women more 

as students for their practical and academic classes than as colleagues. Unveiling, like 

other women’s rights, was primarily advocated by a few elite women until it was decreed 

by Reza Shah in 1936, and was traumatic for many. 

The modernization of women’s rights and government activities about women began 

under the Pahlavi shahs (r. 1925-1979). This comprised the opening of education at all 

levels and of some professions to women, and, most dramatically, under Muhammad 

Reza Shah with pressure from women’s groups, votes for women and major legal reforms 

in the 1967/75 Family Protection Law (FPL). 

The association of such measures with autocratic shahs and elites and with unquestioning 

imitation of the West provided fertile ground for a counter-movement based in part 

(like much of US conservatism) on literalist religion, which claimed that an unequal 

status and rights for women was based both in nature and in religious texts. In order to 

express solidarity with the popular class and religious opponents of the Shah, secularists 

and leftists joined the opposition in large numbers, and many donned chadors. They 

thought Khomeini would not exercise real power and that more secular leaders would 

win out. However, once Khomeini took power in 1979 many of the recently achieved 

rights for women were reversed. The legal situation was more complex than the simple 

pronouncement that the FPL was abrogated and the Shari‘a restored would suggest, but 

still was destructive of women’s recently won rights. 

Many popular class women had not benefited from the Pahlavi reforms and some resented 

the forced changes in behavior that they involved. Before and right after the 

Nikki R. Keddie, Professor 

Emerita of History, UClA 

is the author of numerous 

works, including Women in 

the Middle East (Princeton, 

2007) and Modern Iran 

(yale, 2006). 


Keddie... 

1979 revolution, Western feminists were prominent in attempts to protest Khomeini’s attempts at reveiling and limiting 

women’s legal rights, but these women did not know enough about Iran to accommodate the views of those women 

who did not advocate wholesale Westernization. Regarding women’s status as on other matters, the deep class division 

in religio-political outlook remained strong. To some degree it still does, though more women have become urbanized 

and educated and want more freedoms. 

The very efforts of the government to involve women in defense during the Iran-Iraq war, to educate girls at all levels, 

and, after 1989, to promote family planning and reduce births helped awaken many girls and women to new ideas. 

Women also increasingly resisted reversals in women’s rights. What were formerly only elite ideas about gender and 

women’s rights spread to the popular classes, sometimes in the form of what has been called “Islamic feminism.” Several 

women began to give gender egalitarian interpretations of the Qur’an and Islamic traditions in place of the dominant 

conservative interpretations. 

In broad terms, the decade before Khomeini’s death in 1989 was a period of strengthen- 

Many young elite 

ing Khomeinism, while 1990-2000 was a period of pragmatism and some reform under 

women turned to 

presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, with partial agreement and partial resistance from 

personal and sexual 

Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamene’i. Restrictions on girls’ and women’s public behavior and means of defiance. 

dress and on the press, including a renewed women’s press, were gradually loosened, especially 

in the better-off neighborhoods of big cities. A recrudescence of conservatism, especially enforced in the streets 

by popular class men and their organizations, has come since about 2001, and increased after the election of President 

Ahmadinejad in 2005, who represents a new generation of Neo-conservatives with deep ties to the veterans of the Iran- 

Iraq War and the Revolutionary Guards. Many young elite women turned to personal and sexual means of defiance. 

However, there also was a spread of ideas of women’s rights beyond the elite, especially in the innovative campaign for 

a million signatures for women’s legal equality which brought educated women into the homes of popular class women 

to discuss their problems. The government has recently arrested several of the women prominent in this campaign, and 

has, notoriously, invaded the offices of Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Prize winning activist for women’s, children’s, and human 

rights. 

Scholars of Iranian women’s history found that even before any Western impact was important, many women were far 

more politically active behind the scenes than outsiders realized. This is noted in several books, including the comprehensive 

books by Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran, Janet Afary’s Sexual Politics 

in Modern Iran (2009), and in the three books on Middle Eastern women I wrote or co-edited. Some elite women made 

the mistake of not taking advantage of Iranian traditions and thinking the West had to be imitated in everything from 

dress to drinking. Currently many young women think they are imitating the West (which they know only from the 

media) and defying Iran’s rulers by being, in private, sexually promiscuous, partaking in drugs and drinks popular in the 

West, and provoking the conservatives. Politically active women doubt that these behaviors can bring positive changes 

for women, particularly as they provoke not only the government and right-wing enforcers, but also many women who 


47

Keddie... 

disapprove of such behaviors. 

The current economic crisis in Iran, which is based both in governmental mismanagement 

and the fall in oil prices, exacerbated by international sanctions, has increased 

popular resistance. If change is to come to Iran, economic discontent, which under- 

If change is to come 

to Iran, economic 

discontent, which 

mines popular support for Ahmadinejad, will be a major reason. It seems important undermines popu- 

not to encourage extreme behaviors that, as Parddi Mahdavi’s Passionate Uprisings lar support for 

shows, do not even bring happiness to those who indulge in them and alienate many Ahmadinejad, will 

others. Instead, women and men of all classes who want change should unite around 

a candidate for the presidential elections who promises to reverse the crackdowns on 

be a major reason. 

women, young people, strikers, and reform publications that have characterized recent years; and both women and men 

need to promote programs that meet the needs of ordinary people. 


Women and the Islamic Republic: Emancipation or Suppression? 

Fatemeh Etemad Moghadam 

This essay focuses on the differences between the pre- and post-revolutionary periods 

in legal interpretations regarding the treatment of female sexuality in marriage 

and its implications for the freedom of labor and the autonomy of women. I argue that 

under the monarchy, the theoretical commoditization of female sexuality in marriage 

was treated as negotiable and modifiable. By contrast, the Islamic Republic has treated 

the issue as non-negotiable and has reinforced it through the enhancement of women’s 

entitlements in marriage. This reinforcement, combined with a growing emancipation 

in economic, political, and social aspects, has thus given rise to contradictions and increased 

female activism unparalleled in the region. 

The source of this contradiction can be found in the ambiguity in early Muslim tradition 

influenced by nomadic tribal customs (allowing women power and control) versus 

urban merchants (secluding and treating women as property). In essence a Muslim 

marriage (aqd) is a sale contract. The man makes the offer (ijab) and the woman accepts 

(qabul). The object of sale is female sexuality and reproductive labor. In exchange 

the woman receives a dower (mahryyeh) and financial support (nafaqeh). If capable of 

meeting the financial obligations, a man may practice polygamy. The marriage contract 

also may include additional provisions that should be agreed upon by the two sides. 

This commoditizing contractual aspect can be attributed to the merchant tradition. 

By contrast, early traditions encompassed autonomous aspects that may be attributed 

to nomadic influence. According to these traditions, woman has the right to own and 

inherit property independently and no prohibitions exist for participation in the labor 

market. Moreover, the Qur’an explicitly states that working women are entitled to fair 

wages. Indeed, the Prophet’s first and highly revered wife, Khadija, was a merchant; and 

his granddaughter, Zaynab, publicly challenged Caliph Yazid. It can be argued that Islam 

allows for the involvement of women in public life as well as the market. 

A woman and her sexuality, however, are not separate. Therefore, the theoretical sale 

of sexuality, the provision of autonomous rights, and the exemplary lives of revered 

women create ambiguity in the rights and autonomy of women and allow for interpretations 

ranging from near complete ownership and control (a common practice in premodern 

urban areas), versus a purely symbolic treatment of ownership of sexuality and 

an emphasis on autonomy and public participation. An important development of the 


Dr. Fatemeh Etemad Moghadam, 

Professor of Economics, 

Hofstra University 

49

Moghadam... 

modern era has been a growing tendency to perceive women as agents who possess potential or actual labor that can 

positively contribute to public life and society at large. 

This perception of women as productive labor became pronounced in the 1960s and 

1970s. Iran’s official government documents explicitly referred to women as “a relatively 

untapped supply of labor” that should be utilized for development. Government 

policies aimed at removing or revising the traditional barriers to education and labor 

market participation. The reforms modified the legal commoditization of female sexuality. 

Prohibition of child marriage, as well as equal parental rights in child custody 

undermined a father’s ownership of his children and by extension that of his wife’s 

reproductive labor. Limitations on polygamy, the modification of a man’s unilateral 

right to divorce, and improvements in women’s rights to divorce altered the commoditization 

of sexuality in marriage. Furthermore, the enfranchisement of women, along 

with their growing participation in the public space, labor market, and education constituted 

a trend toward the emancipation of women. 

An important development 

of the 

modern era has 

been a growing tendency 

to perceive 

women as agents 

who possess potential 

or actual labor 

that can positively 

contribute to public 

life and society at 

large. 

By contrast, the post-revolutionary changes have reinforced legal commoditization. The return of child custody to the 

father, the legalization of child marriage, the shift from an obligatory to the voluntary and contractual limitation on polygamy, 

the confirmation of men’s unilateral right to divorce, and the increased difficulties for women to obtain divorce 

have reinforced the male ownership of female sexuality. As compensation, however, new provisions such as inflation 

adjustments for the mahryyeh and an emphasis on the legal rights of married women to nafaqeh are aimed at guarding 

the sale and upkeep values of female sexuality. 

There also has been an explicit recognition of the productivity of female labor at home and the introduction of entitlements 

for household labor. Arguing that a marriage contract does not require women to perform household labor, that 

mahryyeh and nafaqeh are compensations for female sexuality and reproductive labor only, and that child-raising and 

household labor are the primary responsibilities of a married woman, new entitlements have been introduced. Post- 

Revolutionary marriage contracts include a stipulation of a divorcing to share up to 50% of the wealth accumulated by 

the husband during the marriage. The acceptance of this condition by the husband is voluntary: If the condition was 

not included, at divorce the woman is entitled to the wage-equivalent (ojrat-ol-mesl) of the household labor performed 

during the marriage. These entitlements, however, apply only if a man initiates the divorce and, in practice, are far less 

than the 50% limit or the forgone wages. 

As justification, the ruling clergy argue that the traditional marriage contract does not provide financial rewards for 

household activities, and therefore they are a part of the new reforms. It is worth noting that nafaqeh and the new entitlements 

are used as justifications for maintaining the law that requires the husband’s permission for a married woman 

to work outside the home. While this law predates the Revolution, since then its enforcement has been strengthened. It 


Moghadam... 

is argued that men pay nafaqeh and ojrat-ol-mesl; therefore, they are entitled to control over women’s time. Thus, a mar- 

ried woman is not a full owner of her labor and has legal constraints on her participation in the labor market. 

The Revolution brought masses of women to the streets and encouraged them to be politically 

active. Initial attempts to force women out of the labor market proved impractical 

and were faced with resistance. While secular women view forced veiling as an 

infringement of their freedom, veiling undermined family opposition to female participation 

in public space for many women from religious families. Today the gender-gap 

in education has been substantially reduced, and in recent years 60% of all university 

graduates have been females. Compared to the pre-revolutionary period, the official 

data do not show a significant increase in women’s share in the labor force. But they 

indicate that the participants have much higher education and skills and are involved 

in wide-ranging professional, managerial, and entrepreneurial activities. There are also 

indications that the official data underestimate women’s participation rates, and that 

there is a large and unaccounted female informal economy that includes educated and 

professional women 

In summary, in comparison to the pre-revolutionary period, Iranian women have substantially increased their levels of 

education, economic power, political awareness and participation, and overall presence in public space. Legally, however, 

their subservience to male dominance within the family has increased. It is worth noting that the legal reforms under 

the Shah were based on new interpretations of Islamic law and were sanctioned by a group of the ‘ulama’, although 

opposed by Ayatollah Khomeini and some other members of the clergy. Today a segment of the ‘ulama’ believe that 

even far-reaching and sweeping egalitarian gender legal reforms are not contrary to Islam (www.we-change.org). So 

far, however, despite concessions and compromises on some other aspects, the ruling clergy has treated the legal commoditization 

of female sexuality as non-negotiable. Thus, the original Islamic ambiguity in women’s status evolved into 

a contradictory and inherently unstable development of emancipation and legal subordination. 


In comparison to 

the pre-revolutionary 

period, Iranian 

women have substantially 

increased 

their levels of education, 

economic 

power, political 

awareness and 

participation, and 

overall presence in 

public space. 

51

Where Are Iran’s Working Women? 

Valentine M. Moghadam 

The Iranian Revolution and its aftermath have generated many debates, one of which 

pertains to the effects on women’s labor force participation and employment patterns. 

For over 20 years, Iran-born scholars have debated the extent of women’s post-revolutionary 

marginalization, emphasizing the impact of ideology or economic policy. For 

some, Islamization led to women’s labor marginalization, while others have argued that 

Islamization — and its attendant sex segregation — actually benefited women, in that 

conservative families allowed their daughters to be educated and to seek work. The fact 

is that 30 years after the revolution, women constitute only 15% of the formal sector paid 

labor force (that is, those entitled to paid holidays, maternity leave, pension, and other 

provisions of labor law). According to the results of the 1385/2006 Iranian census, only 

3.5 million Iranian women are salaried workers, compared with 23.5 million men. 

However much as Iranians as a whole are doing well in terms of health, education, and 

social protection, the presumed benefits of Islamization for women’s advancement look 

meager when compared to the social and gender indicators of other advanced developing 

countries. 

WoMEN, WoRK, AND THE GloBAl ECoNoMy 

The case of Iranian women’s labor force participation is usually made on its own terms 

but is best understood in a comparative or international perspective, framed by theory. 

The globalization literature and studies done within the Gender and Development 

(GAD) framework show, on the basis of much evidence across the globe, that the employment 

effects of globalization have differential effects on women and men in labor 

markets depending on occupation and sector, and depending also on the nature of the 

country’s integration in the global economy (measured by, for example, trade and foreign 

direct investment). “The feminization of labor” refers to both the growing proportion 

of women in the labor force and the deterioration of work conditions, as “flexible 

labor markets” become the order of the day. At the same time, there has been a growing 

trend, for more educated women, of increasing involvement in a variety of professional 

services, including finance, insurance, and real estate jobs (the FIRE sector). 

The GAD literature also emphasizes the expansion of informal and unregistered work, 

which can be both high-end and low-end. This includes desktop publishing, catering, 

Dr. Valentine M. Moghadam, 

Professor of Sociology and 

Women’s Studies, Purdue 

University 


Moghadam... 

making fancy jams, designing jewelry, private language or music lessons, beauty services, sewing and alteration; as well 

as food preparation, hawking, and producing garments for a sub-contractor. 

In this context, key questions are: How does Iran compare to other countries with similar income levels and at similar 

stages of economic development, such as Venezuela, Malaysia, China, South Korea, Tunisia, or Brazil? How is Iran 

integrated in the global economy and with what effects on labor-capital flows in general and women’s labor force participation 

in particular? Is Iran part of the global economy and globalizing processes? If so, what have been the effects 

on women’s labor force participation, occupational distribution, and income? If not, perhaps that says something about 

why Iranian women remain marginalized from the paid labor force. Are women’s low rates of labor force participation 

a result of systematic discrimination (driven by both cultural norms and legal restrictions) or a function of the nature 

of the Iranian economy? Or, conversely, is this a matter of women’s own choice and preference? 

A number of authors have emphasized Iranian women’s educational attainment, arguing that women’s increasing university 

enrollments is a major achievement of the revolution. And yet, the expansion of female education — including 

the smaller proportion of adolescents in the work force and the larger share of women’s university enrollments — is a 

global phenomenon and cannot be attributed to Islamization. The same is true with women’s employment in services; 

in most medium- to high- middle income developing countries, female labor has shifted from agriculture and manufacturing 

to the services sector. 

WoMEN AND EMPloyMENT 30 yEARS AFTER THE REVolUTIoN 

The most recent Iranian census (1385/2006) shows that the female share of the labor 

force is less than 20%, considerably below the world average of 45%. (The census gives 

The most recent 

Iranian census 

the figure of 18.5%, which is at odds with the 24.6% figure sometimes seen in interna- (1385/2006) shows 

tional data sets. It is also at odds with the higher figure in the Socio-Economic Charac- that the female 

teristics of Households panel data, produced by the Statistical Center of Iran and used share of the labor 

by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani.) Some 33% of Iran’s female labor force is in professional 

jobs, concentrated in education, healthcare, and social services — hardly a seismic shift 

from the pre-revolutionary period in terms of gender roles. Slightly over half of all 

teachers in Iran are women, but the proportion of female university teaching staff is, at 

20%, less than that of Algeria (41%), Tunisia (40%), Turkey (38%), and Bahrain (36%). 

force is less than 

20%, considerably 

below the world average 

of 45%. 

Iranian census data reveal no evidence of a shift to the FIRE sector, and less than 4% of employed women are found in 

senior or executive or managerial positions. 

For the urban areas, the rather small female labor force is about equally divided between private and public sector employment. 

Just 20% of the urban female work force is in industrial employment (compared to 45% of rural women). 

Some 50% of the female work force is in professional and technical employment (54.5% with executive positions in- 


53

Moghadam... 

cluded); 11% in administrative and clerical, and 10% in services and sales. Extrapolating to discern patterns by social 

class, it appears that the vast majority of urban working class women are either unemployed/seeking work; economically 

inactive/housewives; or engaged in informal, home-based, or voluntary activities. This would mean dependence 

on male kin for social insurance and retirement benefits. 

Given high unemployment and inflation in Iran, it is likely that the vast majority of 

non-employed women engage in an array of high-end and low-end home-based economic 

activities described above. Thirty years after the Iranian revolution, we have yet 

to see a systematic study of the informal sector in Iran, or a survey of the services performed 

by women from their homes. We know from anecdotal evidence that the practice 

of mahr/mehrieh, whereby the groom promises an amount of money to his bride, 

has been growing rather than declining in Iran. Can this be explained at least partly by 

the fact that women’s employment opportunities are limited and women cannot rely 

on a steady income? 

Thirty years after 

the Iranian revolution, 

we have yet 

to see a systematic 

study of the informal 

sector in Iran, 

or a survey of the 

services performed 

by women from 

their homes. 


Social Change, the Women’s Rights Movement, and the Role of Islam 

Azadeh Kian 

The implementation of Shari’a reinforced the patriarchal order and institutionalized 

gender inequality in post-revolutionary Iran. Nevertheless, the modernization of society 

has led to profound changes in the lives of Iranian women and in their attitudes 

regarding men’s authority. The modernization of women’s attitudes1 has in turn led to 

their mounting resistance or opposition against gendered social relations. 

The emerging Iranian civil society is marked by the vitality of debate on the social, civil, 

and political dimensions of women’s citizenship. The arrest of dozens of women’s rights 

activists, 2 the closure of several women’s magazines3 and women’s NGOs 4 — the number 

of which has increased from 54 in 1995 to over 600 today — and many other attempts 

by the government to intimidate women’s rights activists attest to the increasing political 

importance of women’s issues. Although state authorities qualify feminism as a sign 

of Western cultural invasion, it has become commonplace in the discourse of women’s 

rights activists, and self-identification with feminism is no longer a taboo. Among women’s 

rights activists, some present a new and dynamic reading of Islam to demand citizenship 

rights for women while others exclusively refer to universal human rights and other 

international charters. Despite limitations set by the current government freedom of expression 

and action, women’s rights advocates attempt to express their views in women’s 

press, internet sites and weblogs, 5 books, novels, paintings, theater, cinema, and through 

ongoing campaigns (e.g., the One Million Signature Campaign to change the discriminatory 

laws, the Campaign Against Stoning and All Forms of Violence against Women, and 

the White Scarves Campaign against sex segregation in stadiums). 

The number of women writers, novelists, journalists, publishers, and movie directors has 

grown sharply. Women use the camera to unveil the mechanisms of patriarchal control and 

to demonstrate women’s struggles against gender disparities. They highlight women’s legal 

1. For a discussion based on statistical data see, Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, “ From Motherhood 

to Equal Rights Advocates: The Weakening of Patriarchal Order,” in Homa Katouzian and 

Hossein Shahidi, eds., Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflict. (London, 

UK: Routledge, 2008), pp. 86-106. 

2. Including the recent trial of Parvin Ardalan, Mansoureh Shoja’i, Khadidjeh Moghaddam, Jelveh 

Javaheri, Nahid Keshavarz, Maryam Hosseinkhah, and Zhila Bani-Yaghoub, to name but a few. 

3. Including the closure of the influential Zanan in January 2008, which has been edited 

since 1992 by Shahla Sherkat. 

4. Including the Training Center for Women NGOs led by Mahboubeh Abbasqolizadeh and 

the Raahi Center led by Shadi Sadr, in 2007. 

5. According to official statistics, the number of internet users had increased from 250 in 1994 

to 4 million in 2006 and the number of weblogs from just one in 2001 to over 65,000 today), 


Dr. Azadeh Khan, Professor 

of Sociology, University of 

Paris 7-Paris-Diderot, and 

Researcher, Mondes iranien 

et indien, CNRS 

55

Kian... 

and social problems and portray women as active and courageous people with strong personalities. The important success of 

these movies shows that the urban population is interested in modern interpretations of gender questions. Rakhshan Bani- 

Etemad, Tahmineh Milani, Pouran Derakhshandeh, Manijeh Hekmat, Marziyeh Meshkini, Samira Makhmalbaf, and Nikki 

Karimi are among the most well known of these movie directors. But women’s active presence is undoubtedly the strongest 

in the realm of literature. Some of these writers, such as Simin Daneshvar, Goli Taraqi, and Shahrnoush Parsipour, had 

started publishing prior to the revolution. Yet others, such as Qazaleh Alizadeh (who died in 1996), Monirou Ravanipour, 

Fariba Vafi, Zoya Pirzad, Lili Farhadpour, Sepideh Shamlou, and Mahsa Moheb-Ali are among the many women novelists 

who started writing from the 1990s onward. The aim of these novelists is to occupy the public space through written expression 

and to give greater visibility to women, their problems, and their struggles. In their literary works women also deal with 

the issues of sexuality and the body that are usually considered to be taboo subjects and are prohibited in the movies. 

Women also became very active in journalism. Some women’s magazines published 

in the 1990s by Islamic advocates of women’s rights (especially Zanân, Farzâneh, and 

Zan) served as a forum for discussion between female activists who criticized civil 

and penal codes, work legislation and the Constitutional Law, and the state authorities. 

Women’s press also played a crucial role in establishing a dialogue between Islamic and 

secular advocates of women’s rights. Despite their political and ideological differences, 

gender and class solidarity emerged among these women, who overwhelmingly belong 

to urban middle classes. Following President Muhammad Khatami’s election, secular 

feminists finally obtained the authorization to publish a magazine in 1998 called Second 

Sexe [Jens-i Dovvom], edited by Nouchine Ahmadi-Khorasani. 

Women’s increasing access to education, revenue earning activities, and social participation, 

and their disaffection with official Islam combined with their inferior positions 

within the social and economic hierarchy to have had an important impact on the 

structuring of their political behavior. 

Women’s increasing 

access to education, 

revenue earning 

activities, and social 

participation, 

and their disaffection 

with official 

Islam combined 

with their inferior 

positions within 

the social and economic 

hierarchy to 

have had an important 

impact on the 

structuring of their 

political behavior. 

Under president Khatami, some advocates of women’s rights tried to ameliorate women’s legal status through interactions 

and negotiations with the political or religious elites. Some who attempted to modify laws through Ijtihad promoted 

discussions with reformist clergy. Although some reformist female members of the sixth Majlis (2000-2004) attempted 

to change the discriminatory laws, the Guardian Council overruled them, declaring that the proposed changes 

to the law were incompatible with Islam. The lack of change in the legal status of women during Khatami’s presidency 

(1997-2005) led to the disillusionment and political demobilization of educated middle class women. Their lack of participation 

in legislative and presidential elections, especially from 2004 onward has contributed to the failure of more 

moderate candidates in large towns, where the bulk of these women live. 

Since the election of the radical populist President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and the intensification of repressive 


Kian... 

measures against women’s rights and human rights activists, the gap has widened between the political elite and women’s 

rights advocates, leading to their further autonomization and radicalization. In 2006, some secular feminists (e.g., 

Nouchine Ahmadi-Khorâsâni, Parvin Ardalân, and Mansoureh Shoja’i of the Women’s Cultural Center) declared that 

they did not identify with the political and religious elite, refused to recognize the latter’s legitimacy, and challenged the 

police and the judiciary by opting for street demonstrations. Their declared aim was to reach out to ordinary women, 

whose mobilization, they argued, would force the elite in power to change laws. More moderate activists (including 

Shahla Sherkat, the editor of the influential Zanân, and a number of Islamic and secular activists) disapproved of street 

demonstrations, arguing that the costs of such acts would be too high for the women’s movement and that they would 

alienate ordinary women instead of bringing them into the movement. 6 Their moderate stand provoked the anger of 

radical secular feminists, who have tremendous support in the Iranian Diaspora and who accused “reformist women” of 

having close ties with the ruling elites and of being content with implementing change in laws through lobbying. 

Despite these controversies, some “reformist” and “radical” women activists launched 

the One Million Signature Campaign together; however, their persistent differences 

contributed to further divisions, leading to the predominance of the secular feminists 

in the campaign. While the activists were preoccupied with their internal debates, the 

government prepared a new Family Protection Bill in 2007 that marks further regression 

of women’s rights. 7 The government also increased its repressive policies against 

all women’s movement activists. 

Faced with this adverse development, some advocates of women’s rights opted for gender 

solidarity. In September 2008, over 50 of these secular and Muslim women who had decided to prevent the bill’s ratification 

demanded to meet the concerned members of Parliament (MPs), presented proposals to change the controversial provisions, 

and ultimately succeeded in convincing the Parliament to postpone ratification pending further investigation. Their 

action also provoked debates among the more moderate MPs who do not support the government of President Ahmadinejad 

and who agreed to modify the bill on the one hand, and pro-government hardliners who support the bill, on the other. 

Despite sporadic success, the Iranian women’s rights movement, still remains largely confined to the educated urban middle 

class women (many of whom are Persian) in large towns. It needs to strengthen ties with lower class, rural, and ethnic 

minority women and women in mid-sized and small towns (were the majority of the population live) who are barely 

represented within the movement, although their younger generation shares the egalitarian demands of women’s rights 

activists. Despite the lack of organic relations between these ordinary women and the activists, the women’s movement 

overwhelmingly reflects the demands of an increasing number of women. Thanks to their better education and their 

increasing social and economic participation, women have become aware that the current laws and institutions tend to 

strengthen the patriarchal order, and that the struggle for women’s citizenship rights and democracy are intertwined. 


Despite the lack of 

organic relations 

between these ordinary 

women and the 

activists, the women’s 

movement overwhelmingly 

reflects 

the demands of an 

increasing number 

of women. 

6. These controversial discussions were published in Zanân, No. 133 (June 2006) and No. 134 (July 2006). 

7. For some of the most controversial provisions of the proposed bill, see the Women’s Learning Partnership website at http:// 

learningpartnership.org/en. 

57

New Challenges for Iranian Women 

Elaheh Koolaee 

Women have played a crucial role in the Iranian struggle for democracy. They have 

played an important role not only in the victory of the Islamic Revolution, 1 but also in 

the developments that have occurred since. The reform period was one of progress in 

women’s rights, including in the public sphere. 2 However, in the post-reform period, 

there has been a strong challenge not just to further progress in women’s rights but to 

preserve the gains that previously had been achieved. 

THE REFoRMIST PERIoD 

The mass participation of women in different aspects of politics laid the groundwork 

for the reformist movement, the impressive electoral victory of President Muhammad 

Khatami, and a new empowerment of civil society. They challenged the stereotype of 

Iranian women as subservient, passive creatures. Reformists in the government and the 

Parliament tried to respond to women’s demands. Reformist parliamentarians were articulate, 

committed advocates for reform. Female MPs formed a special faction and 

tried hard to remove some of the obstacles to women’s progress. 3 Assisted by reformminded 

men, they succeeded in amending some articles of civil law that were against 

women rights. 

The reformist parliament tried to change women’s legal status by focusing on laws related 

to issues such as inheritance, divorce, child custody, and insurance. The reformist 

government ratified and the parliament approved the Convention on the Elimination of 

All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). However, the Guardian Council 

rejected CEDAW, interpreting it as in contradiction with Islamic values. The women’s 

faction presented a plan to reform some parts of the civil code in a package later in that 

period. 4 

1. Mohammad Hossein Hafezian, “Political Participation of Women and the Islamic 

Revolution of Iran,” Discourse, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2002), p. 52. 

2. Elaheh Koolaee, “Women in Public Sphere, a Case Study of Islamic Republic of Iran,” 

Journal of Faculty of law & Political Science, Tehran University, No. 61 (Fall 2001), pp. 228- 

232. 

3. Elaheh Koolaee, “A Glance at Women’s Faction Performance in 6th Parliament,” Shargh, 

Nos. 215, 223 (2002), p. 3. 

4. Ashraf Gramizadegan, “6th Parliament and Women Rights,” Reyhaneh, (Journal of the 

Center for Iranian Participation Affairs), No. 6 (2004), pp. 219-255. 

Dr. Elaheh Koolaee, former 

parliamentarian, is a Professor 

in the Faculty of law and 

Political Science, University 

of Tehran. 


Koolaee... 

THE PoST-REFoRM ERA 

One of the most important achievements of Iranian women after the victory of the Islamic Revolution was their large 

presence in the public sphere. According to the traditional thinking to which the conservatives adhere, women must 

stay at home and essentially perform household duties and raise children while men work to earn money and manage 

the family. But the late leader of Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, stressed the necessity of women’s participation 

in all social activities, and encouraged them to take part in socio-political developments. He focused on the domestic 

roles of women and their family duties, but did not ignore their role in social tasks. 

One of the first initiatives of the new government was changing the name of “The 

Center for Women’s Participation Affairs” in the President’s Office to “The Center of 

Women’s and Family Affairs.” For the new president of this office, Nasrin Soltankhah, 

women’s NGOs had lost their importance. Her counterparts in the Seventh Parliament 

(2004-2008) had been accusatory towards the previous president of the Center for 

helping women improve their capacities and activities. 5 The government decreased the 

budget for women’s affairs, and put its appropriations and allocation under the auspices 

of the Center. 6 This Center has focused exclusively on women who are managing their 

families without men, and has changed the course of its activities profoundly. 

The Seventh Parliament omitted “gender justice” in the process of amending the “Fourth Development Plan,” which reformists 

had passed. 7 Very soon it became clear that there would not be room for women in the board of the Parliament 

and the presidency of commissions and committees of the Parliament. President Ahmadinejad said that he does not 

accept a gender quota, and that he perceives it as a violation of justice and human rights. Some female representatives 

subsequently passed the plan of “house holders insurance” that remained from the Sixth Parliament (1996-2000). The 

Cultural Commission of the Parliament has worked seriously on the plan for matters of dress, especially in relation to 

women. 8 Large propaganda programs promoting the hijab were put forth to persuade all women to put on the chador. 

Many conservatives claim Khatami’s cultural policies have ruined Islamic norms in Iran. However the Seventh Parliament 

has finished some of remaining plans from the Sixth Parliament too. They a passed the bill on conditional abortion 

that permitted the operation to save the life of mother in very specific cases. 9 

One of the serious problems facing Iranian women relates to those who marry foreigners. According to Articles 964 

and 976 of Iran’s Civil Law, an Iranian woman who marries a foreigner may not transfer her citizenship to her husband 

and children, though an Iranian man who marries a foreigner may transfer his citizenship to his wife and children. 


It became clear that 

there would not be 

room for women 

in the board of the 

Parliament and 

the presidency of 

commissions and 

committees of the 

Parliament. 

5. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (Monthly Women Magazine), (August 2006), pp. 20-23. 

6. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (October 2003), p. 21. 

7. “Omit the Gender, Justice and its Reflections,” Reyhaneh, No. 8 (2005), pp. 177-188. 

8. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (June 2003), p. 30. 

9. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (June 2004), pp. 27-32. 

59

Koolaee... 

Although the reformist parliament sought to change this, 10 the Conservatives reaffirmed it. 11 

CoNClUSIoN 

One of the considerable achievements of Iranian women after the Islamic Revolution 

has been the large-scale presence of women in the public sphere. Nevertheless, because 

of many socio-cultural obstacles, many women have been unable to obtain jobs 

commensurate with their education. Conservatives have attempted to return women 

to their homes, and have focused on dividing the private sphere and public sphere 

between women and men again. They have implemented a new gender quota plan to 

limit the number of girls who are admitted to universities. 12 Many structures 

and institutions 

must be changed 

according to women’s 

needs and demands. 

They have put in place a 

region-based university application system whereby a girl must have the permission of her father or husband to attend 

university in another city! 

The “Family Bill” represents another major setback for women’s rights. This proposed legislation would facilitate a man’s 

remarriage by no longer making it necessary for him to gain the permission of his first wife. Although as a result of a 

huge protest by many women activists — from right and left and religious and non-religious quarters — the original bill 

was modified, the issue is not yet settled. 

Nobody can stop the process of social change. Iranian women have used the educational opportunities afforded by the 

Islamic Republic to gain the knowledge and skills with which to better their situation and that of their families. Many 

structures and institutions must be changed according to women’s needs and demands. As is the case in all countries 

where traditional norms are deeply ingrained, women in Iran face stiff resistance from the conservatives. Yet, recent experience 

has shown that Iranian women have learned how to challenge and have succeeded in removing some of these 

obstacles. They, like many of their counterparts throughout the world, continue their struggle. 

10. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (January 2003). 

11. “One Month with Women in the Parliament,” Zanan (August 2006), pp. 27-33. 

12. Elaheh Koolaee, “Gender Quota against Iranian Women,” Aeen, No. 10 (2007), pp. 54-57. 


Education, Media, and Culture 


61

Educational Attainment in Iran 

Zahra Mila Elmi 

Educational attainment has improved considerably in the Islamic Republic of Iran 

over the past three decades. During this period the improvement for women has been 

greater than for men. In recent years, women have gained access to education at different 

levels and in many fields. 

During the first decade after the revolution, Iran experienced a baby boom due to the 

suspension of family planning. Consequently, Iranian educational institutions were inundated 

by a wave of young people in need of training during the second decade after 

the revolution. In addition, because of parents’ support for their daughters’ education 

and the changing attitudes of women about themselves, more women sought an education. 

These circumstances led to a dramatic increase in the number and share of females 

who entered schools and universities. 

As a result, statistical differences between the number of male and female students have 

declined in the third decade of the Revolution. Since 1979, achievements of women in 

higher educational levels are improving, and the number of female students and graduates 

in different fields has increased noticeably in recent years. 

lITERACy 

Statistical analysis of literacy rates in the years 1966, 1976, 1986, 1991, and 2006 indicates 

that educational attainment improved considerably in the Islamic Republic of 

Iran, especially for women. Over this period, the literacy gap between women and men 

has narrowed. Before the Islamic Revolution (specifically, in 1978), over 60% of the 

Iranian female population was illiterate. In the post-revolutionary years, women have 

shown an increasing willingness and effort to become literate and highly educated. Currently, 

more than 55% percent of first-year university students are women. 

According to national census data, in 1966, only 17.42% of the Iranian female population 

or 1,628,000 was literate (Table 1). In the same year, the male literacy rate was 39.19% 

(3,928,000). These figures were 47.49% for men and 35.48% for women in 1976. 

Zahra Mila Elmi, Assistant 

Professor, Mazandaran 

University, Iran 


Elmi... 

Total 

Male 

Female 

Table 1: Literacy Rate (Population over 6 Years Old) 

Year 1966 1976 1986 1991 1996 2006 

Population (in thousands) 19,372 27,113 38,709 45,856 52,295 63,920 

Literate Population (in thousands) 5,556 12,877 23,913 33,966 41,512 54,084 

Literacy Rate 28.68% 47.49% 61.78% 74.07% 79.38% 84.61% 


Literate Population (in thousands) 3,928 8,198 14,078 19,091 22,465 28,835 

Total Percentage of Literate 70.70% 63.66% 58.87% 56.21% 54.12% 53.32% 



Literate Population (in thousands) 1,628 4679 9,835 14,875 19,118 25,247 

Total Percentage of Literate 29.30% 36.34% 41.13% 43.79% 46.05% 46.68% 


Source: National Census, Statistic Center of Iran 

The first post-revolutionary national census in 1986 indicated that the women’s literacy rate had climbed to the level of 

52.1% and that 9.8 million women had become literate by that year. Based on the second post-revolutionary national 

census in 1996, 74.2% of the Iranian female population over the age of six (25.7 million) were literate. This figure was 

74.7% for men (26.5 million). Finally, the 2006 census showed that 80.3% of the total female population over the age of 

six was literate. The corresponding figure for the male population was 88.7%. 

As illustrated in the charts below, Iran has had two educational gaps: between men and women (see Diagrams 1 and 2) 

and between rural and urban residents (see Chart 3). The data show that the gap between men’s and women’s literacy 

rates has narrowed, as has the gap between rural and urban residents’ literacy rates. The narrowing of these gaps over 

time is depicted in Table 1. 


63

Elmi... 

Diagram 1: Female and Male Literacy Rates in Iran 

Diagram 2: Literacy Rate in Iran by Gender 

ENRollMENT IN PRIMARy AND SECoNDARy SCHool 

AND IN TECHNICAl SCHoolS 

The number of students and gender enrollment ratio for primary, 

secondary and technical schools for the four academic 

years 1976/77, 1986/87, 1991/92, 1996/97, and 2006/07, are 

shown in Tables 2 through 5. 

Diagram 3: Literacy Rate (Population over 6 Years Old) 

Table 2: Enrollment in Primary Schools by Gender 

Academic year Total Male Female Ratio (% of total) 

Male Female 

1976/77 4,768,588 2,939,800 1,828,788 61.7 38.3 

1986/87 7,232,820 4,058,853 3,173,967 56.1 43.9 

1991/92 9,787,593 5,224,343 4,563,250 53.4 46.6 

1996/97 9238393 4885665 4352728 52.9 47.1 

2006/07 5699506 2946021 2753485 51.7 48.3 

Table 3: Enrollment in Junior secondary schools by gender 


Male Female 

1976/77 1,368,910 875,516 493,394 64.0 36.0 

1986/87 2,299,510 1,406,118 893,392 61.1 38.9 

1991/92 3,541,578 2,050,707 1,490,871 57.9 42.1 

1996/97 5188812 2845092 2343720 54.8 45.2 

2006/07 3913928 2092895 1821023 53.5 46.5 


Elmi... 

Table 4: Enrollment in Senior Secondary Schools by Gender 


Male Female 

1976/77 740,471 446,974 293,497 60.0 40.0 

1986/87 1,076,762 614,026 462,736 57.0 43.0 

1991/92 1,770,410 984,218 786,192 55.6 44.4 

1996/97 3480635 1817811 1662824 52.2 47.8 

2006/07 3695947 1890567 1805380 51.2 48.8 

Table 5: Enrollment in Technical Schools by Gender 

Academic year 

Total 

(thousand) 

Male (thousand) Female (thousand) Ratio (% of total) 

Male Female 

1976/77 201 162 39 81 19 

1986/87 207 161 46 78 22 

1991/92 292 235 57 80 20 

1996/97 80 60 20 75 25 

2006/07 357 120 237 34 66 

2006/07* 509 200 309 39 61 

* Kar va danesh is a branch of vocational education established in 2006-2007. 

Source: Ministry of Education 

An analysis of the trend in education by gender from 1976 to 2006 points to an increase in gender equality at the primary 

and the secondary school levels. In addition, the downward trend in population growth during the recent decade 

has led to a decrease in the total number of students at various educational levels (Chart 4). In the academic year of 

1999/2000, the number of students was 19,187,000 persons and reached 14,931,000 persons in the year 2006/07. 

Diagram 4: Number of Student during Academic Years 1971/72 to 2006/07 

20000 

18000 

16000 

14000 

12000 

10000 

8000 

6000 

4000 

1971/72 

1973/74 

1975/76 

Number of Student (thousand) 

1977/78 

1979/80 

1981/82 

1983/84 

1985/86 

1987/88 

1989/90 

1991/92 

1993/94 

1995/96 

1997/98 

1999/00 


Feb-01 

Apr-03 

Jun-05 

INDICAToRS oF EDUCATIoNAl QUAlITy 

Indicators of educational quality are shown in Diagram 

5. Educational indices of the quality of “student 

to school,” “student to classroom,” and “student 

to teacher” have trended upward during the 1970s, 

1980s, and half of the 1990s, but improved overall 

during the 2000s, owing largely to a reduction in the 

number of students and an increase in the number 

of teachers. 

65

Elmi... 

Diagram 5: Educational indicators: Quality of “student to school,” “student to classroom,” and 

“student to teacher” during the years 1971 to 2007 in Iran 

200 

180 

160 

140 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

1971/72 

1973/74 

1975/76 

student to teacher 

1977/78 

1979/80 

1981/82 

1983/84 

Student to school 

1985/86 

1987/88 

student to classroom 

66 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org 

1989/90 

1991/92 

1993/94 

1995/96 

Source: Ministry of Education 

(1) Number of students and classes of the new high school level are included since 1996/97 

ENRollMENT IN UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTES oF HIGHER EDUCATIoN 

Over the years, the number of university student in public and private universities rose considerably. But, according to 

statistics presented in Tables 4 and 5, the number and proportion of girls who study in universities and higher educational 

institutions increased compared to boys. During the last decade, the number of girls in public universities and the 

private Islamic Azad University grew almost 4.3 times and 2.4 times respectively. For boys, these figures were 2.6 and 

1.9 times respectively. During the academic year’s 1991/92 to 2006/07, the share of female students enrolled in public 

universities rose from 28% to 58%. The share also increased in private universities. 

Academic Years 

Table 6: Number of students in public universities and institutes of higher education (1) 

Number of students Associate of arts Bachelor of arts/science 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 

1997/98 

1999/00 

Feb-01 

Share 

(% of total) 

Apr-03 

Jun-05 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

1991-1992 344,045 96,969 28.18 43,141 6,471 15.00 242,835 75,486 31.09 

1996-1997 579,070 209,163 36.12 85,165 26,956 31.65 418,692 161,365 38.54 

2001-2002 759,870 378,365 49.79 146,389 56,087 38.31 532,525 294,016 55.21 

2202-2003 809,567 412,848 51.00 172,965 61,353 35.47 552,907 321,568 58.16 

2003-2004 923,913 493,420 53.41 195,369 71,214 36.45 641,718 389,201 60.65 

2004-2005 1,018,980 549,570 53.93 210,845 73,799 35.00 713,461 438,937 61.52 

2005-2006 1,191,048 656,847 55.15 293,422 119,819 40.84 793,955 494,610 62.30 

2006-2007 1,538,874 888,799 57.76 283,284 122,484 43.24 1,131,538 710,740 62.81

Elmi... 


Master of arts/science 

Table 6 continued 

Professional Doctorate Ph.D 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 


Share 

(% of total) 

1991-1992 14,070 2,356 16.74 39,519 11,311 28.62 4,480 1,345 30.02 

1996-1997 26,832 4,771 17.78 39,837 13,304 33.40 8,544 2,767 32.39 

2001-2002 35,481 9,041 25.48 34,093 16,519 48.45 11,382 2,702 23.74 

2002-2003 39,174 11,103 28.34 32,159 15,914 49.49 12,362 2,910 23.54 

2003-2004 42,719 13,395 31.36 30,749 16,275 52.93 13,358 3,335 24.97 

2004-2005 50,226 16,878 33.60 30,291 16,410 54.17 14,157 3,546 25.05 

2005-2006 57,775 21,169 36.64 29,689 16,861 56.79 16,207 4,388 27.07 

2006-2007 76,406 32,783 42.91 29,455 16,613 56.40 18,191 6,179 33.97 

Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education 

Includes Payam-Noor University students (distant learning university) 


Table 7: Number of Students in Islamic Azad University 

Number of students Associate of arts Bachelor of arts/science 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

1996-1997 613,468 250,596 40.85 67,725 30,082 44.42 517,522 212,044 40.97 

2001-2002 806,639 390,068 48.36 200,207 92,788 46.35 568,934 283,419 49.82 

2202-2003 864,190 435,435 50.39 229,906 106,714 46.42 594,205 313,165 52.70 

2003-2004 968,206 481,590 49.74 291,953 132,826 45.50 634,191 332,398 52.41 

2004-2005 1,098,491 529,993 48.25 378,463 165,908 43.84 676,290 346,977 51.31 

2005-2006 1,197,521 574,815 48.00 417,262 182,518 43.74 731,155 372,746 50.98 

2006-2007 1,289,637 593,438 46.02 453,446 186,577 41.15 779,308 383,259 49.18 


Table 7 continued 

Master of arts/science PhD and Professional Doctorate 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

Total Female 

Share 

(% of total) 

1996-1997 18,070 4,861 26.90 10,151 3,609 35.55 

2001-2002 24,974 9,045 36.22 12,524 4,816 38.45 

2202-2003 27,617 10,460 37.88 12,462 5,096 40.89 

2003-2004 27,486 10,268 37.36 14,576 6,098 41.84 

2004-2005 30,140 11,329 37.59 13,598 5,779 42.50 

2005-2006 35,216 13,544 38.46 13,888 6,007 43.25 

2006-2007 41,464 16,746 40.39 15,419 6,856 44.46 

Source: Islamic Azad University 

Both tables show the number of enrollments and gender ratios at various higher educational levels. Over the years, the 

number and share of women at various higher educational levels rose considerably. Tables 8 and 9 present details on the 

student bodies of public universities and Islamic Azad University in the 2006/07 academic year. 

67

Elmi... 

Table 8: Public Universities and Higher Education Institutes (1) and Islamic Azad University in the Academic 

Year 2006/07 by General Fields of Study 

Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and Islamic Azad University 

Includes Payam-Noor University students (distance learning university) 

Table 9: The Female and Male Share of Total Enrollments by Fields of Study at Public and Private University in 

the Academic Year 2006/07 

Fields of Study 

Public 

Universities 

and Higher 

Education 

Institutes (1) 

Female Students Male Students 

Islamic Azad 

University 

Total 

University 

Female 

Students 

Public 

Universities 

and Higher 


Institutes (1) 

Islamic Azad 

University 

Total 

University 

Male Students 

Medical Sciences 7.30 6.54 6.99 5.08 0.75 2.84 

Humanities 56.87 53.61 55.57 43.51 33.73 38.45 

Basic Sciences 14.70 13.36 14.16 10.23 3.85 6.93 

Technical and 

Engineering 

Agricultural 

and Veterinary 

Sciences 

Fields of Study 

Total Female 

Share (% of 

total) 

Total Female 

Share (% of 

total) 

12.11 16.93 14.04 31.39 52.22 42.16 

4.60 5.45 4.94 5.21 7.36 6.32 

Arts 4.42 4.10 4.29 4.60 2.09 3.30 

Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 

Source: Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and Islamic Azad University 

(1) Includes Payam-Noor University students (distance learning university) 

Total Female 

Share (% of 

total) 

Medical Sciences 97,846 64,845 66.27 44,019 38,832 88.22 141,865 103,677 73.08 

Humanities 788,330 505,501 64.12 552,958 318,136 57.53 1,341,288 823,637 61.41 

Basic Sciences 197,096 130,621 66.27 106,141 79,308 74.72 303,237 209,929 69.23 

Technical and 

Engineering 

Agricultural and 

Veterinary Sciences 

Public universities and higher 

education institutes (1) 

Islamic Azad University Total university students 

311,678 107,644 34.54 463,965 100,442 21.65 775,643 208,086 26.83 

74,781 40,921 54.72 83,623 32,365 38.70 158,404 73,286 46.27 

Arts 69,143 39,267 56.79 38,931 24,355 62.56 108,074 63,622 58.87 

Total 153,8874 888,799 57.76 1,289,637 593,438 46.02 2,828,511 1,482,237 52.40 


Elmi... 

Statistics on the enrollments of female students in universities in the academic year 2006/07 indicate that women constitute 

about 70% of university students in medical sciences and basic sciences, about 60% of students in humanities and 

arts, and 47% of students in agricultural and veterinary sciences. The proportion of women in universities is low only 

in technical and engineering fields. 

The figures and trends presented in this essay suggest that Iranian policy-makers should focus their attention on increasing 

male enrollment at universities and improving female labor market opportunities lest the human capital gathered 

at universities not be wasted. 


69

Attitudes towards the Internet in an Iranian University 

Hossein Godazgar 

Iranian universities are undoubtedly experiencing their hardest period since the Cultural 

Revolution of 1980-1982. 1 All this is taking place in the name of “Islam” or “religion,” 

with little attention paid to the complexities of their definitions, nor indeed 

to those of “non-religion,” “non-Islam,” or “secular.” 2 This is perhaps because what has 

ruled Iran since 1979 is not “Islam” as a “religion,” but “Islamism,” a political ideology, 

which cannot escape from its essential character of selectivity, generalization, and, 

as a result, simplicity and simplification. 

Dr. Hossein Godazgar, apart 

from teaching at the University 

of East london, has 

worked at the University of 

Tabriz as an Associate Professor 

in sociology of religion. 

He is currently an Honorary 

Visiting Fellow in Politics at 

the University of york, UK. 

3 However, this ideology did not simply favor 

“traditionalism.” 4 That is, through the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian Islamists “did 

not seek to turn the clock back.” 5 The Islamic Republic maintained more or less the same 

modern institutions, but attempted to mix their modernity with Islamic tradition and 

Iranian culture. This mixture, which I refer to as “cultural nationalism,” emphasizes the 

superiority of the Iranian nation based on ideas of traditional culture, which present a 

different face of modernity. 6 

After the 1979 revolution, Iran did not replace modern universities with the traditional 

seminary schools of hawzehs or madrasahs. It maintained the same modern universi- 

1.One hundred and nine university professors have protested Ahmadinejhad’s policies on 

universities in an open letter to him, citing three major concerns: a) disregard for the principle 

of the ‘independence of universities’ and the endangering of the position of institutes of 

higher education by authorizing the interference of non-higher educational institutions in 

higher educational affairs; b) transformation of university culture and functions by imposing 

non-democratic and non-scientific procedures and policies on universities; c) reduction of 

professors’ and students’ participation in university life by forcing ‘prominent professors’ 

to retire and appointing non-elected chancellors. PDEN (Political Department of Etemad 

Newspaper). “Negarani dar bareye ayandeye daneshgah” [“Concerns about the Future of 

Universities”], Rouznameye Etemad: onvan [Etemad Newspaper: Headline], October 15, 

2008, http://www.etemaad.com/Released/87-07-24/default.htm. 

2. In the early days of his presidency, Mahmud Ahmadinejad addressed a gathering of socalled 

“young scientists” thus: “Today students should protest and shout at the President, 

asking why some liberal and secular professors are still present in the universities … 

Colonialism is seeking the spread of its own secular system.” While he admitted that it was 

not easy to change this system, he said: “Such a change has begun.” “Ahmadinejad: daneshjou 

bayad az hozour-e ostad-e secular dar daneshgah faryad bezanad” [“Ahmadinejad: A Student 

Must Shout [at the President] due to the Presence of a Secular Professor in a University”], 

Rouznameye Shargh: Sotun-e vizheh [Shargh Newspaper: Special Column], October 15, 

2006, http://www.sharghnewspaper.ir/850615/html/news.htm. 

3. L.B. Brown, Ideology (London: Penguin Education, 1973), p. 11. 

4. S.A. Arjomand, “Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran,” in S.A. Arjomand, Ed., From 

Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), pp. 195-232. 

5. S. Bruce, Fundamentalism (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), p. 54. 

6. H. Godazgar, The Impact of Religious Factors on Educational Change in Iran: Islam in 

Policy and Islam in Practice (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 

2008), pp. 67-75. 


Godazgar... 

ties, but attempted to add a flavor of Islamic tradition to them. This essay focuses on attitudes towards the Internet — an 

example of high modernity — in a major Iranian university and examines views of modernity in an Islamist context 

and to what extent they differ from the rest of the world. 

ATTITUDES ToWARDS THE INTERNET 

My findings were shaped by participant observation and interviewing 30 post-graduate students and seven academic 

staff from different faculties of the University of Tabriz, situated in northwest Iran, in the spring of 2002. The main 

variables were as follows: the Internet as a value system; the necessity of the Internet; causes of Internet establishment; 

the pleasant parts of the Internet; access to the Internet; and the effects of the Internet. The six main implications of my 

findings follow. 

First, with reference to the question of “Internet as a value system,” none of my inform- 

ants had absolute negative attitudes towards the Internet. But although the majority of 

them (59%) viewed the Internet positively and as a provider of easy and convenient 

access to scholars, scientific resources, and communications, some others (41%) described 

it as a hybrid phenomenon. They had no doubt that the Internet was useful, and 

indeed necessary for the development of science and knowledge in the present world. 

But, in their view, the Internet also contained some negative aspects with respect to 

culture and morality. Nevertheless, only a few of them wanted to regard it in the context 

of an ideological contest that could pave the way for the “penetration of the strange 

culture” (nofuz-i farhang-i biganeh), usually signifying Western culture. In the opinion 

of some others, this “penetration” could be a positive aspect of the Internet, bringing 

Iran to “universalism and humanism.” 

Second, all my interviewees confirmed the “necessity of the Internet,” while some of them regarded universities as being 

“nothing without the Internet.” They offered the following reasons for this assessment: 

a) access to up-to-date academic books and journals; 

b) the desperate need for acquaintance with the world’s scientific development; 

c) the necessity of communication and avoidance of isolation. 

My informants regarded the Internet as a new technology that has widely replaced the traditional methods of acquiring 

information, such as university libraries. 

Third, globalism was mainly regarded as a major “cause of establishing the Internet” in Iranian universities. For them, 

Iran had no choice other than “imitating universal phenomena, such as the Internet.” In this regard, they raised two key 


After the 1979 revolution, 

Iran did not 

replace modern 

universities with 

the traditional 

seminary schools of 

hawzehs or madrasahs. 

It maintained 

the same modern 

universities, but 

attempted to add 

a flavor of Islamic 

tradition to them. 

71

Godazgar... 

points: 

a) after more than 20 years of ideologically oriented policies, “it was time to take science into 

account” to tackle the country’s social, cultural and economic problems; and 

b) the society was exhausted of ‘being isolated from the rest of the world.’ 

Fourth, a large majority of my interviewees (89%) mentioned that the availability of scientific resources and papers was 

the most “pleasant part of the Internet.” Only a few of them said that they also enjoyed using the Internet for leisure and 

news. Not surprisingly, my informants did not trade, advertisement, and sex in response to this question. (Use of the 

Internet for the latter purpose is illegal in Iran, and use of the Internet for trade is highly inconvenient, given the scarcity 

of credit cards in Iran.) 

Fifth, all of my informants suggested that they had the capability “to access the Inter- 

net.” However, they complained about the lack of continuous access. They attributed 

this problem to the ignorance of the university authorities about the significance of 

the Internet; the lack of understanding by the government of the status of the Internet 

in Iranian society and among Iranian families; financial shortcomings for adequate 

service and/or misuse of the budget for ideological purposes rather than educational 

purposes; the lack of training courses for the use of the Internet; insufficient attention to the humanities and hence less 

access by humanities and social science students to the Internet; restricting access to the Internet to daytime owing to 

the fear of immoral interactions between male and female students during vacations and nights; and censorship of certain 

sites for both political and moral reasons. 

Finally, apart from one respondent, all viewed the “effects of the Internet” as positive and its use for academic purposes 

as very useful and necessary. The impact of the Internet on scientific production in the university, particularly in postgraduate 

studies, was emphasized repeatedly. However, when asked about the non-academic uses of the Internet, the 

respondents offered differing views, as was clear from their comments on the “Internet as a value system.” 

CoNClUSIoN 

Apart from one 

respondent, all 

viewed the “effects 

of the Internet” as 

positive. 

Islamic ideology, particularly the lack of a clear definition for what has come to be known as making universities “Islamic” 

(islami kardan-i daneshgah-ha) and ambiguous aims such as “the Unity of Seminary and University” (vahdat-i 

hawzeh va daneshgah) have caused uncertainty and complexity in the post-revolutionary life of Iranian universities. 

Indeed, various post-revolutionary Islamic authorities have, with differing degrees of emphasis, tried to act as a “switchman” 

to direct the “vehicle,” in Weber’s terminology, of social institutions, particularly universities, towards Islamic 

particularism and cultural nationalism. But, as this research shows, and the current President Mahmud Ahmadinejad 

admits, this objective is not easily achievable. Nevertheless, according to the findings of this research, post-revolution- 


Godazgar... 

ary university staff and students, at least with reference to those of the University of 

Tabriz, welcomed both communication and information technologies and presented 

concerns regarding the restriction of access to these technologies. Through these technologies, 

they appreciated the value of science and universalism in the sense of feeling 

interconnected with different cultures and societies. In brief, post-revolutionary Iran 

has certainly modernized its society, but it has done so in a way that challenges the way 

that modernity is perceived in the West. 


Post-revolutionary 

Iran has certainly 

modernized its 

society, but it has 

done so in a way 

that challenges the 

way that modernity 

is perceived in the 

West. 

73

Literary Voices 

Nasrin Rahimieh 

The history of modern Persian literature is closely aligned with some of the oppositional 

movements that culminated in the 1979 revolution. The origins of modern Persian 

writing are inseparable from a preoccupation that literature speak to the concerns 

of the masses. Mohamad Ali Jamalzadeh, the reputed father of modern Persian prose, 

was among the first and most influential advocates of this view to overcome the elitist 

language and style of early 20th century literature. This move to make literature accessible 

to the masses revolutionized literary expression and form in both prose and poetry. The 

political fate of the nation, her apparent near-domination by outside powers, provided an 

equally strong impetus to those who saw literature as a means to national awakening. The 

preoccupation with the intersection of politics and writing is reflected in the first Iranian 

Writers Congress held at Tehran’s Soviet Cultural Institute on June 25, 1946. The need 

for change in literary form and sensitivity to the population at large were discussed and 

debated, as was the desire to depict Iran’s new social and political realities. 

The anti-colonial and national independence movements of the 1960s that fueled the 

concept of engagé literature influenced the Iranian literary scene and led to a homegrown 

literature of commitment. Many Iranian writers viewed themselves as mouthpieces 

for their oppressed compatriots and used their writing as a vehicle for expressing 

social, cultural, and political problems that beset their nation. There were notable exceptions, 

such as Sadegh Hedayat, the most renowned prose writer of the modern era, 

whose creativity was fueled by other forces as well. Not surprisingly, the most outspoken 

literary voices of the pre-revolutionary era were treated with reverence by opposition 

forces and with suspicion by the monarchy and the secret police. The stories of imprisonment, 

censorship, and intimidation associated with major literary figures made them 

into heroic revolutionaries. This history is occasionally mapped onto the contemporary 

cultural scene. For instance, a major thoroughfare in Tehran is named after the writer 

and social activist Jalal Al-e Ahmad, whose 1962 treatise Gharbzadegi, often translated 

as Occidentosis or Westitis, decried Iran’s cultural dependence on the West. 

Such examples notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic’s relationship to writers has not 

been radically different from the pre-revolutionary era. The attempt to revamp Iranian 

culture and make cultural expression conform to Islamic values and ideals gave rise to 

new guidelines for the publishing industry, while by and large leaving intact the censorship 

mechanisms that had existed before the revolution. 

Nasrin Rahimieh, Maseeh 

Chair and Director, Dr. 

Samuel M. Jordan Center for 

Persian Studies and Culture 

& Professor of Comparative 

literature, University of California, 

Irvine 


Rahimieh... 

There are some obvious thematic overlaps between literature written before and after the revolution. The Iran-Iraq War, 

the closure of universities, and the overall political clampdown of the war years drove many writers to exile. Yet many 

others remained in Iran and continued to find forms of creative expression and to maintain a place of prominence in 

Iranian cultural life. New figures and voices also emerged after the revolution. 

The most immediate discernable shift was the emergence of a literature devoted to the ideals that underwrote the establishment 

of the Islamic Republic. The earlier leftist leanings were replaced in these new forms of literary expression 

with adulation for Shi‘ite and Islamic beliefs. 

The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq also led to the emergence of a literature of war. Ranging between personal 

testimonials, short stories, and novellas this literature spoke to the experiences of a large number of young Iranians and 

captured the harsh realities of a devastating war with whose aftermath Iran continues to grapple, long after the end of 

the hostilities in 1988. Davud Ghaffarzadegan is among the prominent writers today whose prose work bears witness 

to the war’s psychological impact. 

The most remarkable observable change in Persian literature after the revolution is 

the increasing presence of women writers. More than at any other time in Iranian history, 

large numbers of women have entered the literary arena. Even more importantly, 

they have contributed to the introduction of new forms of writing. Writers such as 

Shahrnush Parsipur and Moniru Ravanipur were among early trendsetters who experimented 

with postmodern forms of writing. Along with their male counterparts, ‘Abbas 

Ma‘rufi and Ja‘far Modarres Sadeghi, they also adapted the concept of magical realism 

to the Persian idiom and explored new ways of situating women’s lot within the currents 

of Persian literature. 

Women novelists are also at the forefront of reviving realist explorations of history. The unprecedented popularity of the 

novel Bamdad-i Khomar (Drunkard Morning) by Fattanih Haj Seyyed Javadi, first published in 1998, marked a turning 

point in women’s literary production and its widespread reception among Iranian readership. The novel demonstrates 

that hardships faced by women do not necessarily and exclusively stem from the inequality of the sexes before the law, 

but rather from social, economic, and cultural values that have been deeply ingrained in Iranian history. 

Numerous other women writers, representing a vibrant new generation, have added their voices to contemporary Per- 

sian literature. In addition to reaching a much larger readership, these writers have become recipients of literary prizes. 

Zoya Pirzad, Fariba Vafi, and Parinush Sani’i are among Iran’s most read and celebrated novelists today. Their art is 

marked by a new sensitivity to the lives of ordinary women and their means of coping with daily demands of family 

and work. Their protagonists are not the extraordinary beings or heroic types of the 1960s and 70s, and bear witness to 

a turn away from the almost didactic focus of engagé writing. 


The most remarkable 

observable 

change in Persian 

literature after the 

revolution is the increasing 

presence of 

women writers. 

75

Rahimieh... 

Contemporary Persian literature would seem to have moved beyond the focus on educating and liberating the masses. 

In a dramatic departure from the past, the writer does not see herself or himself primarily or exclusively as a social or 

political activist. The current trends in Persian literature indicate that the experiments with writing in the early 20th century have indeed borne fruit, making literature both accessible and popular among the population at large. 


Communication, Media, and Popular Culture in Post-revolutionary Iran 

Mehdi Semati 

In the news media and the prevailing political discourse, Iran is often portrayed as a 

closed society. Characterizations of Iran as a theocratic state, fundamentalist society, 

and a rogue nation depict Iran as an “Islamic” totalitarian state devoid of any freedom 

and trappings of “civil society.” At the same time, cinéphiles the world over applaud the 

work of Iranian filmmakers. One can cite numerous other examples of robust cultural 

activities in Iran. 

Iran’s popular culture and media landscape are not only vast and complex, but are shot 

through with paradoxes and contradictions. One of these paradoxes is the proliferation 

of a largely secular popular culture that has emerged out of the very context in which 

the state has deployed various “Islamization” projects throughout society. This is not to 

suggest that the state has not been successful in launching institutions and policies to 

propagate its version of Islamic culture. Nor does this necessarily mean that all forms of 

religious popular culture are products of the state. Understanding this context requires 

analytical work that carefully considers the state’s cultural policies on the one hand, and 

how Iranians (with varying degrees of religiosity) live their lives under the roof of the 

“Islamic” Republic on the other hand. Part of the context of everyday life, even in Iran, is 

the presence of “globalization” processes and effects. Another indispensable component 

of this context is communication technologies. 

In order to understand communication media and popular culture in Iran, we should 

begin with government owned and operated IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), 

which, by law, is under the direct control of the office of the Supreme Leader. IRIB 

is a mammoth organization that covers a wide range of activities in the production 

and the distribution of content. Its main domestic activities include seven television 

channels and 14 radio networks. Its domestic broadcasting includes a variety of external 

television and radio services that beam programming in 27 languages. The internal 

broadcasting services offer a wide range of highly popular programs (e.g., entertainment, 

news and public affairs, and sports), which itself is far from monolithic (although 

the news reflects the official views of the state). 

With regard to other media outlets, the commercial newspaper industry is very dynamic, 

with the “reformist” press in a constant tug of war, albeit often in a restrained fashion, 

with the authorities. Satellite dishes, though illegal in Iran, are plentiful in urban, and to 

some extent in rural areas as well. Iranians receive, for a nominal one-time fee, over 40 


Mehdi Semati is Associate 

Professor at Eastern Illinois 

University. His research addresses 

Iranian media and 

popular culture. His books 

include Media, Culture and 

Society in Iran: Living with 

Globalization and the Islamic 

State (Routledge, 2008). 

77

Semati... 

Persian-language satellite television networks from outside Iran (including the dreadful “oppositional” channels). They 

also receive hundreds of foreign-language satellite channels (including BBC, CNN International, Voice of America, the 

Bloomberg channels, and the recently launched Persian-language BBC TV). Iran was among the first countries to go 

online in the Middle East, and internet in Iran has become a major force socially, politically, and culturally. Presently, 

there are 700,000 registered blogs in Persian, which is among the top ten languages for blogging worldwide. It is estimated 

that by 2010 about 50% of Iranians will have at least one cellular phone (text-messaging has become a cultural and 

political force), and the recent introduction of very cheap “pay-as-you-go” mobile phones has pushed these numbers 

even higher. These are the major media components of the media landscape in Iran. With such a wide-ranging media in 

the present globalizing context, in a country where 70% of the population is under the age of 30, popular culture cannot 

help but partake in global youth culture. Here I have space to address briefly only rap music in Iran as one form of 

popular culture that has emerged out of this context. 

Over the past four years, chafiyeh, the checkered scarf which has been a part of the ico- 

nography of the Iranian revolution, has made a comeback in Iran among two groups — 

Mr. Ahmadinejad and his ardent supporters, and underground rappers. This, in itself, 

illustrates the contradictions within Iranian society today. For one group, the chafiyeh is 

the symbol of revolutionary commitment, while for the other it is a hipster’s fashion accessory. 

Over the past four years, rap has exploded in Iran. Clearly, the production and 

circulation of rap music could not be possible without the new media technologies in 

Iran (e.g., accessible software and home studios, file sharing, Internet, cell phones). The 

state authorities in Iran are not pleased with the phenomenon of “underground music.” 

Their concern became dramatically clear when state television recently produced a 

controversial documentary demonizing rappers and rock musicians as devil worshipers, 

drug addicts, and delinquents (not unlike “moral panic” episodes in the West when 

punk music or rock were first embraced by youth). 

The official 

“Islamized” media 

and their discourse, 

then, coexist with a 

secular popular culture 

that is in tune 

with what is globally 

popular, even 

as it is reflexive and 

intensely interested 

in its Iranian identity. 

The official “Islamized” media and their discourse, then, coexist with a secular popular culture that is in tune with what 

is globally popular, even as it is reflexive and intensely interested in its Iranian identity. Here we could say that the wider 

popular culture provides a space in which the demands of state Islamization through official media and the realities 

of (global) youth culture and media-saturated everyday life are negotiated and reconciled. In a country with a young 

and largely urbanized population that has easy access to communication technologies and information, such cultural 

dynamism is noteworthy. In the case of the chafiyeh, in any case, we find the dilemmas and contradictions of the Iranian 

state and the revolution of 1979 that still demand careful examination. 


Society 


79

Iranian Society: A Surprising Picture 

Bahman Baktiari 

Iranian society has changed dramatically over the past 30 years, and bears little resemblance 

either to the expectations of or the picture painted by the leadership of the 

Islamic Republic. Indeed, as much as the ruling clerics like to project self-confidence 

and the ability to predict the future, they could not have envisaged a society with these 

characteristics. While many of these surprising developments have occurred because of 

the policies of the Islamic Republic, others have occurred despite or regardless of them. 

If our picture of Iran prior to 1979 was so positive that we could not imagine anything 

negative happening inside the country, our picture of Iran today is so negative that we 

cannot imagine anything positive taking place. Yet, as this essay shows, some government 

policies have been pragmatic and beneficial to society. 

The “demographic gift” of the post-revolutionary period has resulted in a doubling of the 

population to 71 million, and more specifically a burgeoning of the youth population. Two 

out of three Iranians are under the age of 30. As reflected by Iran’s 85% literacy rate 

(among the highest of Muslim countries), young Iranians are much better educated 

than previous generations. However, fewer than one in three can remember the revolution, 

and the young suffer disproportionately from the regime’s failures. In 2007, by the 

government’s own reckoning, nearly every other Iranian between the ages of 25 and 29 

was unemployed. A lack of jobs is no doubt one reason for the prevalence of crime and 

delinquency in the country. 

The demographic surge has been accompanied by rapid urbanization; seven out of ten 

Iranians now live in cities. Large cities are confronted with serious issues regarding municipal 

management of basic services, poor planning for housing construction, and serious 

environmental risks. The population of Tehran has increased to 14 million (from 

six million in 1980). The World Bank, which in 2003 lent Tehran $20 million to clean 

up the air, said the pollution in Iran’s major cities exceeded World Health Organization 

standards by 40% to 340%. 1 

Iranian society is a nominally austere society, much of whose actual behavior attests to 

the fact that the regime’s draconian policies of imposing Islamic restrictions on everything, 

ranging from the country’s penal code to university admission policies, have backfired. 

According to one source, Iranian clergy have complained that more than 70% of the 

population does not perform their daily prayers and that less than 2% attend Friday 

1. The los Angeles Times, October 21, 2007. 

Bahman Baktiari is the Director 

of the School of Policy 

and International Affairs, 

University of Maine and effective 

July 2009, Director, 

Middle East Center, University 

of Utah. 


Baktiari... 

mosques. 2 The rise of lay intellectuals, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, is due to the fact that their argument emphasizes 

the separation of religion from politics in Iran, implicitly hinting at the problems caused by clerical involvement in 

politics. 3 

Iranian society has become globalized. A recent blog census found that there are more than 700,000 weblogs written 

in Persian, compared with about 50 in neighboring Iraq. Iranian bloggers include members of Hizbullah, teenagers 

in Tehran, retirees in Los Angeles, religious students in Qom, dissident journalists who left Iran a few years ago, 

exiles who left 30 years ago, current members of the Majlis (parliament), reformist politicians, a multitude of poets, 

and — quite famously — the President of Iran, among many others. This has allowed the Internet savvy Iranian 

youth to have access to a wide range of perspectives that criticize the Islamic Republic’s policy positions. 4 

The number of women graduating from Iran’s universities is overtaking the number of 

men, promising a change in the job market and, with it, profound social change. Well over 

half of university students in Iran are now women. In the applied Physics Department 

of Azad University, 70% of the graduates are women — a statistic which would make 

many universities in the West proud. Ten years ago, only 12.5% of Iranian medical students 

were women, and the government responded by setting a goal that half of new 

students would be female. Today, one-third of the 22,326 students in Iran’s 38 medical 

schools are women. But the regime’s policy of depriving female doctors of training in 

male hospital wards leads to tensions. In 2001, students at the Fatimieh Female Medical 

School in Qom, one of Iran’s most religious cities, held a sit-in protest in Tehran. 

Striking a balance between the republican and Islamic components of governance has become exceedingly complicated, if 

not confounding. Iran has a confusing legal structure that is based on parliamentary legislations, codification of Islamic 

law into an Islamic penal code, religious rulings of mujtahids (fatwas), opinions of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 

(known as the faqih or jurisconsult), and rulings by the current Supreme Leader, ‘Ali Khamene’i (vali amr moslemin). 

Although republicanism is expressed in elections for a President, parliamentary deputies, and city councils, powerful 

unelected clerical bodies, such as the Council of Guardians, use their authority to veto any candidate that they view as 

“unacceptable.” Moreover, according to Article 167 of the Iranian Constitution, “whenever there is no law or the law is 

ambiguous, judges must refer to authoritative sources and authentic fatwas.” This has led to thousands of contradictory 

fatwas, which makes it impossible for judges to give uniform rulings on similar violations. 


Striking a balance 

between the republican 

and Islamic 

components of 

governance has become 

exceedingly 

complicated, if not 

confounding. 

2. The Economist, January 16, 2003. 

3. Afshin Matin-asgari, “Abdolkarim Sorush and the Secularization of Islamic Thought in Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 30, Nos. 

1-2 (Winter/Spring 1997). 

4. John Kelly and Bruce Etling, Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere, The Berkman 

Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, April 2008. 

81

Baktiari... 

The publication of books by non-clerics directly question and challenge the clerics on their interpretation of Islamic law. 

To cite one example, Emad Baghi’s book, Right to life, argues for the abolition and suspension of the death penalty in 

Iran and draws on Qur’anic verses to argue that, “Crime, felony, and executions are the results of and contributors to a 

culture of violence.” 

As much as the ruling élite in the Islamic Republic has had a difficult time negotiating 

the boundaries of Islamic principles with its Republican constitutionalism, they have not 

been as rigid in finding a positive interpretation of Shari‘a when it comes to the role of science, 

particularly regarding important scientific discoveries. Since the late 1990s, Iranian 

scientists have engaged the religious hierarchy in a lively debate on genetic engineering, 

biomedical sciences, and ethical issues. Iran is now investing heavily in science, after 

decades of neglect. 5 Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i has issued a fatwa 

calling on researchers to secure Iran’s position as the “leader in science” in the Middle 

East over the next 20 years. 6 They have effectively applied the principle of maslahat (expediency) 

as a way of justifying important scientific discoveries since there are no texts 

in the Qur’an or Sunna that expressly prohibit such innovations. Iranians have been 

quite open in their judgments about scientific developments in genetic engineering, 

artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and transplants. This is in contrast to 

the controversy that has been raging for decades about kidney transplants in Egypt. 7 

After living in 

a state of semicrisis 

for 30 years, 

Iranians have 

learned their lessons 

about revolution, 

the consequences 

of mixing 

religion with politics, 

and the costs of 

living in a country 

that is under sanctions 

and pressures. 

In conclusion, Iranians from all walks of life crave stability on their borders and a government that can deliver on its 

promises and plans. After living in a state of semi-crisis for 30 years, Iranians have learned their lessons about revolution, 

the consequences of mixing religion with politics, and the costs of living in a country that is under sanctions and 

pressures. With 30% inflation, a 35% increase in food prices in 2008, a $50 billion deficit, and an unemployment rate of 

16% (the highest level since the 1960s), Iran’s rulers will have a hard time convincing the population that they are better 

off in 2009. 

5. Science, September 16, 2005, p. 1802. 

6. Science, December 17, 2008, p. 292. 

7. The Egyptian Parliament passed legislation effectively banning any kidney transplants between Muslims and Christians. 

In August 2008, the Egyptian Medical Association denied that a bill would discriminate between Christians and Muslims 

by prohibiting organ transplants between members of the two faiths. The Association supports the controversial measure. 

“This is all to protect poor Muslims from rich Christians who buy their organs and vice versa,” explained Hamdi al-Sayyid, 

the Director of the Medical Association. Under the bill, physicians who violate the proposed law would face retribution. See 

Martin Barillas, “Egypt Seeks to Ban Christian-Muslim Organ Transplants,” The Cutting Edge, August 25, 2008. 


Iranian Nationalism Rediscovered 

Ali Ansari 

In the fall of 2007, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad welcomed President Vladimir Putin 

on the first state visit by a Russian leader since Joseph Stalin came to Iran to attend 

the Tehran Summit in 1943 along with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. 

The Iranian press was in no doubt as to the significance of the visit, which for many illustrated 

not only Iran’s importance but its return to the world stage as a power with which 

to be reckoned. If the press commentary echoed aspirations more commonly associated 

with the pre-Revolutionary monarchy, a more startling symbol of continuity soon became 

apparent. As the two Presidents took their positions for the official welcome and 

opening press conference, observers were faced with a backdrop constructed to look 

like the Achaemenid Persian guards that adorned the ruined walls of Persepolis. 

The celebrated site of the ancient Persian ceremonial capital had remained popular 

within the Iranian consciousness, though it had been kept at arm’s length by the official 

ideologues of the Islamic Revolution. For them, Persepolis was tainted not only 

by the fact that it represents pre-Islamic Iran, but perhaps more crucially because of its 

close association with Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Few would have dared to exploit 

the symbolism as explicitly as Ahmadinejad — an unambiguous statement that Iranian 

nationalism, always a staple of the social consciousness, had returned to the political 

stage. 

Yet it is also remarkable how few have noticed the significance of the transformation 

taking place in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To be sure, Iranian nationalism has never 

been far beneath the political surface, although at the onset of the Islamic Revolution 

it tended to be buried within layers of Islamicized rhetoric. While many have debated 

the relationship between religion and nationalism, and particularly the importance of 

Shi‘ism to the development of a specifically Iranian identity, there has perhaps been less 

appreciation of the process by which religion has effectively been nationalized over the 

last 30 years, such that now more than ever we can talk of an “Iranian Shi‘ism.” There has 

been a tendency in the West to essentialize the Revolution, to view it through an Arab or 

Islamic prism, and above all to see it as unchanging. There are obvious pedagogic reasons 

for this, such as the need to simplify a complex and at times bewildering political 

dynamic. But at the same time, it does little justice to the reality of social change. 

The ideologues of the Islamic Republic did not dismiss nationalism. Instead, they sought 

to define nationalism in such a way that it would play a subservient role to the dominant 


Dr. Ali Ansari, University of 

St Andrews 

83

Ansari... 

Islamic narrative. However, this proved to be difficult. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, it became apparent 

that the people could not be mobilized by religion alone. Confronting an Iraqi regime that had a clear interest in defining 

the struggle in ethnic rather than sectarian terms, the Islamic Republic was quick to adapt. The “nation” became 

sacred. 

The impact of the eight-year war, along with the dramatic growth in literacy, the emer- 

gence of a truly mass media, and the consequent rise in political consciousness, all encouraged 

a vibrant popular discussion of the nature of national identity and the meaning 

of being Iranian. Some of this related to notions of development, especially reflections 

on under-development. Of equal, if not greater importance was the relationship 

between religion, specifically Islam and identity. Some have interpreted this development 

simply as the reaction of society against the oppressive Islamic dogma of the state. 

While this interpretation has some validity, it tends to disguise the role played by the 

state, if only inadvertently, in harnessing this transformation. It was, for example, the 

Islamic Republic that encouraged its acolytes to research the history of early Islam in 

Iran. It was these very devotees of revolution who began to uncover realities that were 

at odds with the dominant orthodox narrative promoted by the new Islamic Republic. 

As in the case of students of religious history in the West, it was a short step for the 

acolytes of the Islamic Republic from studying the history of Islam to contextualizing 

that history. By extension, this development was more complex than a simple return to 

the equally dogmatic and somewhat stale state ideology of the Pahlavis. Indeed, one of 

the real strengths of this rediscovered nationalism was the pluralistic character and the 

intensity of the intellectual debates it engendered. 

The impact of the 

eight-year war, 

along with the dramatic 

growth in 

literacy, the emergence 

of a truly 

mass media, and the 

consequent rise in 

political consciousness, 

all encouraged 

a vibrant popular 

discussion of the 

nature of national 

identity and the 

meaning of being 

Iranian. 

As Ahmadinejad’s press conference revealed, while the Achaemenids had enjoyed a gradual if emphatic rehabilitation 

in the eyes of the state, what was now different was the intellectual depth of the debates, and the crucial fact that in this 

case, the state was more often than not responding to social sentiment. Moreover, it wasn’t simply the Achaemenids who 

were basking in a new-found attention; it was the entire social and culture milieu of the Iranian world prior to the rise 

of Islam along with a reassessment of its legacy for the world of Islam. Through the decade of the 1990s to the present, 

there has been a gradual synthesis of the various narratives of Iranian history — drawing on developments in modern 

historiography and the rehabilitation of traditional mythologies of descent as encapsulated in the national epic, the 

Shahnameh (Book of Kings). It is a view of Iran’s place in the world which has been reinforced by the apparent reality of 

the growth of Iranian influence in the region. This renewed Iranian national project is ongoing and far from complete. 

Like all developing ideologies, it is inconsistent and contradictory. President Ahmadinejad has been the most blatant in 

his exploitation of this sentiment, and there is little doubt that the ruling elite will seek to harness and control it. However, 

history suggests that this may not be as easy as they may think. 


Iranian “Exceptionalism” 

Sadegh Zibakalam 

One of the strange features of 20th century Iranian leaders has been a tendency to perceive 

themselves, their government, and Iran as serious challengers to the present world 

order. Given the fact that the present world order is very much a Western dominated 

system, the Iranian leaders’ historic “crusade” has been broadly anti-Western. Shah Muhammad 

Reza Pahlavi as well as his successors have perceived their respective regime as 

offering the world a different system of leadership — one that is far superior to that of 

the West in many respects. Thus, Iranian “exceptionalism” rests on two main pillars: the 

negation of the present world order and the belief in the inherent superiority of Iranian 

Dr. S. Zibakalam, Professor 

civilization. 

of Iranian Studies, Faculty 

of law and Political Science, 

Iranian leaders’ repudiation of the current world order stems from their criticism that Tehran University 

it perpetuates the gap between the less developed and the more affluent nations; enables 

the exploitation of less developed countries by Western multinational companies; 

imposes an international trade regime while denying useful technology to developing 

countries; drains the meager wealth of developing countries by foisting upon them luxury 

and consumer goods which for the most part they could do without; and pollutes 

the environment. They also accuse the West of fuelling domestic turmoil and conflicts 

between the nations of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. By keeping the conflicts burning, 

the West is able to sell arms to the warring parties, thereby preventing their leaders 

from spending money on health, education, job creation, and other services. Iranian 

leaders also charge that the West has interfered in the political affairs of less developed 

countries, including by tacitly supporting coups and assassinations, and by other methods, 

seriously hampering the efforts of nationalists and patriotic leaders who have challenged 

Western supremacy and incursion into their countries. 

Another important area of dispute between the Iranian leaders and the West concerns 

the latter’s political structure. The Iranian indictment of the Western political system, 

or liberal democracy, is twofold. First, according to Iranian leaders both before and 

since the Islamic Revolution, the notion that genuine democracy exists in the West is 

an illusion. The people in the West are misled by those who hold real power to believe 

that they are enjoying democracy — that they, as citizens, can choose their government 

and that they can alter the government and change its policies through the ballot box. 

These are deceptions and illusions. The real power in the West is held by those who own 

large economic enterprises — banks, factories, financial institutions, and multinationals. 

They choose the government and the ruling elite through a complex political and 


85

Zibakalam... 

media network. It is true that the people in the West believe their votes at the ballot box changes the government and 

appoints new leaders, but lo and behold, it is the vested interest that holds all the strings and imposes its will upon the 

ordinary man on the street, leading him to believe that it was his or her vote which brought changes. 

Second, Iranian leaders have disputed the West’s claims about human rights. Both the Shah and Islamic leaders have 

been criticized by the West for their human rights record. Of course, human rights violations were far more serious 

and widespread during the Pahlavi era than under the Islamic regime. However both regimes’ responses to the Western 

criticism have been astonishingly identical. Neither the Shah nor Iran’s present leaders ever accepted that they might 

have violated human rights. Nor have they ever accepted that they might have put someone behind bars for his or her 

political views. Both have insisted that those who were detained were criminals, were colluding with the country’s enemies, 

or were jeopardizing state security. They also have dismissed Western human rights criticisms as being “politically 

motivated.” Whereas the Shah stated that his independent policies were the real cause of the West’s anger against him, 

Islamic leaders have accused Western countries as being the real violators of human rights. 1 

But the most remarkable similarity between the Shah and the Islamic leaders lies in 

their dismissal of Western civilization on the one hand and their belief in “Iranian superiority” 

on the other. In the case of post-revolutionary leaders, Islam has been added 

to the “Iranian” ledger as well. The Shah praised his “Great Civilization” (Tamadon Bozorg) 

as an alternative to Western civilization which, according to him, would end in 

Fascism or Communism if it failed to change its political system. 2 He was so confident 

of the superiority of the great Iranian civilization and of his political philosophy under 

the Tamadon Bozorg to the West’s liberal democratic system that nearly a year before 

the 1979 revolution he actually advocated it as an alternative to Western democracy. 3 

The most remarkable 

similarity between 

the Shah and 

the Islamic leaders 

lies in their dismissal 

of Western 

civilization on the 

one hand and their 

belief in “Iranian 

superiority” on the 

other. 

The idea that Western civilization is disintegrating and that Islamic Iran offers a viable and a far superior sociopolitical 

as well as economic alternative has become a far more serious undertaking under the leaders of the Islamic Republic. 

Many Iranians perceived the Islamic Revolution as a “third way” between Western capitalism and Eastern communism. 

The great slogan of the revolution “na sharghi, na gharbi” (neither the East nor the West) reflected the conviction that 

Islamic Iran would be a truly independent state — independent from both Western and Soviet domination. Gradually, 

however, the notion of “neither the East nor the West” turned into an ideological crusade implying the superiority of the 

Iranian-Islamic model that had been established in Iran since the revolution. The bitter eight-year war with Iraq and a 

host of other problems which emerged in the country persuaded many Islamists not to greatly boast the merits of the Islamic 

Republic to the West or the East. The ideological crusade receded during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s term as President 

(1989-1997), and receded further during the reformist period under President Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005). 

1. Sadegh Zibakalam, Moghdame-h bar Inghelab-e Islami [An Introduction to the Islamic Revolution], 5 th edition (Tehran: 

Rozaneh Publications, 2007), pp. 195-216. 

2. Zibakalam, Moghdame-h bar Inghelab-e Islami, pp. 189-190. 

3. Zibakalam, Moghdame-h bar Inghelab-e Islami., p. 198. 


Zibakalam... 

However, since the rise of the hardliners in 2005, the ideological crusade has resumed. 

Both President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders are once again beating 

the drum of the superiority of Islamic-Iranian civilization over that of the “decadent 

West.” According to the Iranian hardliners, the US failure in Iraq and Afghanistan 

as well the collapse of the US plan for the “Greater Middle East,” coupled with Israel’s 

defeat by Hizbullah in south Lebanon in 2004, Iran’s progress in its nuclear program 

despite the West’s opposition, and the great financial crisis of the Western economy in 

2008 all are clear indications that the West is on the decline and that the great and historic 

Islamic civilization is on the rise. Of course, the more prudent and more realistic 

Islamic leaders have not partaken in this crusade. But the more hardline Islamic leaders 

enthusiastically tell their huge audience that the decadent and arrogant Western power 

is disintegrating, Islam is on the rise, and victory will come soon. 

Given the extremely dangerous ramifications that this strange “superman” attitude and an “ideological crusade” can 

have for peace and security in the region, not to mention its negative and tragic consequences for Iran itself, it would 

be an interesting academic exploration as well as immensely useful sociopolitical research to find out why so many 

Iranians perceive their country as the great nation which has been entrusted with the historic task of saving the world 

from decadent powers. 


The more hardline 

Islamic leaders enthusiastically 

tell 

their huge audience 

that the decadent 

and arrogant 

Western power 

is disintegrating, 

Islam is on the rise, 

and victory will 

come soon. 

87

Energy, Economy, and the Environment 


Potentials and Challenges in the Iranian Oil and Gas Industry 

Narsi Ghorban 

Thirty years after the revolution, Iran’s hydrocarbon industry is facing new opportunities 

and challenges. This essay attempts to evaluate the future of Iran’s oil and gas sector 

in view of changing circumstances in the oil and gas industry and the barriers to Iran 

taking full advantage of its potentials. 

Iran’s combined oil and gas reserves are probably the highest in the world and are 

matched only by Russia and Saudi Arabia. Based on official statistics, Iran’s oil reserves 

are over 130 billion barrels, which allows the country to produce more than 5 million 

barrels of oil per day for over 50 years. Even if half of the declared estimated reserves 

are considered, Iran could still produce oil at current levels for over 40 years. The gas 

reserves (around 30 trillion cubic meters) make Iran’s gas potential second only to that 

of Russia. If gas production is increased by four times the current level to over 550 billion 

cubic meters per year by 2020, Iran can still produce gas beyond 2055. The country 

is also rich in mineral resources, and the mining industry could be profitably exploited 

in view of the availability of energy in the long term. 

Iran’s other major potential is its educated youth. More than 70% of the Iranian population 

is below 32 years; there are currently 20 million people at schools and 2 million in 

universities. The combination of human skills and mineral resources near the natural 

gas fields of the Persian Gulf makes an ideal investment opportunity in energy-based 

industries. For example, the cost of production of clinker and cement in Iran would be 

one of the lowest in the world, given the vast lime stone availability, low priced gas, local 

technical and operational expertise, and immediate access to Persian Gulf ports. Other 

energy-based industries such as iron, aluminium, and glass industries as well as Gas to 

Liquids and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) also have good potential. Iran’s petrochemical 

industry is already the second largest in the Middle East, but has much room to grow. 

Another potential asset that Iran can utilize is its geographical position connecting the 

resources of the Persian Gulf countries with those of the Caspian Sea region and Russia 

in West Asia as well as being within a reasonable distance on land from major energy 

consuming regions (i.e., the Indian subcontinent and Turkey). Easy access to markets in 

the Far East and Europe from the Persian Gulf is an additional advantage. Iran could be 

a major producer and consumer (given population growth projections) of a variety of 

goods and services, importing and exporting oil products, natural gas, and electricity. 


Dr. Narsi Ghorban is the 

Managing Director of Narkangan 

Gas To liquid International 

Company. He 

is also the Chairman of 

Qeshm Energy International, 

Doran Energy and the 

Director of International 

Institute for Caspian Studies 

(IICS). 

89

Ghorban... 

Against all these enviable potentials, which could easily make Iran a regional superpower in a relatively short time, 

there exist a number of major challenges that have to be addressed if Iran would like to benefit from these advantages. 

First and foremost, Iran needs to redefine its outlook on the world in line with the regional and international realities. 

The governments that have come to power through revolution usually call for a revolutionary sprit and zeal to continue, 

and Iran is not an exception. However, after 30 years of revolutionary behavior, it is time to give priority to the future of 

its young population, who seek jobs and a better standard of living. The biggest challenge is to set these priorities based 

on the country’s real strengths and regional realities, rather than delusions. Iran must sort out its differences with the 

United States and Europe in order to open the door to a constructive competition from all countries for inward investment, 

particularly in the oil and gas industries, which is the country’s engine of growth. 

Iran has to address the rapid decline in oil production from the old fields, which is 

However, after 30 

currently estimated to be over half a million barrels per day each year. This is a major 

years of revolution- 

challenge, which requires a transfer of up to date technology in enhanced oil recovery 

ary behavior, it is 

techniques, development of gas resources to be injected into old oil fields, and huge time to give priority 

capital investment in developing new oil fields. If the political circumstances improve to the future of its 

and the right economic incentives are offered, the transfer of technology and the much young population, 

needed investment would be forthcoming. The present legal framework — “buy back” who seek jobs and 

service contracts — is neither attractive to international oil and gas companies nor a better standard of 

popular among many experts within Iran. In addition, these types of contracts have living. 

failed to bring Iran up to date with recent technological advancements. In general, the 

interaction between Iranian scientists in various fields with their counterparts around the world has been limited. Unless 

serious changes in policies are made, the technology gap will widen, with serious consequences for the industry in 

general and the oil and gas sector in particular. 

Another major challenge that Iran must address is the rising domestic demand for petroleum products and natural 

gas, which has been over 10% annually during the past decade. Energy subsidies and the lack of comprehensive energy 

policies are generally blamed for this. The idea of raising energy prices to the price level of other countries is a folly 

that could reduce the consumption of energy at the expense of the total collapse of the country’s industry, resulting in 

more wide-ranging severe economic consequences. It is prudent that in the initial stage the energy prices are raised to 

the level where it covers the cost of energy production, refining, and transportation with a reasonable rate of return in 

each sector. The government could then gradually levy taxes similar to those in many energy producing countries of the 

world. Although energy subsidies should be directed to the lower income group, it would be unwise to think of this as 

a solution to the problem or use it as a political objective. 

The current structure of the oil and gas industry in Iran is not suited to deal with developments in the world oil and gas 

sector that have taken place in the past 30 years. Major changes are needed in order to enable the present Iranian oil 

and gas industry to cope with the realities of the domestic and world markets. Privatization has not moved according 


Ghorban... 

to plan, and Iranian’s participation in the oil and gas industry has been minimal so far. After 100 years of oil and gas 

production, refining, and transportation, private and even state Iranian companies are not fully capable of undertaking 

major upstream or downstream projects without relying on foreign help. Similarly, the structure of the industry has 

prevented the Iranian banking system and private capital from engaging in the oil and gas business. Consequently, for 

every major project, the government seeks international finance and participation from foreign energy companies. 

Another important issue is the lack of adequate research and development facilities 

and proper institutions for Iranian students to learn about different aspects of the oil 

and gas industry. Although the National Iranian Oil Company has had its own research 

center for some time and a few universities recently have opened petroleum 

study courses, there is no serious link or cooperation between the oil and gas industry 

and higher education institutions. 

If the above-mentioned challenges are swiftly resolved, there will be a huge investment 

in the Iranian oil and gas industry, which would lead to a major positive impact on the 

Iranian economy and the standard of living in Iran. 


Although the 

National Iranian 

Oil Company has 

had its own research 

center for 

some time and a 

few universities recently 

have opened 

petroleum study 

courses, there is no 

serious link or cooperation 

between 

the oil and gas industry 

and higher 

education institutions. 

91

Iran’s Foreign Policy and the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline 

Jalil Roshandel 

Shortly after the revolution in 1979, Iran somewhat irrationally distanced itself from 

the international community. Partly because of revolutionary fervor, Iran initially made 

itself vulnerable. The American hostage crisis and the eight-year war with Iraq exposed 

Iran to economic hardship and international isolation. 

Post-revolutionary Iran has sought to overcome its weakness by using economic and 

political resources to create an international coalition aimed at counteracting pressure 

imposed by the West. To achieve this goal, Iran has played different cards, including 

strengthening ties with Middle Eastern groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas; keeping 

a window of dialogue open or trying to avoid confrontation with the European 

Union with the aim of challenging the US embargo and political pressure; engaging in 

military-industrial cooperation with Russia and China in order to create a friendlier 

environment at the UN Security Council while advancing its nuclear agenda; and pursuing 

a policy of détente with the GCC states, with the broader objective of reducing US 

influence in the Persian Gulf. 

In addition to these efforts, Iran has sought to build a pipeline to transfer Iranian natural 

gas to the Indian subcontinent — though bringing this project to fruition has proven 

elusive. Natural gas reserves were discovered in Iran’s South Pars field ten years after 

the revolution. Soon after this discovery, the governments of Iran, Pakistan, and India 

increased their efforts to realize a natural gas pipeline project that will serve the twin 

purpose of increasing Iran’s gas exports and meeting high energy demand in South 

Asian countries. The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, also called the “Peace Pipeline,” 

has special significance for both economic and political reasons. Not only would 

this project greatly benefit energy-deficient countries such as India and Pakistan, but it 

also has the potential to affect the nature of the relations among them and to contribute 

to greater regional stability. 

Iran, which has the world’s second largest proven natural gas reserves after Russia, has 

been eager to exploit this resource not only as source of revenue, but also as leverage for 

political gains. India, with an increasing need for energy as its population quickly approaches 

1.3 billion, is the biggest potential customer. Pakistan, which refuses to establish 

normal trading ties with India, also can benefit greatly from the pipeline by earning 

hundreds of millions of dollars in transit fees and other annual royalties from both Iran 

and India. Were this pipeline to be constructed, Pakistan’s role between Iran and India 

Dr. Jalil Roshandel is Associate 

Professor and Director 

of the Security Studies 

program in the Department 

of Political Science at East 

Carolina University. 


Roshandel... 

would be very similar to that of Ukraine between Russia and the European Union. 

The United States has been opposed to the gas pipeline project, citing various security concerns. Washington is fearful 

that a situation might emerge where these countries would directly or indirectly confront the United States and other 

Western countries for the control of energy bases. In addition, emerging strategic relations between Iran and India 

could lead to cooperation in the nuclear sphere, or at a minimum provide the revenue that could be used to further 

Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program and its support for terrorism. In addition, this project could help to shape an 

environment in which Iran might be able to perpetuate its poor human rights record. 

Until recently, Iran faced two main challenges in bringing this project to fruition. The 

first challenge is the historic conflict between India and Pakistan over Muslim Kashmir, 

in which Iran has taken the pragmatic stance of non-intervention. Regarding the Kashmir 

conflict, it is worth noting that Iran has had similar experiences with its northern 

neighbors, maintaining a more or less neutral position on the Chechens’ conflict with 

Russia, basically because of the strategically significant gains that this posture promised 

to yield. Similarly, Iran’s position on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno- 

Karabakh was driven by strategic concerns, which ruled out taking a pro-Azeri position, 

rather than by religious ideology. 

The second and more important challenge was and still is the American perception — with which most Western states 

appear to agree — that Iran should not be allowed to make long-term commitments on its strategic resources with 

non-Western countries. It is important to mention that these Western concerns are not limited to Iran; there is a general 

concern that the revenues generated by Pakistan also could be further used to support terrorist activities, depending on 

who channels the funding. The Pakistani involvement in the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 confirms 

that this concern is not baseless. 

The attacks in Mumbai undoubtedly had direct and lasting implications for international security, but its immediate 

regional impact was to disrupt Iran’s efforts to reach a final agreement on the pipeline project at a time when there were 

signs of progress despite the change of government in Pakistan. Following the Mumbai attacks, however, Iran’s negotiations 

with India and Pakistan on the issue of the gas pipeline came to an abrupt halt. The IPI project seems unlikely to 

move forward any time soon. Many strategists believe that Pakistan’s raison d’être is deeply rooted in the conflict with 

India. If their assessment is correct, then Iran either will have to wait a long time for the Peace Pipeline to materialize 

or look for other highly costly and doubtful options like transiting the pipeline through waters not far from Pakistan’s 

southern shores. 

The focal issue for Iran is to push the pipeline project into an operational phase. However, Iran faces several obstacles 

and uncertainties. First, although the United States recognizes the growing energy needs of India and Pakistan, it has 


Were this pipeline 

to be constructed, 

Pakistan’s role between 

Iran and 

India would be very 

similar to that of 

Ukraine between 

Russia and the 

European Union. 

93

Roshandel... 

repeatedly expressed concerns over international participation in energy projects with 

Iran. Second, it is not clear which countries/companies will eventually become involved 

in the implementation of the project. China, Russia, Japan, and even some European 

countries have expressed interest in the project’s long-term potential. Obviously, Russian 

involvement in the pipeline project, in addition to their involvement in Caspian 

Sea projects, could complicate the situation further by reducing US companies’ participation 

in the region. 

The Mumbai terrorist 

attacks have 

disrupted Iran’s 

politico-economic 

strategy. 

In conclusion, the Mumbai terrorist attacks have disrupted Iran’s politico-economic strategy. Indeed, they have deprived 

Iran of a major foreign policy achievement — of which there have been very few in the past 30 years. 


Environmental Snapshots in Contemporary Iran 

Mohammad Eskandari 

Pollution is a familiar story to Tehranis. Every winter a black, smelly cloud accumulates 

over Tehran. But the scale and intensity of the newest phase of invading toxic 

pollutants seems to have taken everybody by surprise. The sick and elderly are warned 

to stay indoors. Schools might be closed for a week. The officials estimate that the life 

expectancy of every resident of Tehran has dropped by five years due to pollution. And 

the argument over which institutions are responsible, and what measures should be 

taken, seem to be leading nowhere. The cars responsible for producing over 90% of the 

pollutants are an integral part of urban transportation and a vital source of income for 

many Tehranis. At the same time, the government is paying over $9 billion every year to 

subsidize gasoline that keeps the cars running. Even so, Tehran’s air pollution is but one 

case among the complex environmental problems in need of radical changes that are 

too politically sensitive to be taken on by any government. 

As Tehran’s air pollution crisis reached its peak, Iran’s first environmental news agency 

— IREN — launched its website. 1 Almost all other national and local dailies also cover 

environmental news routinely. Many even have a special environmental page, a sign 

of heightened environmental awareness. Yet the very existence of these newspapers is 

under threat. An increasing number of papers and journals recently have been forced to 

shut down following sham trials, while the remaining ones find themselves at the mercy 

of a unrelenting press court and a repressive press law. 

The number of environmental NGOs has been on the rise since President Muhammad 

Khatami opened the door to civil society institutions. One expert put their number 

at 500 in 2003. 2 These grassroots initiatives are promising indeed. Yet most of them 

have few or no resources — no labs, maps, or satellite image processing capability. They 

rely completely on the voluntary work of concerned citizens. They do not have a clear 

mission. In most cases, their officials are poorly trained and are poorly connected to 

universities or research institutions. And their activists try to stay away from suspected 

1. Iran NonGovernment Environment News Network, http://www.iren.ir/. See also 

B. Rohani’s interview with Nasser Karami at Radio Zamaneh, http://zamaaneh.com/ 

rohani/2008/12/post_42.html. 

2. See Bagher Namazi’s summary report about Iran’s NGOs at the Wilson Center, http:// 

www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=40196. 

Mr. Namazi, who has been running an NGO empowerment center, the Iran NGO Initiative, 

is the most reliable source about Iranian NGOs, yet this number should be taken with 

caution. Some of these so-called NGOs consist of a few enthusiasts in a small neighborhood 

with no real activity other than regular friendly meetings. 


Mohammad Eskandari 

was born in Tehran. He 

completed his MA in Economics 

at the University of 

Tehran and then worked as 

a translator and editor for 

more than ten years. He is 

currently a PhD student of 

Geography at Clark University. 

His areas of interest 

lie mainly in development 

theory, political economy, 

and the geopolitics of the 

Middle East. 

95

Eskandari... 

international advocacy institutions. Most importantly, they have no clear standing in the decision-making process. No 

wonder these NGOs have not yet been able to successfully oppose even a single project in the country. 

There are reports about the sad condition of Iranian lakes, rivers, groundwater, and other water systems. Lake Bakhtegan 

has gone completely dry. 3 Anzali lagoon is considered by many experts to be terminally doomed. 4 Zayandeh Rood River 

in Isfahan annually goes dry in some seasons. 5 And with the demise of each, whole ecosystems are gone forever. Apart 

from record level drought, extensive dam construction and water diversions are behind this sad scene. Iranian officials 

seem to be obsessed with dam construction, when the adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts of large 

dams are now common knowledge. The guiding principle of water management in Iran is still the discredited view of 

not letting any drop of water be “wasted.” 6 The result is drying lakes. Why are dams still so central to water management 

in top-down development practices in Iran? Why is the opposition to them ignored even in the most extreme cases, 

such as Sivand Dam in Fars Province? 

Lake Uromiyeh in the northwest has been in the news lately because it is going dry and 

its marine life is being destroyed. This is also a result of dams and water diversions. 7 

This lake also has been subject to one of the world’s most bizarre engineering projects: 

a bridge is being built by pouring cement, sand, and rock into the bottom of the lake 

to fill it up to the surface and literally cut it in half. The idea is to build a road through 

it that reaches the bottom of the lake. 8 Where is Iran’s 

Environmental 

Protection 

Organization? 

Had the bridge been completed as originally designed, the project would have 

disrupted completely the ecological life and functions of this lake. Needless to say, thius unified body of water kept moving, 

defying the engineering feat. How are these “development” decisions made? Who is overseeing the implementation 

of these projects? Where is Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization? 

In the north of Iran, all reports indicate that the Caspian Sea is seriously ill. Its only mammal, the Caspian seal, is disappearing 

at an alarming rate. 9 Overfishing is threatening its fish stocks and fisheries, and its sturgeon and other caviar 

3. “Bakhtegan lake gone dry,” BBC Persian, August 28, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/08/080820_mg_ 

bakhtegan.shtml. 

4. Holčik, J. and J. Oláh, “Fish, fisheries and water quality in Anzali lagoon and its watershed,” FAO, http://www.fao.org/ 

docrep/006/AD192E/AD192E00.htm. 

5. “Zayandeh Rood gone dry,” BBC Persian, June 29, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/06/080629_anzayanderood.shtml. 

6. Persistence on not letting water be ‘wasted’ by completing its circle is such a common view in Iran that it is even repeated 

in Friday prayers. 

7. Zoltan Vekerdy, “Integrated Water Resource Management for the Uromiyeh Basin,” Water Food Ecosystems, http://www. 

waterfoodecosystems.nl/?page=1920. 

8. See also these two news reports about the bridge: B Rohani, “Environmental impacts of Uromiyah bridge,” RadioZamaneh, 

http://zamaaneh.com/rohani/2008/11/post_29.html and Esmail Karom, “Environment, the victim of poorly studied 

development projects,” Radiozamaneh, http://radiozamaaneh.com/rohani/2008/08/post_243.html. 

9. “Caspian’s only mammal on the verge of extinction,” BBC Persian, October 14, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/science/ 

story/2008/10/081014_mg_iucn.shtml. 


Eskandari... 

producing fish are going extinct. 10 A kind of comb-jelly fish, Mnemiopsis, an invasive species, is destroying the ecological 

balance. 11 Oil pollution, nuclear pollution, and urban waste are running into it and are threatening the ecosystem. Yet 

Iran and the other countries surrounding this body of water are still fighting over how to divide it between them. How 

are they going to address the pressing environmental problems of this sea absent a working framework for dialogue and 

cooperation? 

What do these snapshots suggest? That the environmental problems faced by Iran are 

The environmen- 

tied to Iran’s confused and rapidly changing political scene. Three decades after the 

tal problems faced 

revolution of 1979, there is still intense competition among political factions on how to 

by Iran are tied to 

define what it means to be an Islamic Republic. It is still not clear what it means to be a Iran’s confused and 

citizen of Iran, i.e. what rights and duties come with citizenship. A degree of freedom of rapidly changing 

the press exists, but the free press is still under constant threat. It is still not clear what political scene. 

model of economic development the country is pursuing. It is not clear how important 

decisions are negotiated, what institutions are involved, where the general public stands with regard to them, who is 

participating, whose values and aspirations are represented through what mediums, and whose voice is silenced. Overseeing 

institutions are constantly sidelined. The relationship between Iran and its neighbors, while friendly, is far from 

actively cooperative. Iran’s relations with the international community and international institutions of governance are 

also ridden with tensions. It is only in this political context that Iran’s mounting environmental problems can be understood. 

Absent a resolution of these contradictions, the environmental problems faced by Iran are the last thing in the 

mind of its citizens. 

10. “Iranian official warns Kaviar fish going extinct in a decade,” BBC Persian, September 21, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 

persian/science/story/2008/09/080921_mg-caviar.shtml. 

11. UNDP, “Comb-jelly spreading through the Caspian Sea,” http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/comb-jelly-mnemiopsis-leidyispreading-through-the-caspian-sea-invasive-species. 


97

Back to the Future: Bazaar Strikes, Three Decades after the Revolution 

Arang Keshavarzian 

Gauging from the events in Iran’s bazaars, October 2008 had an uncanny resemblance 

to October 1978. During the Islamic revolution, bazaaris, responding to the ancien régime’s 

misconceived scheme to address rampant inflation by identifying and prosecuting 

alleged profiteers, had organized nationwide closures. Three decades later, bazaaris 

in Isfahan and subsequently in Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Tehran challenged the government’s 

attempt to impose a value-added tax (VAT) by closing their shops and offices. 

After several days of strikes and vocal criticism by industrialists and traders alike, the 

government suspended the new tax. This about-face was reminiscent of the old order. 

The government sent security forces into the bazaars as the state-run Kayhan daily described 

the strike as “an anti-national movement” and branded the bazaari protesters as 

“wealthy leech-like people” and “smugglers.” Although the more recent round of bazaar 

closures lasted just a few days and was not connected with activism in other social sectors, 

one is nonetheless tempted to assume that not much has changed in the bazaar or 

in its relationship with the state. 

Despite the change in regime from one that was unabashedly hostile to the bazaar and 

its “traditional” ways to a post-revolutionary regime that the bazaaris helped bring to 

power, the bazaaris have continued to resort to public dissent to express their antipathy 

towards the political establishment and protect their economic interests. As in the 

1970s, it was economic apprehension, rather than religious passion that moved bazaaris 

to political action. 

This apparent continuity in state-bazaar dynamics stems from a number of factors. 

Notwithstanding the rhetoric about safeguarding Islamic values, the Islamic regime 

has been as interested in transforming and developing the Iranian economy as its predecessor, 

especially since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Supporters of the short-lived 

VAT, for instance, justified it as a modern and progressive system used in Europe. On 

the other hand, the conflict over the imposition of a new tax system that will require 

greater transparency on the part of businesses, not only threatened the bottom line of 

merchants, but also evoked a central and long-standing dilemma for all Iranians — can 

the state be trusted? At the core, bazaaris are concerned about what the state may do 

with greater access to their business records as well as revenue accruing to the treasury. 

Like previous unaccountable regimes that have ruled Iran, the Islamic Republic has 

not been transparent, efficacious, or just in its spending practices. The mistrust of the 

Dr. Arang Keshavarzian, Associate 

Professor of Middle 

Eastern and Islamic Studies 

at New york University, is the 

author of Bazaar and State 

in Iran: the Politics of the 

Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University 

Press, 2007). 


Keshavarzian... 

Iranian state is endemic, but the specifics of Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s presidency have exacerbated it. The new tax was 

imposed allegedly with little communication with the business community. In the same week that the strikes spread 

from Isfahan’s gold and jewelry bazaar to other cities, a prominent merchant and long-standing member of the Chamber 

of Commerce described Ahmadinejad’s economic policies as a complete failure and his belacose foreign policy as 

resulting in the “self-sanctioning” of Iran’s economy. 1 

However, state-bazaar relations and the bazaar itself have not remained the same over 

the last three decades. In fact, the events of October 2008 were exceptional. In the decades 

prior to the revolution, the bazaar was politically potent, and not merely because 

it enjoyed economic resources and was centrally located in Iran’s urban morphology. 

What made bazaars act as if they were a unitary and solidaristic entity were arbitration 

mechanisms, promissory notes, multilateral credit systems, informal religious circles, 

and expansive kinship webs. These practices blurred and combined economic, social, 

and cultural registers by forging dense, long-term, and multifaceted social relationships 

within the bazaar community that bridged and compensated for the social stratification, 

political diversity, and economic specialization and rivalries inherent among bazaaris. 

For this reason, with and without the support of the clergy, students, and intelligentsia, 

bazaaris throughout the 20th century have been able to confront tyrannical rule 

and protect their “collective interests,” defined and framed in different ways over time. 

Yet, “religious shopkeepers” and “traditional merchants” were not supposed to go on strike against the Islamic Republic 

as they did against the Western-oriented monarchy. Under the current regime, the Islamic associations in the bazaars 

and the bazaaris’ long-standing ties with the clergy (and Khomeinist tendency in particular) are assumed to preclude 

the need to take to the streets and clash with security forces to change state policy. 

This view of a bazaari-regime alliance captures the historical and sociological reality of kinship, economic, and social 

affinities between some members of the bazaar and the clergy. It also reminds us that some of the earliest non-clerical 

supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini were religiously oriented political activists who were merchants or came from merchant 

and petty-trading families, who have in several cases parlayed their long-standing relationship with and loyalty 

to Khomeini and his former students into political capital and positions in ministries, foundations, and other state and 

parastatal organs. 

However, the bazaaris were not uniform or consistent supporters of Khomeinism. In fact, immediately after the revolu- 

tion an important segment of the bazaar clearly favored Mehdi Bazargan’s more liberal and lay brand of political Islam. 

The relative quiet in the bazaars in the 1980s had more to do with the strong-handed tactics of the ascendant Khomein- 


With and without 

the support of the 

clergy, students, 

and intelligentsia, 

bazaaris throughout 

the 20 th century 

have been able to 

confront tyrannical 

rule and protect 

their “collective interests,” 

defined and 

framed in different 

ways over time. 

1. “I am an Emperor: Interview with Asadollah ‘Askarowladi,” Jam-e Jam, 16 Mehr, 1387 (October 7, 2008), http://www. 

jamejamonline.ir/newstext.aspx?newsnum=100951039096 

99

Keshavarzian... 

ists and the Iran-Iraq War than with consent and approval of the consolidation of the Islamic Republic. The eight-year 

war was critical for it both promoted the rhetoric and actual spirit of national unity at the expense of political diversity, 

and because war mobilization created a war economy under the auspices of the state ministries that systematically 

stripped the bazaaris of their historic role in international and local commerce. With the end of the war and the death 

of Khomeini, though the smoldering political and social discord came to the fore, the levers of the economy remained 

in the firm grasp of the state and its clientistic web. Bazaaris were left with two second-rate options: They could act as 

dependent agents of large quasi-state conglomerates with oligopolistic privileges, or they could reconfigure their activities 

to tap into new networks, in particular the cluster of free trade zones in the southern Persian Gulf and Dubai. In 

this growing regional economy, the old bazaari elite were often rendered junior partners to purposefully transnational, 

polyglot, and stealth circuits of trade. This new economy rewarded agility, adaptability, transience and multi-functionality, 

rather than the traits historically lauded in the bazaar — rootedness, multi-generational reputation, conviviality, 

and specialized expertise. 

Iran’s large urban consumerist society and the structure of the macro-economy have 

ensured that commerce remains lucrative, and many bazaaris continue to be wealthy 

in both relative and absolute terms. However, the transformations directly and indirectly 

resulting from state policies and the bazaaris’ attempt to negotiate them have 

rendered the bazaar a very different social constellation than it was during 1977-1979. 

The political-economic and social transformations subsequent to the revolution rendered 

the bazaar as collectively fragile and the sorts of events Iranians witnessed in 

October 2008 rare and surprising. It is no coincidence that the leaders of the recent 

strike were jewelers and that carpet merchants were prominently involved; due to the 

very nature of the commodities they trade, these are sectors that have been better able 

to maintain the close-knit relations essential for making the bazaar more cohesive and 

capable of engaging in collective action. 

The political-economic 

and social 

transformations 

subsequent to the 

revolution rendered 

the bazaar as collectively 

fragile and 

the sorts of events 

Iranians witnessed 

in October 2008 

rare and surprising. 

Anniversaries of the revolution are moments in which the Islamic Republic, its detractors, and many ordinary Iranians 

are encouraged to draw direct comparisons between 1978-9 and the current period. We are invited to deduce that today’s 

Iran is a direct outcome of the events, struggles, and emotions that culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy 

and the establishment of a new order. Yet, these linear narratives of contemporary Iran that set forth from 1979 are too 

easy. Social change tends to be more like a kaleidoscope where transformations interact and refract into unintended and 

unpredictable constellations, rather than an arrow that sets out from the bow of a clear-sighted archer. As the plight of 

the bazaaris suggests, Iran 30 years after the revolution is a society produced by policymakers and ordinary Iranians, 

but made under circumstances not entirely foreseen let alone of their own choosing. More than simply being empirically 

shoddy, over-emphasizing the revolution ironically destines bazaaris, and all Iranians, to blindly reenact history, 

rather than participate in its making, as was the case in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 


Iran Para-governmental Organizations (bonyads) 

Ali A. Saeidi 

The establishment of several para-governmental organizations (bonyads) following the 

revolution of 1979 in Iran has created a large socio-economic sector. This sector tried 

to harness a mass society by creating parallel structures of revolutionary legitimacy and 

authority in order to contribute to the consolidation process. When, in the aftermath of 

the revolution of 1979, the properties of the Shah and the royal family were confiscated, 

the control of these vast fixed and liquid assets passed on to religious leaders in the 

forms of newly established bonyads, and increased their financial independence. Ayatullah 

Khomeini, in his letter to the Revolutionary Council, mandated that “all of the Shah’s 

and royal family’s liquid assets should be deposited in the banks in the name of Revolutionary 

Council.” He directly asked the revolutionary committees across the country 

to implement this injunction and called these assets spoils (ghanimat, pl. ghana’em) and 

added that they must be kept and controlled separately from state properties. 1 

These bonyads claim to conduct a variety of activities related to social work, advisory, social, 

and rehabilitation services for satisfying the needs of low-income groups, improving 

the conditions of families of martyrs, former prisoners of war, needy rural dwellers, 

guardian-less households, the disabled, and the handicapped. The bonyads active in this 

regard include the Martyrs’ Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid), the Imam Khomeini Relief 

Aid Committee, the Oppressed and Disabled Foundation, the Housing Foundation, and 

the 15th Khordad Foundation. 

The bonyads maintained the hegemony of revolutionary forces over the subordinated 

classes and assisted them by administering social welfare and reconstruction programs. 

Yet, they are a unique product of the revolution in the sense that the creation of an Islamic 

state was mainly based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine that the restoration of 

Muslim unity depended solely on the establishment of a government having the real 

interests of Muslims at heart. 2 

Criticizing the machinery of the old regime as being in line with the capitalist mode of 

production, an instrument of dependence, and a system that had established a rentier 

1. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Nur [Pages of light: A Collection of Speeches and 

Pronouncements], Vol.17 (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1984), p. 124. 

2. Ruhollah Khomeini, Nameh’i as Imam Musavi Kashifal-Ghita (Tehran, 1976), pp. 41–42; 

and H. Enayat, “Iran: Khumayni’s Concept of ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult,’” in James 

Piscatori, ed., Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

1983), pp. 160–180. 


Ali A. Saeidi is an Assistant 

Professor of Sociology in the 

Faculty of Social Sciences, 

University of Tehran and Research 

Fellow of the london 

Institure of Middle Eastern 

Studies, SoAS, Uinersity of 

london. 

101

Saeidi... 

economy, the Islamic state tried to create an Islamic economic framework on the basis of independence, self-sufficiency, 

and distributional justice in practical terms. It was impossible to apply the economic aspect of religious injunctions, 

such as collecting the alms-tax, protecting the poor, or supervising endowments (awqaf) within the Islamic state without 

the creation of bonyads. At first glance, it seemed that, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the religious 

and revolutionary leaders did not trust the provisional government and state enterprise to fulfill this truly religious 

obligation. In subsequent years, however, the bonyads expanded, evolving from religious charities into giant private 

monopolies with no governmental oversight of their operations and institutions that could contribute to the ideological 

and cultural needs of the Islamic state. 

The bonyads have embodied a contradictory position within the religious establishment 

and have reinforced part of the dual structure of power in the Islamic state when they 

work parallel with government enterprises. Although the establishment of the Islamic 

Republic led to the integration of the religious establishment into the political system 

by the application of the concept of “Guardianship of the Jurisconsult” (velayat-e faqih), 

the religious leaders were not inclined to apply the economic aspect of religious injunctions 

within government policies. 

The bonyads have 

been actively involved 

in Iranian 

politics by propagating 

the dominant 

ideology in a 

wide range of social 

and cultural activities. 

The revolution led to the integration of religion and state, resulting in the ‘ulama’ as the sole rulers and arbiters of the 

political order, including the enforcement of the Islamic penal code. Nevertheless, none of the governments that have 

taken office have integrated some of the other important religious injunctions, such as collecting the alms-tax and administration 

of awqaf; nor have they let the religious institutions responsible for these financial practices function separately 

from the state organizations. 3 For instance, the Bonyad-e Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, the most important charitable 

foundation, based on the shrine of Imam Reza at Mashad, continued to be controlled by religious leaders. 

The bonyads have been actively involved in Iranian politics by propagating the dominant ideology in a wide range of 

social and cultural activities. This major function reinforced the consolidation of political authority for new men of 

power by sustaining the revolutionary ideology, assisting the disciples of religious leaders with secular backgrounds in 

occupying second-tier positions in the state, and facilitating social mobility for the lower middle classes. In fact, these 

organizations were established in order to assist institutionalization of the ideology of the ruling class by producing 

an ideological apparatus for the new regime, given that the revolutionary forces could not trust the old regime’s bureaucratic 

apparatus. They also increased the rate of social mobility among the lower middle classes and supporters of 

revolutionary forces in order to extend the power of Islamic ideology. They assisted individuals from these classes in 

moving into new economic, social, and occupational positions. 

In the post-revolutionary era thousands of professionals, white-collar workers, students, and teachers of both liberal 

3. H. Amirahmadi, “Bonyad,” in John L. Esposito, ed., The oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 234–235. 


Saeidi... 

and radical persuasions, who were purged, imprisoned, executed, or who fled into exile were replaced with members 

of the lower middle classes who supported the revolutionary regime by the bonyads. 4 These organizations then took 

advantage of the situation to circumvent the quota system for higher education in order to set up a system for producing 

a new cultural elite. The special higher education quota has been set aside for these organizations in order to solve 

the difficulties confronting the regime resulting from a minimal degree of knowledge among potential appointees. This 

exemption enables the bonyads to allocate key positions to those who support the ruling regime. 5 

Thus, it can be concluded that since the revolution, bonyads have facilitated social mobility 

by supporting members of lower middle classes with lay backgrounds in occupying 

the secondary positions in the state apparatus. They enabled the Islamic state to 

implement the policy of training and distributing human capital by controlling accessibility 

to higher education and public sector employment to the advantage of special 

social groups. In stages, they helped restructure the state apparatus. In fact, the revolutionary 

regime needed the resources of these organizations to consolidate and expand 

the central state apparatus. 6 

4. A. Ashraf, “Charisma, Theocracy, and Men of Power in Post revolutionary Iran,” in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., 

The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 

118. 

5. N. Habibi, “Allocation of Educational and Occupational Opportunities in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Case Study in the 

Political Screening of Human Capital in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iranian Studies, vol. 22, no. 4 (1989), p. 23. 

6. For more see Ali A. Saeidi, “The Accountability of Para-governmental Organizations (bonyads): The Case of Iranian 

Foundations,” Iranian Studies, vol. 37, no. 3 (September 2004), pp 479-498. 


Since the revolution 

bonyads have facilitated 

social mobility 

by supporting 

members of lower 

middle classes with 

lay backgrounds in 

occupying the secondary 

positions in 

the state apparatus. 

103

Poverty and Inequality since the Revolution 

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 

Thirty years ago, Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed equity and social justice as the Revolution’s 

main objective. His successor, Ayatollah Khamene’i, continues to refer to social 

justice as the revolution’s defining theme. Similarly, Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad, 

though they are from very different political persuasions, placed heavy emphasis on 

social justice in their political rhetoric. Yet the very fact that 30 years after the revolution 

social justice continues to occupy the highest place in Iran’s political discourse implies 

that this goal of the revolution remains as elusive as ever. 

Inside Iran the facts regarding the evolution of equality are hotly debated. However, 

data from the Statistical Center of Iran offer evidence of how inequality has changed in 

terms of household expenditures, education attainment, and access to health and basic 

services. The picture that emerges is a mixed one: success in improving the standard of 

living and the quality of life for the poor, and failure in improving the overall distribution 

of income. 

INEQUAlITy 

The most obvious, 

if not quantitatively 

Figure 1: Trends in rural and urban per capita expenditures, 

1984-2006 (2006 rials per day) 

most important, 

source of inequality 

in Iran is the ruralurban 

differential. 

Figure 1 shows that 

during the great 

economic downturn 

of 1984-88, average 

expenditures 

in rural and urban Source: Author’s calculations using HEIS data files. 

areas fell by 20% and 33%, respectively, narrowing the rural-urban gap in expenditures. 

Rural incomes continued to grow faster than urban, raising the rural-urban ratio to a 

historic high of 69% in 1990, before falling back to 53% in 2006. The widening ruralurban 

gap in the last 15 years has contributed significantly to the resilience of measured 

inequality in the country as a whole. 

Professor of Economics, Virginia 

Tech University, and 

Guest Scholar, Wolfensohn 

Center for Development, 

Brookings Institution 


Salehi-Isfahani... 

Immediately following the revolution, overall 

inequality fell substantially, by about ten Gini 

points, from 0.56 to 0.46, 1 Figure 2: The Gini index of inequality by region, 1984-2006 

but has since remained 

fairly stable at levels well above those observed in 

countries such as Egypt. It is nonetheless much 

lower than in Latin America (see Figure 2). Rural 

inequality, which was much lower than urban 

inequality during the war years (1980-88), increased 

sharply after the war, reaching the urban 

level, most likely because of government policies 

such as ending the rationing (that had protected Source: Author’s calculations using HEIS data files. 

the poor from inflation during the war) and permitting a greater role for markets in setting prices. 

Significantly, during the first two years of the Ahmadinejad Administration (2005-06) inequality worsened in both rural 

and urban areas, possibly because higher inflation hurt those below the median income level more than those above it. 

This is not so much an indication that Ahmadinejad was insincere in promising redistribution but how difficult it is to 

redistribute income without fundamental changes in the country’s distribution of earning power (wealth and human 

capital) and political power, which determines access to government transfers from oil rent. 

PoVERTy 

Despite a lack of improvement in inequality, poverty 

has declined steadily in the last ten years. Figure 3 

shows the proportion of individuals who were poor 

(the Headcount ratio) during 1984-2006 using separate 

rural and urban poverty lines. 2 Poverty rates 

increased sharply during 1984-88 but, contrary to 

popular belief, fell during the economic reconstruction 

and market reforms. Poverty rose again briefly 

when the economy had to adjust to the balance of 

payments crisis of 1994-95. Since then, poverty has 

declined steadily to an enviable level for middleincome 

developing countries. 3 Despite claims to the 

Figure 3: Poverty rates by region, 1984-2006 

Source: Author’s calculations using HEIS data files. 

1. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran,” Journal of Economic Inequality, published online 

February 21, 2008, http://www.springerlink.com/content/67k71t441vk54ml3/fulltext.pdf 

2. In 2005 Purchasing Power Parity dollars these lines were $2.7 per person per day for rural and $3.8 for urban individuals. 

See Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Poverty, Inequality, and Populist Politics in Iran.” 

3. Based on the international two-dollars-per-day poverty line ($3 in 2006), Iran’s poverty rate in 2006 was only 6%, which is 


105


contrary, during the eight years of the Khatami Administration, poverty fell by more than 2 percentage points each year. 

Significantly, in the first two years of the Ahmadinejad government, urban poverty appears to have increased by 1.5 percentage 

points, or about 680,000 individuals (rural poverty remained unchanged). Given the huge inflow of resources 

into the economy in 2006 and the Ahmadinejad government’s active redistributive efforts, the increase in urban poverty 

is quite striking. The data for 2007 and 2008 are not available to reach a definitive conclusion on the current administration’s 

efforts at redistribution and poverty reduction, but the available evidence on inequality and urban poverty does 

not bode well for his re-election. 

EDUCATIoN 

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the revolution during 

its 30-year history is the expansion of educational 

opportunities, especially for women and rural families. 

Figure 4 shows the impressive gain in education by the 

least educated group — rural women. Their average 

years of schooling increased from about 40% of their 

male counterparts for women born in the 1960s (who 

started school during the Shah’s White Revolution) to 

about 90% for those born in the late 1980s (who started 

school after the war with Iraq). Urban women have now 

surpassed urban men in average years of schooling, a 

phenomenon that led Iran’s Parliament to seriously consider 

and partially implement affirmative action for men 

in entering university! 4 

Figure 4: Average years of schooling by birth cohort 

Increased access to free education from primary to university has equalized educational attainment between individuals. 

The Gini index of inequality of years of schooling for adults born in the 1950s was in excess of 0.60, compared 

to 0.35 for cohorts born 20 years later, which is a substantial decrease in education inequality in just one generation. 

However, there is evidence that educational attainment still depends greatly on family resources. 5 Education inequality 

is likely to worsen as private education, both at the university and high school levels, continues to expand. 

very low by the standards of developing regions. See Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, “The Developing World is Poorer 

Than We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty,” The World Bank Development Research Group, 

Policy Research Working Paper 4703 (2008), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/I 

B/2008/08/26/000158349_20080826113239/Rendered/PDF/WPS4703.pdf 

4. See Djavad Saleh-Isfhani, “Are Iranian Women Overeducated?” The Brookings Institution (2008), http://www.brookings. 

edu/opinions/2008/0305_education_salehi_isfahani.aspx. 

5. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Daniel Egel, “Youth Exclusion in Iran: The State of Education, Employment and Family 

Formation,” Working Paper, The Brookings Institution (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/09_youth_exclusion_ 

salehi_isfahani.aspx. 



HEAlTH AND BASIC SERVICES 

Another major equalizing achievement of the country in the last 30 years is reduced fertility, especially in rural areas, 

thanks mainly to increased education and improved access to health and other basic services (electricity and piped 

water). Together with women’s gains in education, family planning has substantially advanced gender equality in Iran, 

bringing social pressure to improve women’s status in law. In rural areas the average number of births per woman fell 

from about eight in the mid-1980s to about two in 2006. The poor’s access to basic services has substantially increased: 

during 1984-2004 access to electricity by the poorest quintile (bottom 25%) in rural areas increased from 37% to 94% 

and to piped water from 31% to 79%. 6 Remarkably, as a result of the extension of these services, by 2004, 80% of these 

households owned a refrigerator, 77% a television, and 76% a gas stove. 

PoPUlIST PolITICS 

There are very few countries (e.g., South Korea) that have combined economic growth with increased equity. Iran is not 

one of them. Nevertheless, much has been achieved in terms of improving the lot of the poorest section of the population. 

Even so, many Iranians seem disappointed with the material improvements of the last 30 years. There are good 

reasons why. In the last ten years, a huge inflow of oil revenues has taken place without any improvement in income inequality. 

Added to this is a lack of government transparency, which has fueled suspicion about how the oil riches are being 

spent. Ahmadinejad’s populist rhetoric has intensified fears of corruption and distrust of the rich in a country where 

wealth accumulation is held in low esteem, no matter its sources. Indeed, the proper purpose of politics and governance 

in Iran is considered to be redistribution much more so than promoting economic growth. As the revolution enters its 

fourth decade, with oil prices down for the foreseeable future and the disappointing results of the latest experience with 

populist politics already evident, it would be interesting to speculate if this narrow view of politics is likely to change. 

The June 2009 presidential election is a good time to find out. 

6. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Revolution and redistribution in Iran: poverty and inequality 25 years later,” Department of 

Economics Working Paper, Virginia Tech University (2006), http://www.filebox.vt.edu/users/salehi/Iran_poverty_trend.pdf. 


107

Government and Politics 


Elections as a Tool to Sustain the Theological Power Structure 

Kazem Alamdari 

In the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), a total of 30 elections have 

been held. In spite of losing popular ground, and despite uninterrupted elections, the 

clerics in Iran still firmly hold the reins of power because elections are designed to serve 

the status quo rather than to change it. 

Elections in the IRI have aimed to: (1) legitimize the system while discriminating 

against the majority of the people by declaring them ineligible to run for office; (2) prevent 

unwanted people (outsiders) from entering the power structure; (3) determine the 

shares of rival groups (insiders) within the ruling circle, which reduces internal tension; 

(4) manipulate and orchestrate religious people because their participation in elections 

is a means of supporting Islam, and (5) make the system appear to be democratically 

endorsed by the people. 

The ruling circle in the IRI includes appointed and elected persons. Those appointed, 

mainly clergy, enjoy higher power with less — or even no — accountability because it is 

asserted that they have been divinely chosen for their positions to serve Islam. 

The major elective offices in the IRI include the presidency, the legislature, and the Assembly 

of Experts (AE). Election of the city and town councils is less political and therefore 

less controlled. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, appoints crucial 

power-holders such as the six clerical members of the Guardian Council (GC); the 30 

members of the Expediency Council; the head of the judiciary branch; the commanders 

of the Army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Militia (Basij); the Chief of Police; the 

head of the National Security Council; and the head of the radio and television broadcasting, 

among others. 

Local and regional governors appointed by the president are publicly controlled by 

clerics, who are appointed to represent the Supreme Leader in cities and towns, where 

they deliver Friday sermons. They are not accountable, and they enjoy great local power 

through their social and religious status. Also, both the processes and the outcomes of 

elections for positions in the legislative and executive branches are restricted by unelected 

clerics. Even the president cannot select his cabinet members without consulting 

with the Supreme Leader. In some cases, Majlis (parliament) deputies travel to the 

holy city of Qom to consult religious leaders before introducing a bill in the legislature, 

because they know that the clerical members of the GC have the authority to reject their 


Kazem Alamdari received 

his Ph.D from the University 

of Illinois,Champaign-Urbana. 

He is the author of four 

books and numerous articles 

in Persian and English. His 

first book, Why Iran Lagged 

Behind and the West Moved 

Forward (2001) has been 

published 15 times. Currently, 

he is teaching at the Department 

of Sociology, California 

State University, Northridge. 

109

Alamdari... 

bills if they find them un-Islamic. 

According to the Constitution, the political structure of the IRI is composed of two opposite poles: Shari‘a (Islamic law) 

and the Republic (people’s will). While elections symbolize the Republic (the rule of the people), Shari‘a represents the 

religious pole of the structure, which guarantees the rule of clerics and undermines the role of the people. According to 

Article 4-four of the Constitution, “All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and 

other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles 

of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha’ of the Guardian Council are judges 

in this matter.” 

Clerics legally manipulate elections through two mechanisms. First, the GC is authorized 

to screen the candidates before allowing them into a race. 1 For example, opponents 

of the Velayat-e Faqih (rule by the Jurisconsult) are banned from elections as being 

unfit to hold office in the Islamic system. Second, all elected officials, including the 

President, are in a subordinate position to the Supreme Leader (the Walayat al-’amr,) of 

the Umma (the nation), who enjoys absolute power in the system. The Supreme Leader 

also can remove an unfit President from office, if he desires to do so. 

While elections 

symbolize the 

Republic (the rule 

of the people), 

Shari‘a represents 

the religious pole of 

the structure, which 

guarantees the rule 

of clerics and undermines 

the role of 

the people. 

The role of the six clerical members of the GC in elections and law-making is decisive. 

According to Article 99 of the Constitution, the GC has the responsibility of supervising 

the elections and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda. However, 

referring to Article 98 and Part 9 of Article 110, which gives the right of interpreting the laws to the GC, they have been 

developed into a political tool for keeping the entire electoral system under the control of the conservative clerics. 

The legislative assembly is deliberately named the “Consultative Assembly” because, in the IRI, this organ “does not hold 

any legal status if there is no GC in existence” (Article 93), and cannot make laws without the GC’s approval. The GC 

can declare any law passed by the legislative branch to be unconstitutional or un-Islamic (Article 94). Therefore, the 

legislative branch cannot pass a law to limit the role of the GC in elections. This order is based on Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. 

Khomeini, the founder of the IRI, believed that elections should not undermine clerical rule. He wrote that the people 

must accept the rule of the clerics and follow their decisions as religious duties. 2 In his book, Islamic Government, 

1. The Guardian Council is composed of six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six lawyers proposed by the 

judiciary chief and approved by the Majlis. However, only the clerics have authority to judge and interpret whether a law is 

un-Islamic. 

2. More precisely, the notion of Velayat-e Faqih originated in the writings of several Shi‘ite jurists such as Mulla Ahmad 

Naraqi, who used the idea to legitimize the absolute rule of Fatali Shah Qajar and Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri, who strongly 

opposed constitutional rule (1906) as an anti-religious measure in Iran. Other predecessors of Khomeini in this regard 

include Mirza Hasan Shirazi, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shriazi, and Kashif al-Ghita. 


Alamdari... 

Khomeini asserted that 

... the ulema [clerics] were appointed by the imam for government and for judgment among 

people, and their position is still preserved for them ... Ulema are the heirs to the prophets 

… If a knowledgeable and just jurisprudent undertakes the task of forming the government, 

then he will run the social affairs that the prophet used to run, and it is the duty of the people 

to listen to him and obey him. 3 

The third elective body of the IRI is the AE. All candidates are carefully screened, and they must be clergymen. The AE 

is responsible for selecting, evaluating, and dismissing the Supreme Leader. However, because the members are carefully 

screened by the GC, whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, the AE members never challenge the Supreme 

Leader’s performance or decisions. AE elections are mainly competitions among 

conservative senior clerics. Since 1982, when it was established, the biggest action of 

the AE has been the selection of ‘Ali Khamene’i as the Supreme Leader. 

After reformist Muhammad Khatami’s surprise landslide victory in 1997 and the takeover 

of the 6th Majlis by reformist representatives, the GC has rigidly applied its control 

to prevent known reformists from entering political races. The GC, in addition to using 

its influence among religious people, has hired 30,000 thousand new local employees 

to carefully watch and screen all candidates who want to run for any office. The tight 

control over the candidates leaves the voter with fewer choices and less motivation to 

participate in the elections. Therefore, conservative candidates have a much greater 

chance to be elected. 

Another major institution that plays a significant role in elections is the charity organization the “Imam Khomeini 

Committee.” The Supreme Leader appoints the head of this organization, which has a several-billion-dollar budget to 

help poor people. In response to the efforts of this charity, many poorer people tend to support conservative candidates 

in elections. 

Therefore, elections under the current political, legal, and religious structure are at an impasse and move in a vicious 

circle under the firm control of the clerics. This process only serves the status quo, which is characterized by absolute 

domination by conservative clerics. In other words, elections in IRI do not have the capacity to bring about any structural 

change, but only to sustain the theological power structure. 


After reformist 

Muhammad 

Khatami’s surprise 

landslide victory in 

1997 and the takeover 

of the 6 th Majlis 

by reformist representatives, 

the GC 

has rigidly applied 

its control to prevent 

known reformists 

from entering 

political races. 

3. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Government. Translated by Joint Publications Research Service (New York: Manor 

Books, 1979), p. 37. 

111

Shi‘a Politics in Iran after 30 Years of Revolution 

Babak Rahimi 

In the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Twelver Shi‘a Islam saw the crystallization 

of a major radical movement led by activist clerics and militant ideologues with a 

revolutionary agenda to establish an Islamist political order. The institutionalization of 

the political ideology of the velayat-e faqih or the “guardianship of the jurist,” advanced 

by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900-1989), brought to the fore a new conception 

of Shi‘a government. This paradigm recognized the most learned cleric as the representative 

of the Twelfth Imam, whose eventual return is believed to culminate in the 

establishment of divine justice on earth. With the authority to participate in the political 

decision-making process, the new activist clerics emerged to help (and perhaps even 

shape) the first theocratic power in Shi‘a Islamic history, hence breaking away from the 

traditionalist quietist school of thought that had been dominant for centuries. 

By and large, the 1979 Revolution included the different motivations of activists and 

groups that took part in it, and it is therefore not surprising that a variety of Shi‘a Iranian 

factions emerged in the aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. 

At the core of such factional rivalry was a vigorous debate over the question of clerical 

authority — the extent to which it can operate above the laws laid out by the legislative 

body, and, in essence, how best to achieve a political order that is both mundanely 

democratic and spiritually governed by divine law. As for dominant trends within Iranian 

Shi‘ism since the outbreak of the revolution, four significant historical phases can 

be identified: (1) Khomeinism (1979-1989); (2) re-constructionism (1989-1997); (3) 

factionalism (1997-2005); and, finally, (4) neo-Khomeinism (2005-to the present). 

During the first nine years following the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic 

evolved into a militant state directed with the essential aim of fulfilling God’s will on 

earth. While struggles with pragmatists and ideologues over state management continued 

to cause frictions within the regime, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) provided a new 

opportunity for the revolutionaries to solidify their radical agenda. During the war, the 

regime promoted a culture of martyrdom among Iran’s youth that primarily relied on 

symbols and mourning practices specific to Shi‘a cultural tradition. Such culture was 

shaped on an activist retelling of the martyrdom of the Prophet’s beloved grandson, 

Husayn, whose heroic death at the Battle of Karbala (680) was used to mobilize troops 

to the frontlines. 

Dr. Babak Rahimi is Assistant 

Professor of Iranian and 

Islamic Studies, University of 

California, San Diego 


Rahimi... 

Not all Shi‘a Iranians accepted Khomeini’s vision of theocracy in the years following the revolution. For instance, Ayatollah 

Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari (1904-1985), a senior Shi‘a cleric at the time, publicly opposed Khomeini, whose 

radical movement he regarded to be a deviation from true Shi‘ism. In response, the regime immediately stripped him 

of his religious authority and placed him on house arrest, a major affront to the clerical establishment that had never 

before seen a high-ranking jurist deposed by another cleric. In addition, the take-over of Qom, the country’s religious 

scholarly center, by state-sponsored activist clerics caused many non-Khomeinists to keep quiet for fear of retribution, 

thereby successfully containing dissident senior clerics and their followers. 

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini initiated a second phase that largely gave way to 

the rise of pragmatists and technocrats who aimed to strengthen state control over 

the public sector for the purpose of establishing a functioning bureaucratic state and 

adopting a realist foreign policy in the post-war period. The initial push for state consolidation 

primarily involved a revision of the constitution that not only broadened 

the juridical and political power of the guardian jurist, but also allowed him to qualify 

for the post without being a marja or high-ranking cleric. The August 1989 appointment 

of a mid-level ranking cleric, ‘Ali Khamene’i, to the position of Supreme Leader 

introduced a major transformation in the classical function of the juristic authority 

that previously had recognized only the most learned mujtahid as the spiritual head of 

the Shi‘a community. 

By the early 1990s, a loose coalition of dissident clerics, seminary students, university 

students, intellectuals, and middle-class professionals gradually formed a movement 

to challenge the conservative establishment. The presidential election of 1997, which 

brought to power the reformist Mohammad Khatami, gave momentum to this new coalition. 

The implication of the reformist’s ascendancy can be described in many terms, 

but one prominent feature is the escalation of political rivalry between reformists (who 

sought to limit the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader) and conservatives (who aimed to maintain political 

hegemony through repression and manipulation of the electoral process). The late 1990s came to represent the high 

point of post-revolutionary factionalism that gradually released Iranian civil society from the tight grip of Khomeinist 

authoritarianism. 

In a swift reaction to reformists’ success and control over the direction of the theocracy, the 2004 parliamentary and 

2005 presidential elections saw the advent of a new faction of Khomeinist ideologues, who aimed at reviving the militant 

values of the 1979 Revolution and set back Khatami’s achievements. The new movement, represented by the former 

mayor of Tehran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, gave credence to a strategy to expand the role of ideologues, especially the 

Revolutionary Guard Corps, in the country’s economic and political activities, and, more importantly, curtail the progress 

of the reform movement in the electoral process. The rise of the neo-Khomeinists highlights the fractious nature of 


The implication 

of the reformist’s 

ascendancy can be 

described in many 

terms, but one 

prominent feature 

is the escalation 

of political rivalry 

between reformists 

(who sought to 

limit the absolute 

authority of the 

Supreme Leader) 

and conservatives 

(who aimed to 

maintain political 

hegemony through 

repression and manipulation 

of the 

electoral process). 

113

Rahimi... 

Iranian Shi‘ism in the post-Khatami era, and the significance of the legacy of Khomeini’s vision of the Islamic Republic 

in the way it continues to play a vital role in shaping politics in Iran. The intriguing issue here is how contestation over 

the formation of a just Islamic government, paradoxically, not only has helped perpetuate the political hegemony of the 

(neo) conservative Right but also helped reformists bolster aspirations for a new political order based on democratic 

norms and pluralism. 

With the collapse of Saddam’s regime in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent revival of 

Najaf, representing the center of quietist Shi‘a orthodoxy, Shi‘a Iran underwent an additional 

development. While reformists continued with their struggle to reinterpret 

Shi‘ism in a democratic light, Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani, the most revered Shi‘a cleric in the 

world (based in Najaf), emerged as a leading quietist senior cleric to offer an alternative 

model of spiritual leadership. With an expanding religious network and a tight social 

organization operating on a global basis, coupled with an adherence to a clerical democratic 

tradition dating back to the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911), Sistani’s 

positive influence over Iraqi democratic politics has served as an exemplary model of 

Shi‘a democracy to many Iranian reformists, which potentially could have an impact 

on the country’s political future. 

Sistani’s positive 

influence over Iraqi 

democratic politics 

has served as an exemplary 

model of 

Shi‘a democracy to 

many Iranian reformists, 

which potentially 

could have 

an impact on the 

country’s political 

future. 

After 30 years, the identity of Shi‘ism in Iran remains uncertain as new generations of reformists and hard-liners continue 

their rivalry with the determination to define the future of the Islamic Republic. What is certain, however, is that 

the future of Iran will be shaped by competing Shi‘a factions, each possessing its own distinctive interpretation of sacred 

tradition. 


Muhammad Khatami: A Dialogue beyond Paradox 

Wm Scott Harrop 

Whether or not Muhammad Khatami decides to run again for President of Iran, his 

prominent legacy symbolizes an ongoing fertile debate inside Iran about political reform 

and adaptation. For Khatami, democracy and dialogue remain the essential path 

for Islamic Republic, a bridge between civilizations, a solid course for Iran to the future. 

Observers, including this author, often emphasize apparent Iranian paradoxes to alert 

outsiders to Iran’s vibrant and dynamic society, beyond the static, enigmatic “black” clichés 

so commonly clung to in popular Western discourse. 

An appreciation for irony and nuance is surely needed. In the same country where cur- 

rent President Mahmud Ahmadinejad trivialized the Holocaust, a very popular television 

program sympathetically portrayed an Iranian diplomat who rescued Jews from 

the Nazis during World War II. 

Yet paradox as a metaphor for Iran becomes less than helpful if it leaves the impression 

of a “hidden Iran” being incomprehensively mired in its own contradictions. Bewildered 

perhaps by such analytical frameworks, top Western officials, beginning with former 

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, commonly admit that “they do not understand Iran” 

or that they “do not know” if negotiating with Iran will work. 

To his critics, including disillusioned former supporters, President Khatami’s reformist 

agenda was hobbled by contradictions inherent in the Islamic Republic. To more 

sympathetic observers, he was “transformational in vision,” but constrained to be “incremental 

in strategy.” 

As Khatami evaluates what he might achieve in a third term as President, he recently 

lamented, according to the reformist paper Aftab-e yazd (January 19, 2009), that because 

of “immoral behavior such as insults, denigration, elimination and suppression 

and lies,” even for “many who were in the revolutionary front, there is no psychological 

security and they cannot present themselves and are liable to be rejected.” 

Yet despite such chronic problems, Khatami concedes no inherent conflict between the 

Islamic Republic and reform, between faith and freedom, between Islam and democracy, 

between justice and order, between idealism and realism, between Iran, America, 


Wm. Scott Harrop, a long 

time assistant to R.K. Ramazani, 

is a recent Jefferson Fellow 

at the Robert H. Smith 

International Center for Jefferson 

Studies at Monticello. 

He was present there when 

President Khatami visited on 

September 11, 2006. 

115

Harrop... 

and the world. 

Khatami’s optimistic approach to transcending paradoxes was illustrated during a luncheon appearance on September 

11, 2006 at Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson, the third US President and drafter of America’s Declaration 

of Independence. 

When asked by R.K. Ramazani to clarify his written advocacy of “the formulation of democracy in the context of spirituality 

and morality,” Khatami unequivocally affirmed first that today, “there is no way other than the establishment of 

democracy for any country in any part of the world.” For Khatami, “The legitimacy of power relies entirely on the vote 

of the people” and “people have the right to replace this power with another power without recourse to violence.” 

Democracy is then deemed compatible with “a progressive reading” of Islam that “recognizes the right of human beings 

to determine their own fates,” to think and feel for themselves. The alternative reading of Islam is the “path of the 

Taliban.” 

Khatami then spoke to the sensitive and most commonly perceived paradox in the Islamic Republic, between democratic 

electoral forms and the absolute authority vested in the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader. Speaking “at least 

theoretically,” Khatami reasoned that those “given that kind of power” are “held responsible” to the people via their 

election of the Assembly of Experts, which in turn elects (or deposes) the Jurisconsult “and oversees a system of checks 

against the office of the Leader.” 

When asked a Jefferson-tinged question about another frequently cited paradox, concerning religious liberty within an 

Islamic Republic, Khatami again saw no inherent contradiction: “Freedom of conscience and the freedom of believing 

what one wants to believe, and practicing according to your beliefs, is one of the minimum requirements of the democratic 

system … [and are] tenets of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.” 

When discussing how to improve ties between the US and Iran, Khatami addressed yet another paradox — how Iran 

refers to America as “the Great Satan” while Khatami as President called for dialogue. Khatami clarifies that even 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was not referring to the American people or nation, but to “satanic policies,” such as the 

overthrow of the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq in 1953. 

Khatami well understands how such broad swipes at another country can be felt, as he related his personal “inability to 

forgive the one” (e.g., President George W. Bush) who called him (i.e., who called Iran), “an axis of evil.” 

As a corrective, Khatami, in keeping with his famous emphasis on “dialogue among civilizations,” urges mutual respect 

between peoples — that countries “should pay attention so that the expression of political differences does not degenerate 

into expressions that might be interpreted as insulting to the peoples of the other nation.” 


Harrop... 

In a veiled reference to the “well meaning” current President, Khatami recently observed that, “a word out of place may 

have many costs for the country.” By contrast, “a considered word can defend the country’s principles, norms and interests 

and reduce threats at the same time.” 

Well aware of deep seated resistance to reforms in Iran, President Khatami lamented in a January 1998 Time Magazine 

essay that “Autocracy has become our second nature. We Iranians are all dictators, in a sense.” Thus, Iran’s “path to freedom 

is risky and rough.” 

Yet Khatami echoes Jefferson in also affirming that, “I am of the view that thought cannot be contained, and if we live in 

a free atmosphere, opinions shall balance each other and logic shall prevail.” Without such freedom, Khatami warned, 

“the thought sparkling in the minds of thinkers shall be channeled into hidden communities and may emerge one day 

in the form of bitter and violent reaction.” 

For Muhammad Khatami, the Islamic Republic of Iran understands that the expectation of democracy — of freedom 

and participation — remains ingrained within Iran’s culture. Iran has the choice between trying to bottle it up and risk 

“reaction,” or to advance again on the path of Islamic democracy. 


117

Minorities 


Religious Apartheid in Iran 

H.E. Chehabi 

The religious make-up of Iran’s population is marked by a paradox: while many religions 

and sects are present, the overall picture is one of homogeneity, as over 99% of 

Iranians are Muslims, and of these somewhere between 75% and 90% adhere to Twelver 

Shi‘ism, Iran’s official state religion for the last five centuries. However, the exact numbers 

are unknown, since Iranian censuses ask citizens for their religious affiliation but 

allow only four choices: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, the latter 

three constituting the “recognized” minorities. This classification is enshrined in both 

the constitutions of 1906 and 1979. 

Iran’s Sunnis, the largest religious minority and numbering many millions, live mostly 

in the country’s periphery and overwhelmingly belong to ethnic minorities: Kurds in 

the west, Turkmens in the northeast, Baluchis in the southeast, Arabs on the shores 

of the Persian Gulf. For this reason, resentment against discrimination among Sunnis 

becomes easily couched in terms of ethnic nationalism. Moreover, these ethnic 

groups straddle Iran’s borders, conferring a geopolitical dimension to the ethnic/sectarian 

question. 1 

In addition, various Sufi orders offer Muslims a spiritual alternative and thereby arouse 

the suspicion and often hostility of the clergy. Iran’s non-Muslim citizens include, in addition 

to the above-mentioned constitutionally “recognized” communities, Mandaeans, 

Yezidis, Sikhs, and most numerically important, Baha’is, whose numbers were estimated 

at around 300,000 on the eve of the revolution. 

The constitution of the Islamic Republic retained the provisions of the 1906 constitution 

regarding non-Muslims, granting them freedom of worship and parliamentary 

representation (three deputies for Christians, and one each for Jews and Zoroastrians). 

It improved on the previous basic law by acknowledging the existence of Sunnis, stating 

that they were “free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing 

their religious rites,” adding that in areas where they formed a regional majority, “local 

regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils are to be in accordance 

with the respective school of fiqh.” Recognizing that these two articles did not 

exhaust the nation’s religious diversity, a third article, intended for the benefit of all re- 

1. Other Muslim minorities include the largely Kurdish Ahl-e Haqq, whose membership 

runs in the hundreds of thousands, the non-Twelver-Shi‘ite Ismailis (less than 100,000), and 

the Twelver Shi‘ite Shaykhi sect. 


Dr. H.E. Chehabi, Professor of 

International Relations and 

History, Boston University 

119

Chehabi... 

maining non-Muslims, proclaimed that they must be “treated kindly by the government and by Muslims in general.” 

This differentiation of citizens according to their religion is reminiscent of apartheid’s classification of citizens by race, 

except that where the racist regime in South Africa at least maintained the pretense of “separate but equal,” the Islamic 

Republic does not even do that. The most repressive treatment was meted out to the Baha’is. Since the revolution, a 

total of about 300 have been killed, which equates to one in a thousand. There being no civil marriage in Iran, religious 

marriages contracted according to their faith were not recognized by the state, leaving their children in a legal limbo. 

Their cemeteries were bulldozed and they were given no land to bury their dead. 

The “recognized” minorities fared better. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians maintained 

their houses of worship, communal institutions, and separate family laws. They 

were even exempted from the general prohibition of alcohol. They were allowed to have 

their religion taught to their children at school, although the textbooks were written by 

Muslims. 

Iran’s Sunnis, who 

have received far 

less international 

attention than Arab 

Shi‘ites and are 

perhaps the most 

overlooked Muslim 

community in the 

Middle East, have 

fared better than 

non-Muslims. 

Iran’s Sunnis, who have received far less international attention than Arab Shi‘ites and 

are perhaps the most overlooked Muslim community in the Middle East, have fared 

better than non-Muslims. In traditionally Sunni areas of the country mosques function 

and flourish, although the Sunni population of Tehran, whose numbers runs into 

the hundreds of thousands, is not allowed to have a mosque of its own; the government 

invites them to attend prayers in Shi‘ite mosques, an option most of them do not find attractive. This has posed 

a problem for Sunni diplomats stationed in Tehran, who in the 1990s held their Friday prayers in the basement of the 

Pakistani school. Like non-Muslims, Sunnis suffer discrimination in state employment, but to a lesser extent. Even in 

Sunni-majority areas like Kurdistan or Baluchistan, government officials are routinely recruited from among the local 

Shi‘ites. But there are a number of Sunni MPs in the Majlis. 

The liberalization of social, political, and economic life during the presidencies of ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and 

Muhammad Khatami benefited religious minorities. The signs “special to religious minorities” disappeared from eateries 

and pastry shops; Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i does not deem “people of the book” polluting. Jews, who had been 

treated more harshly than Christians and Zoroastrians, were given exit visas more easily. The penal code was amended 

to equalize the blood money of Muslims and (“recognized”) non-Muslims. Mandaeans were recognized as a “people of 

the book” in 1996 by Ayatollah Khamene’i, but not given the parliamentary seat they demanded. 

President Khatami made a point of embracing high dignitaries of the three recognized minorities at his first inauguration, 

named three trusted Sunni personalities as his advisors for Sunni affairs, and sent them as his personal emissaries 

to Sunni-majority areas. In Tehran, they acted as ombudsmen for Sunnis who felt discriminated. In Kurdistan, for the 

first time, two Sunnis were named district governors. But, as in other areas, the reformist administration’s actions were 


Chehabi... 

stymied by the entrenched powers: when the Presidium of the Sixth Majles attempted to co-opt a Sunni Kurdish MP 

into its ranks, Shi‘ite ‘ulama’ in Qom protested so vehemently that the President’s parliamentary supporters gave up the 

idea. 

The reformists’ efforts bore the most visible fruit in Baluchistan, Iran’s largest Sunni-majority province. By making 

concessions to the local population, the government defused sociopolitical tensions exacerbated by the proximity of 

Afghanistan, where the virulently anti-Shi‘ite Taliban supported Baluchi insurgents, and Pakistan, a country whose Baluchis 

have been in a state of almost continuous rebellion for years. Baluchis rewarded the reformists by voting en masse 

for the reformist candidate in the 2005 presidential elections. 

Unsurprisingly, the advent of Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005 brought reversals on all 

fronts. The heightened sectarian tension in Iraq has led to an increase in anti-Sunni 

sentiment among the military and intelligence figures who dominate the regime. Public 

policy now aggressively tries to reaffirm the Shi‘ite nature of the state. One way that 

this is done is through the saturatation of Sunni-majority areas like Baluchistan with 

Shi‘ite imagery on occasions such as the mourning ceremonies for Imam Husayn in 

the month of Muharram, which leads to a sense of being occupied. Predictably, Iran’s 

Sunnis have become more restive. In Baluchistan a shadowy organization called Jundullah 

wages a low-level insurgency against the Revolutionary Guards, fuelled by the 

drug trade with Afghanistan, ethnic nationalism encouraged by the United States, and 

Sunni fundamentalism financed by Saudi Arabia. In the Kurdish areas of Western Iran 

people watch Kurdish television broadcast from Iraqi Kurdistan and wonder why in Iraq a Kurd can become President 

while in Iran he cannot even become provincial governor. Meanwhile, Wahhabi missionaries from Saudi Arabia ply 

Iran’s southern coasts. 

Sufis also came under attack. In February 2006 mobs destroyed their main house of worship in Qom, and a year later 

a prominent Sufi leader, Nur Ali Tabandeh, was arrested. The “recognized” minorities have come under closer scrutiny 

by the state as well. As might be imagined, the new intolerance has hit Baha’is the hardest. The organs of the state have 

maintained a steady barrage of accusations and calumnies intended to incite the population against the Baha’is. 

What is often forgotten in discussions of the Iranian regime’s discriminatory policies towards those citizens who happen 

not to profess the official religion of the state is that these policies contradict not only article 14 of the constitution, 

which enjoins the government to treat non-Muslims “kindly,” but also numerous international conventions to which 

Iran is a party. International law creates both rights and duties for states, and when a state consistently disregards its duties, 

it cannot expect the rest of the international community to respect its rights. 


International law 

creates both rights 

and duties for states, 

and when a state 

consistently disregards 

its duties, it 

cannot expect the 

rest of the international 

community 

to respect its rights. 

121

Azerbaijani Ethno-nationalism: A Danger Signal for Iran 

Daniel Heradstveit 

By the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, Iran was forced to cede its dependent khanates 

north of the river Aras to Russia. The majority population of both North (Russo-Soviet) 

and South (Iranian) Azerbaijan belong to the same ethnic group within the Turkic linguistic 

family. Many Azerbaijanis tend not to differentiate between the modern republic 

and Iranian Azerbaijan; they consider the Iranian Azeris “kith and kin.” In fact, many 

Azerbaijanis actually have family on the other side. The nomenclature of North and 

South Azerbaijan is a way of asserting that the two areas belong together; the river Aras, 

which under the Soviet Union was a hermetically sealed frontier, symbolizes the artificial 

chasm running through the Azeri nation. 

The Azeris are the biggest minority in the multiethnic Iranian state, variously estimated 

at between a fifth and a third of the population. Persian speakers often speak of Farsi as 

a “more cultivated” language, which naturally is resented by Azeri speakers, who feel that 

they are the victims of cultural humiliation. Violent oppression, however, has decreased 

since the fall of the Shah. Azeri-language publications, for example, have advocated the 

free expression of Azeri identity and cultural rights. In 1997, newly elected President 

Muhammad Khatami offered more space for minority cultural rights so as to win the 

support of the periphery against the centralizing elite. 

IRAN FEARS AZERI NATIoNAlISM 

The Turkic peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey itself are more secularminded 

than the deeply religious Persians; whereas for the latter, the great marker is 

Islam, the former respond more to ethnicity. Language can thus be seen as a proxy for 

the very ancient Ottoman/Persian “clash of civilizations” in the Transcaucasus; for Tehran, 

pan-Turkic nationalism is the biggest threat of all. Promotion of a Turkic language 

in Iran can therefore be seen as potentially treasonous. When Abulfaz Elchibey, the first 

post-Soviet President of Azerbaijan, openly advocated irredentism, the Iranians were 

genuinely alarmed. They therefore determined to keep their new northern neighbor 

small and powerless. 

One way of weakening Azerbaijan is to keep the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the boil; 

Iran openly supported Christian Armenia against its own (both Muslim and Shi‘ite) coreligionists. 

Iran was afraid that supporting Azerbaijan instead could strengthen the 

Dr. Daniel Heradstveit is 

Professor and Senior Fellow 

at the Norwegian Institute of 

International Affairs 


Heradstveit... 

ties across the frontier and thereby facilitate Azerbaijani backing for Iranian Azeris. This tells us something about the 

balance between ideology and realpolitik in the Islamic Republic. 

Both Azerbaijanis and Iranian Azeris viewed this opportunism as a double betrayal — of both co-religionists and ethnic 

cousins — and were encouraged to political activism. For this reason Tehran does not want Armenia to get too strong 

either, as that could lead to an influx into Iran itself of Azerbaijani refugees who would be very negatively disposed towards 

the Iranian state and inclined to ally with “the enemy within” (i.e., the already restive Iranian Azeris). 

DIVIDED By A CoMMoN lANGUAGE? 

In the nearly two centuries since the Treaty of Turkmenchay, two very different cultures 

have evolved on the banks of the Aras. The situation is analogous to that in 1989 between 

the two Germanies, except that the separation between the two Azerbaijans has 

lasted about four times as long. For this reason, the early euphoria over the prospects of 

fellowship between Azeris in the two countries did not long outlive the encounter with 

political reality. Azerbaijanis both desire and fear this fellowship; they see themselves 

as secular and cosmopolitan, but see their Iranian cousins as regrettably influenced by 

Persian religion and culture. Iranian missionaries in Azerbaijan have been given the 

cold shoulder. 

THE IRANIAN AZERIS AND THE IRANIAN STATE 

It is hard to gain a clear picture of the strength of the Azeri identity in modern Iran. The Islamic Republic says that the 

Azeris are happy in the Iranian state; ethnic identity movements are largely non-violent and thereby invisible to the 

outside world. Moreover, metropolitan Azeris tend to display their Islamic identity in the public space, their Turkic one 

at home. It is such sophisticates, who do not see their double identity as a problem, whom foreigners tend to meet. In 

the provinces, however, people are less assimilated, and there are sporadic disturbances. The closer to the Caspian, the 

less the acceptance of the clergy’s watchdog role and Tehran’s attempt to equate Islam with Persianness is resented. It is 

frequently said that emissaries from the capital are not competent to govern the provinces of the northwest because they 

lack a comprehension of the area’s mentality; they should stay in Tehran where they belong. 

The fact that almost everyone can now get hold of TV sets that can receive both Turkish and Azerbaijani programming 

has brought Turkic civilization psychologically much closer. The language of the Iranian Azeris can now be considered 

part of a “world language” rather than a despised sociolect. Tehran’s endeavor to present all things Persian as superior 

is thus losing ground. 


The situation is 

analogous to that 

in 1989 between the 

two Germanies, except 

that the separation 

between the 

two Azerbaijans has 

lasted about four 

times as long. 

Such Turkic programming gives the minority population insight into another world, one that resonates with its own 

123

Heradstveit... 

identity and mentality. Whether this will lead to Iranian Azeris feeling steadily more alienated from the Iranian state, 

to the point of wanting to break away altogether, is another question. Can the Azeri identity in Iran be integrated into 

loyalty to the Iranian state, or might the Iranian Azeris — in certain circumstances — consider reuniting with their 

cousins in Azerbaijan? 

WAR AS THE TRIGGER 

It would not be hard to unleash ethno-nationalism in both north and south, especially 

in times of war and disaster; for then, people would turn to their “own kind.” In the 

spring of 2006, an American attack on Iran seemed imminent. This served to revive 

the flagging idea of pan-Azeri identity. Indeed, Azerbaijan feared that a military attack 

on Iran could destabilize the country to such a degree that oppressed minorities could 

seek new alliances with surrounding states and ethnic groups. Thus, if a conflict or a 

domestic crisis were to occur, one cannot rule out a surge of Azeri ethno-nationalism, 

nor in that event predict what the repercussions might be. 

Can the Azeri 

identity in Iran be 

integrated into loyalty 

to the Iranian 

state, or might the 

Iranian Azeris — in 

certain circumstances 

— consider 

reuniting with 

their cousins in 

Azerbaijan? 


III. Regional and 

International Relations 


125

Sources and Patterns of Foreign Policy 


Iran’s International Relations: Pragmatism in a Revolutionary Bottle 

Anoush Ehteshami 

Revolutions, though essentially domestic affairs, cause a tear in the very fabric of the 

prevailing international system, disrupting the balance of power and the normal flow 

of diplomacy. Iran’s religiously inspired revolution has been no exception. On the one 

hand, it undid the intricate international web that had sustained the Pahlavi monarchy, 

and on the other it brought forth a series of priorities more consistent with the perceptions 

and values of the new elite and the ideological regime that the revolution had 

spawned. 

The revolutionaries claimed theirs to be different from all previous revolutions, inspired 

neither by the values of the West nor by the proletariat-driven Communist world. Yet, 

its small print — the constitution, power structure, governance system — shared aspects 

with both, adding to the unique characteristics of the Islamic Republic. However, 

this republic did indeed come to resemble none other, arguably evolving into an antiimperialist 

Muslim version of the French republic as one thumbs through its (1979 and 

1989 amended) constitution! 

The Iranian revolution, which bucked the trend in 20 th century revolutions in terms of 

its ideology, ended the reign of a pro-Western and secular regime in a large and strategically 

important Middle Eastern country. Inevitably, therefore, its ripples were to be 

felt across the region, despite the fact that this revolution had occurred in a non-Arab 

and Shi‘a-dominated country. Like other revolutionary regimes, Tehran was determined 

to encourage the growth of its ideology and “export” it wherever possible. This regime, 

moreover, emerged and consolidated its grip at the height of a deepening Cold War 

between the United States, its far away adversary, and its next-door anti-religion neighbour, 

the Soviet Union. It had to find a new place for itself in this starkly defined international 

system. Yet, within ten years of its birth, it had to put aside the very rationale 

of its global presence — neither East nor West — as it witnessed the end of the halfcentury 

Cold War. It had to come to terms with the demise of its superpower neighbor, 

an unchallenged United States, and its own strategic and geopolitical presence in a New 

World Order. 

Therefore, Iran’s foreign policy, and indeed its international relations, reflect not only 

the complexities of a revolutionary state emerging in a highly dynamic and strategically 

important part of the world, but also perhaps the complexities and contradictory tensions 

of the new revolutionary republic’s own domestic politics. 


Professor Anoush Ehteshami 

is Professor of International 

Relations and Head of the 

School of Government and 

International Affairs at Durham 

University. 

127

Ehteshami... 

This is a regime whose stated goals in the international arena, as enshrined in its constitution, are either too abstract or 

too prescriptive to add any value to understanding its actual conduct. So, there is little sense in trying to take stock of 

the past 30 years with reference to those ideals. Nevertheless, the revolution-crafted republic has shown unique features 

that are best captured by the words of a prominent foreign policy advisor to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Mojtaba 

Samareh-Hashemi: 

Iran’s foreign policies have some principles and those principles are clear. These principles 

have been stated in the Constitution and at the same time have been defined by Iran’s 

approaches during [the] 30 years since the revolution. Also macro policies on foreign 

issues have been specified and are clear in the remarks made by Imam Khomeini or the 

supreme leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i] … One of the most important issues is justice 

which has its own interpretations. There must be a just relationship whether in the bilateral, 

regional, multilateral or international relationships. Another issue is friendships, kindness 

and affection between human beings. [The] Islamic Republic believes relations should be 

based on friendships and brotherhood. The third point is the issue of spirituality and paying 

attention to human values. Paying attention to ethics or in one word monotheism [is another 

principle]. And the last issue is protecting human being’s dignity and rights … Iran would 

like to have relations with the whole world based on these principles. 1 

In practice, Iran’s international relations have evolved into a series of pragmatic decisions 

alongside ideological stand-offs. Indeed, the country’s international relations have 

been remarkably non-controversial, by and large. Revolutionary Iran has carried on being 

a fairly normal state on the international stage with few extraordinary aspirations. 

Iran has remained a faithful member of virtually every international organization of 

which the Pahlavi monarchy had been a part, and in this regard at least, it has acted as 

a status quo state. Indeed, until the late 1990s, Iran also had retained a similar trading 

pattern to that of the ancien regime (with the exception of trade with the United States). 

Trade with the West dominated until well into the 21st Revolutionary Iran 

has carried on being 

a fairly normal 

state on the international 

stage with 

few extraordinary 

aspirations. 

century and only began tapering off with the imposition of a series 

of UN sanctions from December 2006. There has been very little tangible shift towards the developing world in this 

regard, despite Iran’s efforts to start a D-8 forum of large developing countries going. Iran’s stance towards the Muslim 

world, theoretically its closest constituency, also has been uneven. The irony of the 1980s was that Iran had good relations 

with some secular-leaning Muslim states (Algeria, Libya, Syria) and bad relations with Islamic Saudi Arabia, but 

very indifferent relations with others. There was no “Muslim world first” policy, despite Tehran’s overtly Islamist tone. 

Yet, Iran’s international posture and role does continue to concern, if not fascinate observers. The mix of religious-na- 

1. Financial Times, May 30, 2008. 


Ehteshami... 

tionalism and revolutionary-populism propaganda, policy opportunism (e.g., buying arms from Israel during the Iran- 

Iraq War or importing weapons from the Communist states of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea), and anti- 

Americanism/anti-Zionism make Iran’s policies and intentions difficult to understand. For many, its anti-Americanism 

is sufficient evidence of deep-seated anti-imperialism, yet this regime has not been in the business of trying to take the 

world towards an Iran-made utopia. Its radicalism has been limited to certain issues 

and manifests itself closer to home, in the Middle East. Its other main concern has been 

how to manage its confrontation with the “Great Satan” (the United States). 

Iran is a country whose trading links with the West remain strong, though it is desper- 

ate to shift East (to include Russia in this instance) politically and economically. Iran’s 

own Third Way of “neither East nor West” gave way to a menu of relations with both the 

East (Sharq) and the West (Gharb), to paraphrase Ramazani. 2 

Analytically, then, the Islamic Republic’s international relations can usefully be divided into distinct periods: from a 

period of confrontation (1980-88) to a period of accommodation (1989-97), détente (1997-2005), and rejection (post- 

2005). But this demarcation should not disguise the many elements of continuity, even with the policies of the Pahlavi 

era. Nor should it disguise the erratic nature of foreign policy in Iran. As The Economist has noted, 

The country’s foreign policies look erratic, too. Iran has condemned jihadist terrorism, but 

sheltered al-Qaeda fugitives. It has backed the government of Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri 

al-Maliki, yet has abetted militias opposed to him. It champions Muslim unity but creates 

division by vilifying pro-Western Muslim rulers, backing Shia factions and expecting Shias 

everywhere to bow to Mr Khamene’i’s authority. 3 

“Zigzagging” appears to be the hallmark of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Then again, what country’s foreign 

policy cannot be thus described? Nonetheless, given Iran’s location and revolutionary-religious-based political regime, 

its erratic foreign policy has been particularly troubling to many, especially to the United States. 

While the revolution itself was a geopolitical earthquake, the Islamic Republic’s international relations have been remarkable 

for their ordinariness. Indeed, the republic’s enduring foreign policy legacy has been its anti-Americanism. 

Post-revolutionary Iran succumbed to the practical geopolitical forces that were at the heart of the monarchy’s foreign 

policy making and its strategic thinking. In the end “Iran zamin” (i.e., the Iranian “cultural continent”) as a concept and 

as a geographical entity consumed the revolution and made the country’s new masters hostages to this ancient land’s 

needs. 

2. R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), pp. 393–412. 

3. The Economist, May 24-30, 2008. 


While the revolution 

itself was a 

geopolitical earthquake, 

the Islamic 

Republic’s international 

relations 

have been remarkable 

for their ordinariness. 

129

Culture and the Range of Options in Iran’s International Politics 

Hossein S. Seifzadeh 

Iran’s political culture is most compatible with a proactive foreign policy based on 

“patriotic cosmopolitanism,” a kind of doctrine with two apparently antithetical com- 

ponents: the idea of global citizenship, regardless of people’s political affiliation; but also 

political committment to sustain one’s own values — in this case, Iranian values. Ideally, 

this formulation should appeal to religious intellectuals and pro-Mossadeq national- 

ists. But in reality, contemporary Iran has been caught between two extreme tendencies 

in its approach to international politics — “repulsive assertivism” and “primordial glo- 

balism.” Repulsive assertivism is an ideological tendency driven by negative emotions 

to expunge the vestiges of 

a past adverse status quo 

— in this case, the humili- 

ations imposed upon Iran 

by great powers in last two 

centuries — in a bid to 

once again become a vi- 

able and honorable polity. 

In this respect assertive- 

ness functions primarily 

to express emotion and perhaps also to elicit similar emotions among others (in this 

instance Muslims and other disgruntled groups) against foreign intruders. Primordial 

globalism is a long-standing approach to mobilizing Muslims around the world to sup- 

port the Islamic republic’s cause and integrity against the threat of Western-led global- 

ism. In turn, these latter cultures have been undermined by the idealistic imperatives of 

patriotic cosmopolitanism. Based upon a survey by the BBC, 85% of Iranians express a 

cosmopilitan passion, and feel that they are citizens in a global civil society. 

Essentially, then, contemporary Iranian political culture as it relates to Iran’s approach 

to the Westphalian international system is a “push-pull” dynamic between these two 

competing tendencies. On one end of the spectrum lies the “repulsive assertivist” ten- 

dency, which dispenses with Iran’s role as a geopolitical bridge in a realist bid to safe- 

guard Iran’s independence against foreign incursions. On the other end lies “primordial 

globalism,” which is of more recent vintage and embodies the hope for reviving either 

Iranian and/or Islamic empires. It is within this mixed cultural context that the real 

strategic outlooks of contemporary Iran have been devised. 

Dr. Hoseein S. Seifzadeh is 

Professor of Politics at the 

University of Tehran and Adjunct 

Scholar at the Middle 

East Institute. 

130 The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Iranian Revolution at 30 • www.mideasti.org

Seifzadeh... 

CUlTURE AND HISToRIoGRAPHy oF IRANIAN APPRoACHES To INTERNATIoNAl RElATIoNS 

Iran’s first approach to the Westphalian international system arose from its epoch-making defeats by Russia and Great 

Britain in the 19 th century. As a result of these defeats, the “push-pull” mechanism in Iran appeared for the first time. 

Chancellor Ghaem-Magham Farahani 1 embraced a “cognitive” approach to the defeats, while Muhammad Shah ad- 

opted a “primordial” (or ethnic foundationalist) reaction. Whereas the cognitive approach of Ghaem Magham was a 

deliberate approach based upon the national interest and values of Iran, the primordial (foundationalist) tendency of 

Muhammad Shah was an instinctive impulse, driven more by his tribal affiliations. 

As time passed, other “pushes” complicated the picture. Rational choice of a balance- 

of-power between European Great Powers and the primordial surrealism of the clerical 

gentry defined in terms of anti-Russian fundamentalism also surfaced. In the process 

of push-pull mechanisms, however, the balance-of-power principle of “divide and rule” 

by Great Britain and Russia prevailed. Muhammad Shah 2 was enticed to kill Ghaem 

Magham in 1835. Hence, Iran’s approach toward the Westphalian international system 

has been influenced by primordial culture. 

Such a push-pull phenomenon has recurred many times in Iran. In a matter of two de- 

cades, such a push-pull and its tragic consequences once again resurfaced in Iran’s ap- 

proach to international relations. In this case, yet again the cognitive approach of Amir 

Kabir 3 was truncated by the ethnic foundationalism of Nasser-ed-Din Shah. 4 This time 

British machinations provoked both clerical fundamentalism and the ethnic founda- 

tionalism of Nasser-ed-Din Shah against the cognitive approach of Amir Kabir. Similar 

to the case of Ghaem Magham, foreign machinations enticed Nasser-ed-Din Shah to 

kill Amir Kabir in 1852. 

Due to these experiences, the monarchs of the Pahlavi dynasty tried to incorporate Iran into the modern international 

system, justifying their approach with national interests, revolving primarily around the bridge geopolitics of Iran’s 

location and then of its oil. A succession of prime ministers assisted the Pahlavi monarchs in this effort: Mirza Hossein 

Khan Sepah-salar (appointed in 1871), Mohammad Ali Forughi (appointed in 1925, 1933, and 1941), Ahmad Ghavam 

(last appointed in 1952). 

This approach received harsh criticism primarily from the nationalists gathering around Prime Minister Muhammad 

Mossadeq. Of course, the humiliating invasion of the Allied forces during the Second World War, ignoring Reza Shah’s 

1. Iranian Prime Minister from 1834-5. 

2. Shah of Persia, 1834-48. 

3. Prime Minister from 1848-51. 

4. Shah of Persia, 1848-96. 


Whereas the cognitive 

approach of 

Ghaem Magham 

was a deliberate approach 

based upon 

the national interest 

and values of 

Iran, the primordial(foundationalist) 

tendency of 

Muhammad Shah 

was an instinctive 

impulse, driven 

more by his tribal 

affiliations. 

131

Seifzadeh... 

policy of neutrality, was a contributing factor. The inadvertent opening up of the polity of Iran was another factor. 

Against these favorable circumstances, Mossadeq attempted the first “velvet revolution” in Iran in 1950. Due to his legal 

education and moral attachment to Iran, he worked hard to make Iran’s international politics an extension of its domes- 

tic needs. This time, the strategic calculations of Britain and the United States led to the US-engineered coup against his 

legitimate government. The Soviet Union betrayed him as well. 

As a result, the second Pahlavi monarch, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and his subservient prime ministers attempted 

to resign Iran to a proxy role in international relations. Such an inverted approach to politics — making domestic poli- 

tics a continuum of international politics — required some due changes in Iran’s domestic sphere. The secularization 

of politics and capitulation were ratified and implemented in the 1960s. This infuriated the clerics not only against the 

regime but also against the international system and order. The Islamic Revolution was a reaction to such Westphalian 

politics. 

The Islamic revolution exhibits both change and continuity. The primordial overarch 

remains constant, but its locus has changed from ethnic foundationalism to religious 

fundamentalism. In the process, however, after the cognitive approach of Prime Min- 

ister Mehdi Bazargan (1979) and America’s allowing the Shah’s entry into the US, the 

way for the fundamentalist approach was paved. After the embattled President Bani 

Sadr, Muhammad ‘Ali Rajai’s fundamentalism (1981) and Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s mixed moral-fun- 

damentalist approach took effect. In reaction to their policies, for 16 years, Hashemi Rafsanjani attempted a modified 

pragmatic detente (1989-1997) and Muhammad Khatami attempted a triadic and inconsistent coexistence-adjunct 

coalition-global cooperation. President Bill Clinton’s imposed sanctions betrayed Rafsanjani, and George W. Bush’s 

naming of Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil” betrayed the latter. Since 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad has pioneered 

a primordial surrealist campaign against the Pax Americana international system and order. His primordial surrealist 

campaign is a pragmatic foreign policy targeted to undermine Western globalism and hegemony by capitalizing on the 

already charged emotions (pan-Muslim solidarity and hate for the hostile West) of Muslims around the world. Khata- 

mi and Rafsanjani shifted their campaign in favor of preventive realism, in their hope for self-defense and resistance 

against the West. 

The lasting popularity of Mossadeq, the more or less widening distance of Mousavi and Khatami in contrast 

to the tarnished images of rationalists such as Mohammad Ali Forughi and Jamshid Amouzegar, and the waning 

popularity of surrealism explains Iran’s two-tiered international politics for normal and crisis circumstances. 

THE IMPACT oF MoRAl CUlTURE oN THE INTERNATIoNAl PolITICS oF IRAN 

The Islamic revolution 

exhibits both 

change and continuity. 

Thanks to the criticism leveled against the trials and errors of the various appointed or elected officials in entangling 

in the pushes and pulls of polar positions of anarchic assertivism to primordial confrontation or in-between modified 


Seifzadeh... 

positions, Iran has come to its own approach to international relations. Anarchic assertivism is a part of self-defense 

policy of Iran to undermine the Pax Americana order by asserting that Iran is an independent state, with differing 

strategic interests and values, and against the conformist measures imposed by the Pax Americana order. In case the 

US decides to push for confrontation to defeat Iran’s assertive campaign, then the only remaining option for Iran is to 

opt to capitalize on the primordial values and the divided surrealist (love-hate) emotions of Muslims. By lumping both 

strategic needs and cultural tendencies, two alternative ideational approaches are devised; the positive and negative 

ranges. Each of these ranges has two normal and crisis situations. The normal positive range revolves around moral 

culture and the negative range revolves around cognitive culture. The best case scenario 

is located in the moral culture context; and the second best case scenario is located 

within the cognitive context. Each of these first and second best options include two 

scenarios. In sum, these four strategies reflect the proactive approach of Iran to inter- 

national relations. The best case scenario for Iran is operationally defined in terms of 

two policies: either “Adjunct Coalitions” or “Cooperation on Global Issues.” This tier of 

Iran’s proactive policy is based upon a win-win policy for all and in accordance with 

Iran’s status as a geopolitical bridge. In case the great powers decide to use Iran’s geo- 

political status against its will, then Iran will opt for the alternative tier of second best 

scenario. This scenario is operationally defined in terms of self-defense or resistance. 

Under exigencies, Iran will either shift to a rational choice culture defined in terms of 

“repulsive assertivism,” or instead to “primordial globalism,” at either extreme poles of 

the following diagram. The diagram above depicts the correlation between the culture 

and international relations approaches of Iran. 


Anarchic assertivism 

is a part of selfdefense 

policy of 

Iran to undermine 

the Pax Americana 

order by asserting 

that Iran is an independent 

state, with 

differing strategic 

interests and values, 

and against the conformist 

measures 

imposed by the Pax 

Americana order. 

133

The Geopolitical Factor in Iran’s Foreign Policy 

Kayhan Barzegar 

Revolutions either expand to export their ideologies or preserve themselves from the 

outside world. The 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran is no exception. A careful reading 

of Iran’s actions in the region shows how and why Iran has shifted its policies to meet 

the latter aim. Since the revolution, Iran’s leaders have faced the challenge of balancing 

their ideological (idealism) and geopolitical (pragmatism) approaches to foreign 

policy. Gradually, the Iranian leadership has come to focus on the geopolitical factor in 

the conduct of foreign policy; today, ideology one factor among many other sources of 

Iran’s power, and serves the aim of preserving Iran’s national security and interests. 

Since the advent of the Islamic revolution, Iran’s regional policies have been driven by ideology 

as well as geopolitics. Evidence of both of these elements can be found in the conduct of 

Iran’s regional foreign policy over the years. Nevertheless, the geopolitical factor predominates 

in Iran’s management of its relations with other regional states, and is likely to continue 

to do so. The main reason for this is the nature of the issues that Iran faces in its immediate 

political-security environment, which is marked by multiple sources of insecurity, 

including US military threats. These conditions require that Iran build strategic coalitions. 

Living in an unstable neighborhood has been costly for Iran. This generalized condition 

of instability persists. There is sectarian conflict on Iran’s western flank (Iraq). There are 

failed and fragile states on Iran’s eastern frontier (Afghanistan and Pakistan). There are 

states along Iran’s northern border whose political, social, and economic transformations 

are unsteady and incomplete (Central Asia and the Caucasus). And authoritarian 

and security-dependant regimes, each subject to political-social changes in future, lie to 

the south. Such an insecure environment has the potential of fuelling regional rivalries, 

igniting crises or military conflicts, and inducing a larger presence or direct intervention 

of major foreign powers. A major portion of Iran’s political and economic capital is being 

spent on tackling these varied threats. The Iranian leadership’s determination to maintain 

a powerful army reflects the national security concerns stemming from them. 

Iran’s geopolitical realities, ethnic politics, and cultural-religious characteristics profoundly 

tie its national security inextricably to that of the region. The situation in postinvasion 

Iraq has highlighted and intensified this security interdependence. Arising 

from the conditions in Iraq have been ethnic geopolitical rivalries, the risk of territorial 

disintegration, religious war, and interstate rivalries. Fear of Iraq’s fading Arab identity 

has prompted Saudi Arabia to be more involved in the Shi‘a and Kurdish issues. As the 

Dr. Kayhan Barzegar, Assistant 

Professor of International 

Relations, Science and 

Research Campus, Islamic 

Azad University, and Fellow 

Kennedy School of Government, 

Harvard University 


Barzegar... 

question of federalism and the threat of Iraq’s possible disintegration have come to the fore, Turkey also has become 

more engaged in Shi‘a and Sunni issues. Jordan and Egypt have warned that a “Shi‘a Crescent” has formed, within which 

Iran has emerged to play the leading role. Through concerns about Hezbollah’s relations with the Shi‘a militias, Iraqi 

issues are now more germane than ever to Lebanese domestic issues. Concerned about Iran’s increased activity in the 

southern Shi‘a-dominated areas and its effects in the Persian Gulf region as a whole, Israel, too, has become involved in 

Iraqi Kurdistan. Lastly, on account of increasing cooperation at the transnational level between al-Qaeda operatives and 

sympathizers, Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s issues are increasingly inextricable. The interrelated characteristics of the region’s 

newly emerging geopolitical and security issues have brought both challenges and opportunities for Iran. 

Thirdly, there is a direct relationship between the level and likelihood of US military 

threats towards Iran and the implementation of the two elements of geopolitics and ideology 

in Iran’s foreign policy. The Iranian engagement in the Iraq crisis is a good example. 

The greater the number of US threats made against Tehran and its overall politicalsecurity 

system, the more Iran asserted and employed the Shi‘a ideological element, inter 

alia, in its foreign policy approach. A diminution in foreign threats will, conversely, lead 

Iran to remain focused on issues related to its immediate security perimeter, reducing 

the ideological element while emphasizing the economic and integrative aspects of its 

relations with regional states. To protect itself from the US military threats and preempt 

future security challenges, Iran has requested openly the right to modest engagement 

in the region’s political-security architecture and economic-cultural activities. Indeed, 

tackling the new challenges mentioned earlier and creating prospects for economic development 

require that Iran help to build a secure and stable neighborhood. 

Lastly, Iran’s close relationships with Shi‘a factions in the region are aimed at building a strategic coalition based on 

geopolitical realities. In Iraq, one aspect of establishing this strategic coalition is the installation of a new generation 

of friendly elites at the level of the state. By supporting these Shi‘a political factions or groups that are, in a remarkable 

break with the past, friendlier today towards Iran and unwilling to participate in an anti-Iranian coalition for the foreseeable 

future, Iran has attempted to coax Iraq into fulfilling the role of a strategic partner in the region. Another aim is 

the creation of an Iran-Iraq coalition aimed at shaping new political-security arrangements in the Persian Gulf in which 

all of the littoral states are included. The new Iraq is the place that Iran’s ideological and pragmatic aspects of foreign 

policy have converged for the first time since the Islamic revolution. 

During the first decade of the revolution, Iran’s regional foreign policy was defined principally in ideological terms. More 

recently, however, geopolitical factors have predominated. Today, ideology is placed in the service of Iran’s national interests 

and security. Given the multitude of security challenges and opportunities facing Iran, one can expect the Iranian 

leadership to follow a pragmatic approach to relations with the regional states that reflects geopolitical realities. 


A diminution in 

foreign threats will, 

conversely, lead 

Iran to remain focused 

on issues related 

to its immediate 

security perimeter, 

reducing the 

ideological element 

while emphasizing 

the economic and 

integrative aspects 

of its relations with 

regional states. 

135

Iranian Foreign Policy: Concurrence of Ideology and Pragmatism 

Nasser Saghafi-Ameri 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued, as have other post-revolutionary states, 

certain principles and ideals that were revered in the movement that led to the revolution. 

Although Iran’s foreign policy during the past three decades has had an ideological 

component, this has not prevented it from translating ideology into operational policy 

in its foreign relations. 

From the outset, the Islamic government of Iran declared an independent foreign policy, 

employing the axiom, “Neither East nor West.” In fact, this was not merely a declaration 

of independence — an attempt to be free of the hegemonic influences of the two superpowers 

— but it also constituted a repudiation of the bipolar international system. 

That proclamation and revolutionary Iran’s ensuing policies were generally interpreted 

as a revolt against the existing international system, and thus were confronted by both 

the East and the West. Similarly, the notion of the “export of Islamic revolution” caused 

much anxiety, especially among Iran’s neighbors and in the region at large. 

In fact, in Iran, there were two competing views about “exporting Islamic revolution.” 

At one end of the spectrum were those who advocated exporting the moral values of 

the revolution, solely in the fields of education and culture, through normal diplomatic 

channels. At the other end were those who viewed revolutionary Iran as the vanguard 

of a world revolutionary movement to liberate Muslim countries specifically, and other 

Third World countries generally, from imperialist subjugation. 

However, it did not take long for the radical elements in the latter group to be marginalized 

and lose much of their clout in foreign policy decision-making. The “moderates” 

mostly approached the issue within the context of national interest. They considered 

Iran to be the ideological leader and supporter of an international brotherhood. In that 

capacity, they consider it a duty and obligation for Iran to fill the vacuum of failed and 

fading pan-nationalism. 

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that since 1979 Iran has faced numerous 

foreign policy challenges. Foremost among these was the eight-year war imposed upon 

Iran by the Ba‘thist regime of Iraq, which the West supported; this intensified Iran’s distrust 

of the outside world. The Western objections and pressures brought to bear on Iran 

regarding its nuclear program is yet another challenge, one that finally motivated the 

Dr. Nasser Saghafi-Ameri 

is a veteran Iranian foreign 

policy and international security 

analyst. 


Saghafi-Ameri... 

government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to fervently pursue a policy of “Looking to the East.” The aim of this 

policy is to forge closer ties with major countries like China, Russia, and India and with other like-minded countries in 

Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In conjunction with that outlook, Iranian politicians aspire to strengthen the economy 

and to overcome the challenges confronting Iran by Western-imposed economic sanctions. 

Meanwhile, the geopolitical changes that have occurred in Iran’s immediate neighborhood since September 11, 2001 

have provided a chance for Iran to recoup its position in the region as a major power. Yet, the West, and the United 

States in particular, seem determined to prevent Iran from attaining this status. Western concerns about Iran’s nuclear 

program, which is in its final stages of development, are widely perceived in Iran as being anchored mainly in mistrust 

and suspicion, focused on non-verifiable intentions, and aimed primarily at keeping Iran down. This situation returns 

us to the original question of the fundamental character of Iranian foreign policy, specifically the extent to which it is 

driven by ideology, as opposed to a rational and pragmatic approach to advancing the national interest. The following 

observations may help to answer this question.. 

First, revolutionary governments in their early days tend to have a strong inclination 

toward ideological approaches to foreign policy. However as these governments mature, 

pragmatic considerations inevitably become salient, since the state’s survival much depends 

on taking into account the realities of the outside world. This may explain what 

prompted Iran to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Iranian 

leaders viewed the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq as being vital to the national 

interest. This consideration took precedence over the ideological preference for not 

talking or working with the United States. Pragmatism has prevailed over ideology in 

other instances, for example, when Iran adopted a policy of neutrality in the Nagorno- 

Karabakh conflict between Armenia, a Christian state, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 

an Islamic state with a Shi‘a majority. 

Second, objective facts, not ideological fervor validate Iran’s aspiration to be regarded as a major regional power. Iran’s 

size, the educational level of its 70 million people, and its natural resources make the country a natural candidate for 

regional preeminence and enhance its ability to play a leadership role reflective of its geopolitical weight. Iran’s regional 

influence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Levant gives it additional weight in regional politics. So does Iran’s progress in 

nuclear and high technology. 

Third, in contrast to general perceptions of Iran being a revolutionary country, its foreign policy is guided and influenced 

largely by its cultural heritage of moderation and close regional ties. The sanctity of the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of other states has been emphasized repeatedly in Iranian foreign policy declarations. When Iran voiced its 

opposition to the Bush Administration’s attempt to impose its favored model of democracy and policy of regime change 

throughout the Middle East, this policy was accentuated. 


Western concerns 

about Iran’s nuclear 

program, which is 

in its final stages of 

development, are 

widely perceived in 

Iran as being anchored 

mainly in 

mistrust and suspicion, 

focused on 

non-verifiable intentions, 

and aimed 

primarily at keeping 

Iran down. 

137

Saghafi-Ameri... 

Fourth, the animosity that has plagued Iran-US relations has overshadowed many aspects of Iranian foreign policy over 

the past 30 years. During that period and despite the fact that the two sides had many common interests in the region, 

harmful politics prevented any attempt at reconciliation. In the past, Israel — as the closest ally of the United States, citing 

an Iranian threat to its security — has been one of the main obstacles to an Iran-US rapprochement. Regarding the 

allegation by some that Iran is determined to attack Israel, President Ahmadinejad declared that the Islamic Republic 

has never waged war against any nation and does not intend to do so in the future. 

Iranian foreign policy has undergone many upheavals during the past 30 years. In this 

period Iran has gained experience through hardship and endurance. The lesson to be 

learned is that success in a challenging and rapidly changing world requires striking a 

balance between ideological world views and pragmatism. Given the growing national 

sentiments in Iran, Iranian foreign policy is likely to be focused on pursuing the national 

interest, guided by ideological principles but flexible and practical approaches. 

Given the growing 

national sentiments 

in Iran, Iranian 

foreign policy is 

likely to be focused 

on pursuing the 

national interest, 

guided by ideological 

principles but 

flexible and practical 

approaches. 


Iran’s Tactical Foreign Policy Rhetoric 

Bidjan Nashat 

Shaped during their coming of age in the Shah’s prisons and at the frontlines of the 

Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s leadership harbors fundamentalist and anti-Israeli beliefs that are 

deeply ingrained in their revolutionary identity. Nevertheless, Iranian leaders have often 

combined their ideological fervor with pragmatic calculations to achieve their strategic 

objectives. While Iran’s geopolitical power has increased considerably since the beginning 

of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it faces old territorial and new international 

challenges. As a non-Arab Shi‘a state, Iran suffers from strategic isolation in the Middle 

East. Its geopolitical importance is limited by growing ethnic and sectarian divides in 

the region. 

Ayatollah Khomeini, who was keenly aware of these challenges, directly appealed to the 

umma by deliberately bypassing the leaders of other Muslim states. Although partly successful 

in the Persian Gulf states and southern Lebanon, the revolution’s appeal did not 

reach Iran’s Shia brethren in Saddam Husayn’s army during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). 

After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad 

Khatami employed more conciliatory tactics and less extensive use of revolutionary 

rhetoric. Ending with a declaration of Muslim unity and solidarity, the December 1997 

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Tehran marked a high point 

of Iranian success in terms of regional public diplomacy. 

After September 11 th and Iran’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil” by the Bush Administra- 

tion in January 2002, conservative hardliners slowly returned to prominence. After his 

election in June 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, recognizing the power of anti-imperialist 

and anti-Israeli rhetoric both as a foreign and domestic policy tool, broke with the conciliatory 

rhetoric of his predecessors and returned to the early revolutionary rhetoric of 

confrontation. 

With the backing of Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s new nuclear policy team or- 

dered the restarting of uranium enrichment in August 2005. Concurrently, Ahmadinejad 

and his advisors seized the chance to internationalize the nuclear conflict by attacking 

Israel and questioning the Holocaust, a subject which previously had not played 

an important role in the Iranian domestic debate. This rhetoric not only paralyzes Ahmadinejad’s 

domestic opponents, but also fits into a national security concept promoted 

by hardliner elements. Their goal is to overcome Iran’s strategic isolation in the Middle 

East by extending Iran’s security perimeter to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. 


Bidjan Nashat is a consultant 

on international development 

and Middle Eastern affairs at 

the World Bank and for German 

political foundations. 

He has studied at the Hertie 

School of Governance and at 

the universities of Tübingen, 

Georgetown and yale and 

holds a Magister Artium in 

International Relations and 

Iranian Studies, and a Master 

of Public Policy. 

139

Nashat... 

Moreover, by re-positioning Shi‘a Iran as a pan-Islamic force fighting for the (Sunni) Palestinian cause, Iran seeks to 

reduce the growing ethno-sectarian divide caused by the Iraqi civil war. 

Ahmadinejad chose the venues for his anti-Israeli outbursts carefully. During the December 

2007 Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Mecca, he elaborated 

on his idea for relocating Israel to Europe in an interview with Iranian state television. 

Through his rhetoric, Ahmadinejad managed to endear himself to the Arab “street” and 

dominate the agenda. By using regional and international gatherings such as the OIC 

and the Gulf Cooperation Council meetings, he has forced the pro-US Arab regimes 

to walk a tightrope between their allegiance to the US on the one hand, and a growing 

Islamist opposition and a considerable Shi‘a minority in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 

states on the other. 

Moreover, by repositioning 

Shi‘a 

Iran as a pan-Islamic 

force fighting 

for the (Sunni) 

Palestinian cause, 

Iran seeks to reduce 

the growing ethnosectarian 

divide 

caused by the Iraqi 

civil war. 

However, Ahmadinejad’s belligerent rhetoric soon backfired, leading the consensus-oriented Supreme Leader to balance 

the demands of the moderate reformers and the conservative pragmatists with those of Ahmadinejad’s Neo-conservative 

power base. By establishing a new foreign policy-making council (Strategic Council for Foreign Relations) in June 

2006, Khamene’i created a counterbalance to Iran’s main foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National 

Security Council, which is chaired by the President. The new council is headed by some of the Islamic Republic’s most 

experienced foreign policy officials. After the December 2006 local elections, which brought defeat for the President’s 

supporters, the Supreme Leader reasserted himself as the main arbiter on foreign policy matters and started to keep 

Ahmadinejad’s belligerence in check. However, if the appointment of Saeed Jalili as the new top nuclear negotiator in 

fall 2007 is any indicator, Ahmadinejad’s influence in foreign policy decision-making is still considerable. 

In response to this setback in the internal foreign policy-making struggle, Ahmadinejad started to increase Iran’s international 

outreach. The strategy towards the international community centers on a message of self-sufficiency in 

technological progress and justice in world affairs. The main targets were the members of the Non-Aligned Movement 

(NAM). In September 2006, Iran’s public diplomacy scored a victory when 118 NAM members issued a statement at 

their summit in Havana in support of Iran on the nuclear issue. Since then, Ahmadinejad has seized every occasion 

to assert Iran’s leadership of the developing, nonaligned states. During a January 2007 tour of Latin American states, 

Ahmadinejad proved that Iran is willing to add substance to the rhetoric of creating a “backyard of loneliness” for the 

US. At a meeting with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, both leaders pledged to set up a fund worth $2 billion to 

support countries which oppose US foreign policy. Even though it is not clear whether the fund is in place, both states 

have intensified mutual investments and the exchange of technology. At a June 2008 UN summit on world food security 

in Rome, Ahmadinejad stressed that “the competitions for power and wealth need to be changed to competitions for 

serving humanity and friendship and the unilateral and oppressive relations must be replaced by just mechanisms.” 1 

1. President Ahmadinejad’s speech at the High-Level Conference on World Food Security, Rome, June 3-5, 2008, http://www. 

fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/foodclimate/statements/irn_ahmadinejad_e.PDF. 


Nashat... 

Due to its effective public diplomacy and anti-imperialist rhetoric, Iran has been much more successful than the Arab 

states in reaching out to different parts of the world. In July 2008, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki announced 

Iran’s bid for a seat on the 2009-2010 UN Security Council at a meeting of the group of 57 Islamic nations. Iranian 

diplomats have claimed the support of the “Asian Group” and general agreement from other factions. Even though 

this application ultimately failed, it demonstrated the difficulties that the US and Europe face as they attempt to isolate 

Iran from the “international community” for its nuclear program. 

The use of anti-Israeli, pan-Islamic, and anti-imperialist rhetoric has been a deliberate 

tool in the conduct of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy. President Ahmadinejad’s 

administration has reintroduced and amplified Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric as a tactical 

means, which include overcoming Iran’s isolation in the region and internationalizing 

the standoff over its nuclear program. Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denials and his 

efforts to tie the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Iran’s nuclear program have increased 

Iran’s pan-Islamic reach into the Arab street and have put Arab governments on the 

defensive. On the international stage, Iran’s leadership has succeeded in internationalizing 

Iran’s nuclear program by tying it to the North-South conflict and stressing the 

themes of international justice, state sovereignty, and technological self-sufficiency. 

Nevertheless, Iran’s foreign policy approach has not been entirely successful. It has increased 

Iran’s international isolation and led to three UN Security Council resolutions 

and economic sanctions. Some Arab governments, such as that of Saudi Arabia, have 

become more vigorous in their opposition to Iran’s nuclear program, raising the prospect of a regional arms race. Ahmadinejad’s 

rhetoric also has backfired within Iran, strengthening the more pragmatic conservatives around the influential 

former President Rafsanjani and the former nuclear negotiator and new Majlis speaker Ali Larijani. 

Though Iran has managed to win the hearts and minds of the Arab populace and some NAM members, a different approach 

is required to establish trust with Arab and Western governments. Iran is facing challenges to its security ranging 

from a possible failed state in Iraq, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, and international pressure over its nuclear program. 

It is likely that historic pragmatism will once more prevail over its revolutionary identity in the Islamic Republic’s 

foreign policy conduct. 


On the international 

stage, Iran’s 

leadership has succeeded 

in internationalizing 

Iran’s 

nuclear program 

by tying it to the 

North-South conflict 

and stressing 

the themes of international 

justice, 

state sovereignty, 

and technological 

self-sufficiency. 

141

The Regional Theater 


The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations 

Nader Entessar 

Kurdish issues have been an important part of the myriad political and socioeconomic 

problems that have preoccupied the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception. The 

Kurdish factor has also been an important determinant of Iran’s regional foreign policy 

in the past three decades. Shortly after the onset of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the 

Iraqi government began to woo the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) as potential 

leverage in its war effort. In January 1981, Saddam Husayn’s regime established 

its first major weapons supply route to the KDPI near the Iranian cities of Nowdesheh 

and Qasr-e Shirin. Securing Nowdesheh was Iraq’s prime objective, as the city’s strategic 

location would deny Iran the use of the Baghdad-Tehran highway. The KDPI, for 

its part, had hoped to create “Kurdish liberated zones” throughout Iranian Kurdistan 

by relying on Iraqi-supplied weapons and those captured from military depots inside 

Iran. The tide, however, began to turn against both the KDPI and Iraq by later 1981 as 

Iranian forces managed to inflict heavy casualties on Iraqi forces in the northern front 

and push them across the border. Consequently, the Iranian forces launched a series of 

debilitating attacks against the KDPI, rendering them a marginal military factor during 

much of the Iran-Iraq War. 

By 1983, Iran began to play its own Kurdish card against Saddam Husayn’s forces. Having 

secured the support of both Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq 

(KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and forming a united 

front against the Iraqi regime, Saddam Husayn, in a last ditch effort to untangle the 

Iranian-Kurdish threat in the north, opened a secret channel of negotiations with the 

Kurds by promising them greater autonomy in their internal affairs. Baghdad was also 

concerned about possible Kurdish attacks against a strategic and highly lucrative pipeline 

that connected the Kirkuk oilfields to the port of Iskenderun in Turkey. Given Iraq’s 

numerous attacks against Iranian oil installations, Tehran felt compelled to threaten the 

safety of the Kirkuk-Iskenderun pipeline. Although Iran never carried out its threat 

against this pipeline, Iraq remained highly vigilant against a potential Iranian-supported 

Kurdish attack on one of its most important economic assets. 

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War and following Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait 

in 1990, the regional strategic calculations changed dramatically. With the establishment 

of a “safe haven” in northern Iraq and the creation of a no-fly zone north of the 

36th parallel, upwards of 8,000 Western troops were stationed in or around this zone 

with the ostensible goal of protecting the Iraqi Kurds from reprisals by Saddam’s forces. 


Dr. Nader Entessar, Professor 

and Chair, Department of 

Political Science and Criminal 

Justice, University of 

South Alabama 

143

Entessar... 

From the start, Iran opposed Western operations inside Iraq and feared that the no-fly zone could be used by the United 

States to threaten Iran’s territorial integrity or simply become a protected enclave for a variety of anti-Iranian opposition 

forces. In particular, Tehran became highly concerned about the United States using the KDPI to destabilize the border 

regions in the country’s northwest. Beginning in March 1993, Tehran thus launched a series of bombing raids against 

the KDPI and its supporters inside the no-fly zone. However, as the Kurdish Autonomous Region developed semiautonomous 

governing entities, Tehran opened up channels of communication with both the KDP and PUK, engaged 

in lucrative trade with Iraqi Kurdistan, and opened representative offices inside the Kurdish region of Iraq, allowing the 

two major Iraqi Kurdish parties to do likewise in Iran. 

The US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba‘thist government in Baghdad 

From the start, Iran 

presented yet another opportunity and challenge to Iran to devise a new approach to 

opposed Western 

Iraqi Kurdistan. Economically, Iran’s importance to Iraqi Kurdistan has increased ex- operations inside 

ponentially since 2003, with the volume of trade and investment between the two sides Iraq and feared 

having reached over $2 billion. Notwithstanding generally good ties between Tehran that the no-fly zone 

and Iraqi Kurdistan, political obstacles remain. On several occasions, Iran has accused could be used by 

the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of allowing Israeli agents to operate against the United States 

Iranian interests from the Kurdish territory. Israel’s presence, although not openly ac- to threaten Iran’s 

territorial integrity 

knowledged by the Kurdish authorities, has remained a source of tension between the 

or simply become 

two sides. As reported by the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in the June 28, 

a protected enclave 

2004 issue of the New yorker magazine, Israel has established a “significant presence” for a variety of antiin 

Iraqi Kurdistan, and Israeli Mossad agents work undercover as businessmen in the Iranian opposition 

area. The Israeli agents have reportedly been involved in providing direct and indirect forces. 

aid to the newly-formed Kurdish Independent Life Party (PJAK), an off-shoot of Turkey’s 

Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK), whose forces have been engaged in a guerrilla campaign and acts of terrorism 

inside Iranian Kurdistan. Iranian retaliatory attacks against PJAK and other hostile forces inside Iraqi Kurdistan continue 

to be a major source of friction between Tehran and the KRG. 

The capture and subsequent imprisonment of Iranian officials by US forces inside Iraqi Kurdistan in January 2007 have 

affected routine relations between the two sides. For example, when the US military raided the Iranian Liaison Office in 

Arbil and detained five mid-level diplomats working there, KRG officials reacted angrily, accusing American forces of 

violating their trust and attacking a liaison office that had been, for all practical purposes, operating as a consular office 

since 1992. Similarly, in September 2007, the US military raided a hotel in the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan 

and arrested Mahmud Farhady, the head of an Iranian trade delegation that had been invited by the Kurdish authorities 

to negotiate a series of wide-ranging agreements between the two trading partners. In protest, Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, 

a Kurd, sent an angry letter to US Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus, then chief US military 

commander in Iraq, demanding, to no avail, the release of the Iranian trade delegate. This incident caused a diplomatic 

rift between Iran and the KRG and led to retaliatory measures by Iran. For example, Tehran intensified its bombing 


Entessar... 

raids in the border areas and against the suspected PJAK bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic 

temporarily closed an important border crossing between Iran and the Kurdish region. Given the fact that 50% of 

goods imported into Iraqi Kurdistan were crossing from Iran, the closure of the border post caused extensive hardship 

inside Kurdistan. The assault on the Iranian trade delegation also jeopardized years of delicate negotiations between 

Iran and the KRG to establish an overland trade route between Iran’s Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf to a border 

crossing near Suleymaniyeh. 

Finally, Iran’s Kurdish policy is affected by domestic developments in Iraq. In particular, 

Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan is a function of its broader foreign policy 

towards Baghdad. So long as Iraq’s territorial boundaries are not challenged and its 

internal cohesion is not threatened by Kurdish political demands, Tehran can afford to 

maintain cordial relations with the Iraqi government and the KRG. However, if Iraq’s 

viability is challenged, Iran’s outlook towards the KRG will change and Tehran’s policies 

towards Iraqi Kurdistan will be calibrated to minimize any negative spill-over effects of 

turmoil into Iran’s national and regional interests. 


Iran’s foreign policy 

towards Iraqi 

Kurdistan is a function 

of its broader 

foreign policy towards 

Baghdad. 

145

Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite Relations 

Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr 

Next to the Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps few other topics in the history of the modern 

Middle East have captured the interest of policymakers and scholars alike as has postrevolutionary 

Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite relations, particularly the creation of Hizbullah. 

Although both groups have come to this topic with a set of similar questions — namely, 

what is the impact of this transnational network among Lebanese Shi‘ites and how does 

it operate? — thankfully, they have arrived at very different conclusions. 

The US government and many other Western governments have labeled this a terrorist 

network and a global threat since the early 1980s, classifying Hizbullah as a static and 

secretive organization. Scholarship on this network however, has in the meantime undergone 

several changes, providing us more and more with a nuanced understanding of 

Hizbullah’s ideologies, activities, and institutions. 

In the initial phase of the intensification of this particular Iranian-Lebanese network in 

the early 1980s, when large pictures of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appeared on the 

streets in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the number of Shi‘ite women wearing the 

so-called Iranian style hijab rose, this drastic change in the public space and its presumed 

resemblance to the public space in Iran led some scholars to speak of the “Iranization” 

of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. Murals, for example, were often taken as an indication that the 

population interpreted them according to the intention of the producers. However, more 

recent scholarship has argued, and rightly so, that what flows in this transnational network, 

from economic support to ideologies, is reconfigured into a local context. 

Later, scholars focused on how Hizbullah’s public institutions fill a gap in Lebanese 

social services, and how Hizbullah has adapted and transformed some Iranian revolutionary 

discourses, fitting them into a particularly Lebanese sociopolitical context to 

advance its position in those fields. Some others have also paid attention on how the 

rule of the jurisprudent (vilayat-i faqih) gives meaning to Hizbullah members and produces 

a “society of resistance” for which Hizbullah is so well known. Such works have 

thrown light on the Shi‘ite community’s diversity and its complex identity politics and 

have shown how and to what end Hizbullah transforms “global ideologies.” Nevertheless, 

the scope of research has remained limited as a result of the rigidity and timidity 

with which Western decisionmakers view Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite ties, and in particular 

Hizbullah and its projects as a stooge of the Iranian government. 

Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr 

received her PhD from 

the University of Chicago 

and is currently a visiting 

fellow at the International 

Institute for the Study of Islam 

in the Modern World 

(ISIM). She is the author 

of Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational 

Religion and the 

Making of National Identities 

(New york: Columbia 

University Press, 2008). 


Shaery-Eisenlohr... 

The academic knowledge produced so far partially reads — sometimes unintentionally — as a response to such claims. 

To counter the terrorist label and to destroy this simplistic image, these scholars have focused on providing as many 

examples as possible to show the “Lebaneseness,” the “modernity,” the independence, and the piety of Hizbullah members, 

and have sometimes elevated Hizbullah members to ideal Lebanese citizens and romanticized some of the group’s 

violent and coercive activities. 

However, the politics of labeling has not been limited to Western governments and mainstream media but is also widespread 

in Lebanon across sectarian lines, including among many non-Hizbullah Lebanese Shi‘ites. Interestingly, the 

logic of some of this labeling can itself be viewed as one of the impacts of the Iranian revolution in Lebanon. The intensification 

of post-revolutionary Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite ties has affected the Lebanese Shi’ite community in such an 

array of fields that it would be almost impossible to list them all. Depending on one’s interest, one could give preference 

to some over others. But in my view, the most important influence has been that the support of the Iranian government, 

the religious networks, and their outreach organizations has led to institutionalizing difference within the Lebanese 

Shi‘ite community along a discourse of piety, 

Iran officially sponsors a vision of piety in Lebanon by naturalizing the link between Leadership piety 

the support of the Palestinian cause and what it declares as legalistic and authentic politics has led to 

Shi‘ism. In other words, the Iranian activists since the early 1980s have not simply sup- a de facto improveported 

a split in the Shi‘ite community along the lines of two political parties (Amal ment of the social 

and Hizbullah), but they have helped reconfigure how Shi‘ites envision the Lebanese conditions of many 

nation and its identity; how they express their loyalty to the Lebanese nation; and how Shi‘ites, regardless 

of how these Shi‘ites 

they imagine their own position as citizens there. By backing the creation in a weak 

themselves envi- 

state of a variety of well-functioning social institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and 

sion the relation 

orphanages, in addition to its relatively successful resistance activities, where a certain between piety and 

vision of piety is taught, practiced, and developed, Iranian officials have encouraged to social services. 

create a new mode of competition in the Shi‘ite community over leadership positions. 

References to piety are now preconditions to access symbolic and political power. Each Shi‘ite party, in order to propagate 

its own interpretation of Lebanese Shi‘ite piety competes in form of institutionalization, believes such establishments 

to be productive avenues for not only disseminating the group’s particular vision of piety and ideal citizenship 

but also to produce loyal followers. 

Leadership piety politics has led to a de facto improvement of the social conditions of many Shi‘ites, regardless of how 

these Shi‘ites themselves envision the relation between piety and social services. It has also resulted in the emergence 

of a nascent culture of self-reliance and civil society. As compared to the late 1970s, where there was only one regular 

school for Shi‘ites in Beirut with almost 2,000 students, there is now a multitude of Shi‘ite-run schools all over Lebanon 

where more than 20,000 students receive a decent education. As such, the impact of the Iranian revolution has not been 


147

Shaery-Eisenlohr... 

simply an Islamicization of a section of the Shi‘ite population, but more importantly, it has been the Islamicization of 

the citizenship discourse among Shi‘ites in Lebanon in addition to radically politicizing social institution-building as a 

crucial component of political legitimacy. 

Finally, what has changed in Iran’s foreign policy in Lebanon in the past 30 years? Cer- 

The discourse about 

Hizbullah’s independence 

from Iran 

and its loyalty to 

the soil of Lebanon 

has taken over the 

language of support 

for establishment of 

an Islamic government 

in Lebanon. 

tainly, from its inception, ideological and financial backing of Hizbullah has been crucial 

to Tehran’s claim to be the main patron of the Palestinian cause. While Iran’s vision 

of the triangle relation between its government, Hizbullah, and the Palestinian cause 

has transformed little, the rhetoric of its own relation with Hizbullah has changed considerably. 

The discourse about Hizbullah’s independence from Iran and its loyalty to the 

soil of Lebanon has taken over the language of support for establishment of an Islamic 

government in Lebanon. Instead of former calls to pan-Islamic and pan-Shi‘ite unity, 

“solidarity and strategic alliances” are the vocabulary the Iranian and Lebanese leadership 

now uses to describe these ties. This adjustment of discourse reflects as much the 

power struggles on the Lebanese national scene as it does the political dynamics in Iran between the so-called reformists, 

hardliners, and the leader ‘Ali Khamene’i. But to merely trace the change of discourse to ideological disagreement 

reduces the complexity of Iranian politics. Such transformation of discourse suggests also that an entire bureaucracy 

in Iran now owes its life to both charisma building as well as to the routinization of this transnational network. Not 

surprisingly, such officials are often members and close allies of the Iranian religious ruling elite. 


The Syrian-Iranian Alliance 

Raymond Hinnebusch 

Syria and Iran have been referred to as the “odd couple:” to some, an alliance between 

a Persian Islamic theocracy and an Arab nationalist secular republic has appeared as a 

bizarre and temporary marriage of convenience. Given the internal dissimilarity of the 

two regimes, one might therefore profitably look to shared geopolitical threats — Iraq 

and Israel — to explain the alliance. But a state’s conceptions of enmity and threat are 

less objectively given than shaped by its identity. 

Iran under the Shah was aligned with Israel and the United States, and suspicious of 

Syria. However, in redefining Iran as an Islamic state opposed to imperialism and Zionism, 

Iran’s revolutionary elite also redefined its friends and enemies: Israel’s occupation 

of Jerusalem and victimization of the Palestinians as well as America’s backing of Israel 

and intervention in Iranian politics made them enemy states while Syria (where some 

Iranian revolutionaries had spent their exile), shared their anti-imperialism and was, 

hence, seen as a natural ally. 

Moreover, to assert the relevance of its Islamic revolution beyond Iran’s Shi‘a community, 

Iran needed to break out of its marginalization from the Arab world; the Syrian 

alliance served this end. Syria, also locked in a struggle with a US-Israeli “imperialist” 

alliance, responded with alacrity to the possibility of breaking the Israeli-Iranian pincer 

on the Arab world. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel 

meant that Syria not only faced Israel alone, but also faced a hostile Iraq. Although it 

was not a substitute for the Egyptian army on Israel’s southern front, Islamic Iran was a 

valuable asset to Syria in the Arab-Israeli power balance. 

During the 1980s, the strategic interests of the two states converged in the face of increased 

security threats. First, the Iran-Iraq War sharpened Iran’s and Syria’s shared animosity 

toward Iraq. The historic rivalry of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes escalated over 

their contrary views of Iran: For Saddam Husayn, Iran was a strategic threat, while for 

Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad, Iran’s Islamic revolution had made an ally of Israel into a partisan 

of the Arab cause, and Saddam’s invasion of Iran had taken both Iran and Iraq out of 

the Arab-Israeli power balance. Once Asad had earned Saddam’s deep enmity by siding 

with Iran, he had an interest in preventing an Iraqi victory that would allow Saddam to 

seek revenge. Iran bought substantial amounts of Eastern bloc arms through Syria while 

the latter’s shutdown of the trans-Syria pipeline damaged Iraq’s capacity to finance the 

war. Syria helped prevent Iraq from depicting the war as an Arab-Persian struggle. Syria, 


Dr. Raymond Hinnebusch 

is Professor of International 

Relations and Middle East 

Politics and Director of the 

Centre for Syrian Studies 

at the University of St. Andrews. 

149

Hinnebusch... 

in return, was provided with cheap Iranian oil that limited the economic pressures Syria’s Gulf Arab aid donors could 

put on its foreign policy. 

Syrian and Iranian objectives also converged in countering the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Iran, in order to export 

its revolution and acquire a role in the struggle with Israel needed access to the Lebanese Shi‘a, which Syria facilitated. 

The Lebanon war enabled Iran to establish a foothold in Lebanon and become a player in Arab politics. Syria, for its 

part, needed any help it could get in mobilizing a Lebanese coalition against the Israeli invasion, the Gemayal government 

Israel helped install, and the US-backed Lebanese-Israeli accord of May 17, 1983 that would have made Lebanon 

an Israeli satellite. The effectiveness of the Iranian-sponsored Islamic resistance in Lebanon taught Israel the costs of 

interventionism and, in helping to foil a mortal threat to Syria, proved to Asad the strategic value of the Iranian alliance. 

Later, Syrian opposition to the continuing hostage crisis perpetrated by Iran’s Lebanese clients strained relations, but 

once ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani came to power in Iran he helped Syria take credit in the West for hostage releases. 

By the end of the 1980s, the alliance had important consequences for the regional power equation. It balanced the Israeli-American 

coalition in Lebanon and the pro-Iraq Arab coalition during the Iran-Iraq War; in both cases, revisionist 

(Israeli, Iraqi) ambitions were blunted, thus maintaining the regional status quo. 

That the alliance survived the dramatic 1990s global systemic changes wrought by the 

end of the Cold War, and the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war suggested that it was more 

than a mere “marriage of convenience.” Syria’s use of the 1990-91 Gulf war crisis to realign 

toward the United States in lieu of its declining Soviet patron and to join the Arab- 

Israeli peace process and the Damascus Declaration (the latter an exclusively Arab Gulf 

security pact) might have spelt the end of the alliance. But Iran similarly used the Gulf 

crisis to demonstrate its moderation to the Western powers. With the demonstrated 

ability of the United States to intervene in the region in the absence of any countervailing 

Soviet power, Iran and Syria both needed to ease hostilities with the West. 

The alliance provided the two states with a number of benefits: helping Tehran to counter 

US efforts to isolate Iran; strengthening Syria’s hand in negotiations by the offering 

the prospect that a peace settlement might break the alliance; fostering the collaboration 

in armaments development, especially missile deterrents; and balancing the emerging 

Israeli-Turkish alignment. Israel’s expulsion by Hizbullah from south Lebanon in 2000 

was a joint victory that boosted the prestige of both states. While the two regimes disagreed 

over the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, with Iran apparently regarding this action as 

an opportunity as well as threat and Syria adamantly opposed, they shared an interest 

in blocking the establishment of a US client state in Iraq. 

By the end of the 

1980s, the alliance 

had important 

consequences for 

the regional power 

equation. It balanced 

the Israeli- 

American coalition 

in Lebanon and 

the pro-Iraq Arab 

coalition during the 

Iran-Iraq War; in 

both cases, revisionist 

(Israeli, Iraqi) 

ambitions were 

blunted, thus maintaining 

the regional 

status quo. 

Increased US pressure, including economic sanctions on Syria over the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 


Hinnebusch... 

and on Iran over its nuclear program, drew them to coordinate in the economic as well as the security realms. Once 

forced out of Lebanon, Syria was dependent on Iran-backed Hizbullah to prevent a pro-Western takeover there and an 

orchestration of the Hariri murder tribunal to engineer regime change in Damascus. 

The 2006 Israel-Hizbullah war over Lebanon pitted the Syrian-Iran alliance not only 

against the United States and Israel, but also put it at odds with pro-American Sunni 

Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that feared a “Shi-‘a” axis — more appropriately, 

a “nationalist coalition” — of Iran, the Iraqi Shi‘a, and Hizbullah. A 2007 Saudi 

bid to detach Iran from Syria in the Lebanon crisis failed, and the May 2008 victory of 

Hizbullah over the US-Saudi backed Lebanese ruling factions, again demonstrated the 

value of Hizbullah as a joint strategic asset. The alliance was therefore pivotal to the 

ongoing struggle over the Middle East between the United States and its client regimes 

on the one hand, and the last remaining states that cling to the banner of indigenous 

nationalism and are more attuned to the largely Arab and Islamic identities of the regional 

public on the other. 

The durability of the Iran-Syria alliance is attributable to common enemies, the shared 

disquiet of the two states at the ever advancing US penetration of the region, the balanced 

benefits each derives from it, and a certain institutionalization of consultation. The relationship also benefits from 

intra-elite trust rooted in the experience of each that the other will come to its aid when it is most in need and that each 

will defer to the other’s vital interests — Syria’s in the Levant and Iran’s in the Gulf. The alliance has, against all expectations, 

not only lasted a quarter century, but has also become a major component of the regional power balance and the 

main obstacle to unchallenged US hegemony over the Middle East. 


The durability of 

the Iran-Syria alliance 

is attributable 

to common 

enemies, the shared 

disquiet of the two 

states at the ever 

advancing US penetration 

of the region, 

the balanced 

benefits each derives 

from it, and a 

certain institutionalization 

of consultation. 

151

Twists and Turns in Turkish-Iranian Relations 

Mustafa Kibaroglu 

Bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran have been marked by relative peace and 

stability for the past four centuries. Since the founding of the modern Republic of Turkey 

in 1923 and the creation of an absolutist monarchy in Iran in 1925, the ruling regimes 

of both countries have sought to consolidate their domestic power and to pursue 

an independent foreign policy. Neither Turkey nor Iran has viewed one another as an 

immediate threat to the attainment of these vital objectives. 

During the Cold War, fearing Soviet expansionism and Soviet influence in their domestic 

affairs, Turkey and Iran aligned with the pro-Western camp. As founding members of 

the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Turkey and Iran became regional allies. The 

United States supported their efforts to cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally. In 1964 

Iran and Turkey, along with Pakistan, founded the Regional Cooperation and Development 

Organization to promote economic, technical, and cultural cooperation among 

the members. Turkey perceived Iran as a status quo power, and thus non-threatening to 

its security or position in the region. 

The 1979 Islamic Revolution shook the stability of Turkish-Iranian relations. The Islamic 

Republic of Iran’s militant Islamist statements and foreign policy fuelled tension 

and mutual distrust. However, both countries sought to prevent conflict or a rupture in 

relations. This reluctance to escalate the tensions stemmed largely from their desire to 

protect their economic interests, given that Turkey was an exporter of goods to Iran and 

Iran was a major energy supplier for Turkey. 

The end of the Cold War paved the way for a rivalry to emerge between Turkey and Iran 

in Central Asia and the Caucasus. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, 

Iran and Turkey sought to increase their influence and power in the newly independent 

former Soviet republics. Both countries underlined their common history, values, and 

linguistic and religious affinities with the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 1 

Western countries, especially the United States, which feared the spread of political Islam 

in the area and regarded Turkey as a “model” to the former Soviet republics, supported 

Ankara’s efforts. 

The improvement of Turkish-Israeli relations has been a source of tension between Iran 

1. John Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of 

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1998), pp. 75-94. 

Mustafa Kibaroglu (Ph.D., 

Bilkent University) teaches 

courses on “Arms Control & 

Disarmament” in the Department 

of International 

Relations at Bilkent University 

in Ankara since 1997. Dr. 

Kibaroglu was a Research 

Fellow at the United Nations 

Institute for Disarmament 

Research in Geneva (1995); 

International Atomic Energy 

Agency Fellow at the University 

of Southampton (1996); 

Post-doctoral Fellow at the 

Monterey Institute in California 

(1996/97); and Sabbatical 

Fellow at the Belfer 

Center of Harvard University 

(2004/05). 


Kibaroglu... 

and Turkey. Having recognized the State of Israel in 1949, Turkey always has been cautious in its relations with Israel in 

order to avoid offending its Arab neighbors. 2 However, the advent of the Madrid peace process between the Arab states 

and Israel paved the way for improved relations between Turkey and Israel. When both countries signed a comprehensive 

defense and security cooperation agreement in 1996, Iranian officials expressed their suspicions regarding such an 

arrangement and voiced their opposition. This development pushed Iran to align with Iraq and Syria in order to balance 

the Turkish-Israeli military alliance. 3 

The 1990s also have witnessed a deterioration in Turkish-Iranian relations, especially due to the threat perceptions of 

these countries with respect to their domestic security. Turkish secularists and the military were suspicious of Iran’s 

intentions. Turkey accused Iran of interfering in its domestic affairs by supporting radical Islamic organizations propagating 

against the secular regime in Turkey. 4 The events reached a peak on the night of February 1, 1997, when during 

the commemoration of the “Jerusalem Day” in Sincan (a small town in the environs of the Turkish capital of Ankara), 

posters of Hizbullah and Hamas were displayed and the participants strongly criticized the secular regime of the Turkish 

Republic. One of the participants, then-Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Mohammed Reza Bagheri, reportedly called 

for the institution of Shari‘a in Turkey 5 

The Sincan incident alone shows how closely Iran’s activities in Turkey were being 

monitored and how promptly and effectively the secular circles within the state structure 

confronted them. Hence, following the revelations in August 2002 by an Iranian 

opposition group of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities, 

which are clear indications of Iran’s long-term nuclear ambitions, Turkey would 

be expected to have raised much more serious concerns about Iran’s efforts to become 

a nuclear power. 

Nevertheless, in the post-September 11 period, Turkey adopted a substantially different attitude toward Iran. Following 

the events leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the relationship between Turkey and Iran seemingly has 

entered a new phase. Similar concerns about the probable consequences of developments in Iraq have caused the two 

countries’ positions with respect to regional political issues to converge. 

Turkey’s official stance toward Iran’s nuclear program is clear. Turkey recognizes the right of Iran, which is a member of 

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to develop nuclear technology, provided that it remains 

on a peaceful track and allows for the application of full-scope safeguards inspections by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) in such a way that would lend the utmost confidence to the international community about its 


Similar concerns 

about the probable 

consequences of developments 

in Iraq 

have caused the two 

countries’ positions 

with respect to regional 

political issues 

to converge. 

2. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Israeli Relations through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 

27, No. 1 (1997), pp. 22-37. 

3. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Israel Strategize,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 61-65. 

4. Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran,” p. 85. 

5. Yavuz, “Turkish Israeli Relations through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate.” 

153

Kibaroglu... 

intentions. 

The consensus view among the Turkish political and security elite is that, contrary to its apparent low-profile stance, 

Turkey cannot stay aloof from Iran’s nuclearization for long. The presence of nuclear weapons in the Iranian military arsenal 

will upset the delicate balance that exists between the two nations since the Kasr-i Shirin Treaty in favor of Iran. 

Considering the fact that Turkey is a member of the United Nations Security Council 

for the period of 2009 to 2010 as well as a newly elected member of the Board of Governors 

of the IAEA, where Iran’s nuclear program will continue to be the top agenda 

item, the nature as well as the extent of Iran’s nuclear program is highly likely to have a 

decisive impact on the future of Turkish-Iranian relations. 6 

Bearing in mind the rivalry between the Turks and the Iranians throughout history, 

despite the fact that some common concerns exist as regards their national interests, 

the scope and the content of Turkish-Iranian relations may not go far beyond the present 

levels unless Turkey makes a radical turn in its relations with the West in general, 

and with the United States in particular, even if they may not be at satisfactory levels 

either. 7 

The presence of 

nuclear weapons in 

the Iranian military 

arsenal will upset 

the delicate balance 

that exists between 

the two nations 

since the Kasr-i 

Shirin Treaty in favor 

of Iran. 

6. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2008). 

7. Tarik Oguzlu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Incompatibilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey’s 

Prospects for EU Membership,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2008), pp. 945-962; Mustafa Kibaroglu and Tarik 

Oguzlu, “Turkey and the United States in the 21st Century: Friends or Foes?” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 

4 (2008), pp. 357-372. 


The Dichotomist Antagonist Posture in the Persian Gulf 

Riccardo Redaelli 

Since the end of “Pax Britannica,” a zero-sum approach to Persian Gulf security has 

predominated. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s rhetoric and ideology in favor of “exporting 

the Revolution” to the Sunni Arab world coupled with the strong hostility of 

the Gulf Arab regimes toward the Islamic Republic of Iran reinforced a dichotomist 

mindset with respect to regional security. Iraq’s invasion of Iran and the taking of US 

diplomats as hostages by Iran (which compounded the severity of the fracture in US- 

Iran relations) exacerbated this trend. 

In 1981 the United States sponsored the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC), with the idea of creating a balance of power to maintain a fragile peace in the 

area. Notwithstanding all the limits of that organization in the field of inter-Arab security 

policy integration and cooperation, the GCC in a way formalized this dichotomist 

posture and focused it on the “antagonist.” 

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the 

consequent Gulf War of 1991, Washington’s “dual containment” strategy against Iraq 

and Iran crystallized this approach: Gulf security became hostage to the nature of the 

governments involved, without any conceptual development of the security frame. 

Meanwhile in Tehran, an antagonist posture toward the West and toward the “moderate 

Arab” regimes became a distinctive characteristic of the post-revolutionary political 

elite; this posture still constitutes a pillar of the official ideology of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran, well beyond its real regional and international policy. (Until Mahmud 

Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iranian foreign policy often had been more pragmatic and 

rational than its regime rhetoric.) 

During the reformist period (1997-2005) President Muhammad Khatami tried to deconstruct 

the theoretical basis of this radical confrontational policy, mainly by insisting 

on conducting a “dialogue of civilizations” and making an effort to foster mutual understanding 

with the other Islamic countries. Unfortunately, Khatami managed to adopt 

more moderate policies only toward Arab regional countries and the European Union. 

The ideological pattern of the Islamic Republic remained untouched. 

In recent years, the political atmosphere in the region has worsened due to the post- 

9/11 US military presence all around Iranian borders (in Afghanistan, Central Asia, 


Riccardo Redaelli is Associate 

Professor of Geopolitics, 

Catholic University of the 

Sacred Heart, Milano, and 

Director of the Middle East 

Program, landau Network 

— Centro Volta (lNCV), 

Como, Italy. 

155

Redaelli... 

the Caucasus, Iraq, and the Gulf); the questionable US decision to include Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” as articulated in 

President George W. Bush’s State of the Union speech in January 2002; the idea of promoting “regime change” in Tehran; 

and the crisis related to the Iranian nuclear program, which since 2002 has been the main issue of concern for the 

international community. 

These factors reinforced Tehran’s feelings of isolation and strategic loneliness. Conser- 

vative and radical factions of the Iranian ruling elite seized on these developments to 

exaggerate the dangers and perils facing the country. Moreover, US policies of coercion 

and isolation contributed to the progressive “securitization” of Iranian foreign policy 

thinking and actions. Security and military forces have taken the reins of Iranian policymaking 

processes, subordinating all foreign decisions to a radical, distorted interpretation 

of the “security needs” of the country. 

This process of securitization has yielded very negative domestic and international consequences. 

At home, it has provided a powerful excuse for cracking down on reformist 

and moderate voices; it has reinforced the regime’s paranoia about “fifth columnists” 

(i.e., enemies of the Islamic Republic working inside the country being coordinated by 

the United States); it has made it very risky to speak in favor of pragmatic, friendly policies 

toward the West; it has exacerbated the threat perception of “existential risk” of the 

Islamic Republic; and it has provided a perfect excuse for the failures of Ahmadinejad’s 

government. At an international level, it contributed to further mistrust and recrimination 

between Iran on the one hand, and the US and Arab countries on the other. 

US policies of coercion 

and isolation 

contributed 

to the progressive 

“securitization” 

of Iranian foreign 

policy thinking and 

actions. Security 

and military forces 

have taken the reins 

of Iranian policymaking 

processes, 

subordinating all 

foreign decisions to 

a radical, distorted 

interpretation of 

the “security needs” 

of the country. 

At the same time, a series of developments — the removal of Iran’s two main enemies in the region (the Taliban in 

Afghanistan and Saddam Husayn in Iraq), the catastrophic post-invasion period in Iraq, the creation of a Shi‘ite-dominated 

government in Baghdad, and the difficulties faced by NATO in Afghanistan — boosted Iran’s geopolitical importance 

in the Middle East. These changes subsequently provoked Sunni Arab oil monarchies’ fear of rising Shi‘a power in 

the Gulf (where Shi‘ite communities represent almost 50% of the population, but face political discrimination in several 

countries). 

A growing number of analysts have pointed out that Iran has impressive “soft power” and growing connections with 

governments, parties, and political groups in the region (though this probably overestimates Iran’s influence). Nevertheless, 

the enhancement of Iran’s political role has made the ultra-radical government in Tehran more aggressive and 

even overconfident, which in turn has reinvigorated Arab fears. Iran again has become a dangerous antagonist whose 

main strategic goals are unclear. 

It is well known that understanding the domestic political evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is notoriously dif- 


Redaelli... 

ficult, due to both its political fragmentation and the extraordinary complexity of its constitutional framework. Dealing 

with Iranian foreign policy is sometimes even more puzzling, since one has to add the dichotomy between the regime’s 

official rhetoric and the more pragmatic policies it has often adopted. 

However, there seems to be no option other than to try to move toward an inclusive 

regional security system, and to encourage Iran to perceive itself as less antagonistic 

vis-à-vis the other regimes. The international community should seek to nurture a process 

of desecuritizing Iranian foreign policy by pursuing a policy of selective engagement 

that exploits the convergence of interests on specific topics between Iran and the 

West for creating confidence and that ameliorates Tehran’s isolation, thereby reducing 

Iranian perceptions of insecurity. 

This is the only way to weaken the dichotomist pattern of imagined regional and international 

relations, which, after 30 years, still inform the actual security policies and 

conditions in the Middle East. 


The international 

community should 

seek to nurture a 

process of desecuritizing 

Iranian 

foreign policy by 

pursuing a policy 

of selective engagement. 

157

Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council 

Mehran Kamrava 

Some three decades into the life of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian regime has yet 

to devise and implement a coherent national security policy or even a set of guidelines 

on which its regional and international security policies are based. In relation to the 

Persian Gulf region and the country’s immediate neighbors, this has resulted in the articulation 

of regional foreign and security policies that at times have seemed fluid and 

changeable. Fairly consistently, however, Iranian foreign and national security policies 

are influenced far more by pragmatic, balance-of-power considerations than by ideological 

or supposedly “revolutionary” pursuits. 

Appearances to the contrary, Iranian foreign and security policies in relation to the 

Persian Gulf region have featured certain consistent themes, or, more aptly, areas of continued 

attention as well as tension. The first feature revolves around the broader military 

and diplomatic position that Iran occupies in relation to the Persian Gulf itself. Equally 

influential in Iran’s regional diplomacy is what Tehran sees as “the Saudi factor,” namely 

Saudi Arabia’s posture and pursuits in the region. Iran’s regional security policy, in the 

meanwhile, is largely determined by the role and position of the United States in what 

Iran considers its rightful sphere of influence. By extension, for Tehran, questions about 

Saudi diplomatic and American military positions and intentions bear directly on the 

nature and direction of Iran’s relations with Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Also important are Iranian relations with its neighbors to the south, with a number of 

whom — namely Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — Iran’s relations 

have been tense and cooperative at the same time. The most problematic of these 

have been Iran-UAE relations and the tensions surrounding contending claims by both 

countries over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Again, both 

in relation to Iran-UAE tensions and Iran’s regional diplomacy toward the other Persian 

Gulf states, the Saudi and American factors, especially the latter, are not unimportant. 

Given the steady securitization of the region’s politics since the 1980s, for both Iran 

and also for the other Gulf states, foreign and security policies are inseparable. Insofar 

as Iran’s position in and relations with other Persian Gulf states is concerned, the US 

military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf, Iran’s dispute with the UAE 

over the three islands, and the potential for spillover from internal conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have all combined to create an environment in which security and diplo- 

Dr. Mehran Kamrava, Director, 

Center for International 

and Regional Studies, School 

of Foreign Service in Qatar, 

Georgetown University, 

Doha, Qatar 


Kamrava... 

matic issues are intimately interconnected. At least for the foreseeable future, therefore, any analysis of Iran’s regional 

foreign policy needs to also take into account its security and strategic calculations. 

Despite persistent tensions over the three islands, particularly since 1992, there is another, equally significant aspect 

to the relationship between the UAE and Iran — the commercial trade between them. According to one estimate, the 

volume of trade between the two countries, both officially and unofficially, was around $11 billion in 2007. 1 There are an 

estimated 500,000 Iranian residents in Dubai alone, of whom some 10,000 are registered owners of businesses. 2 Dubai 

has emerged as perhaps the most significant entrepot used by Iranian businesses in their attempt to circumvent US and 

Western economic sanctions on Iran, with goods routinely re-exported from Dubai to various destinations in Iran. 3 Not 

surprisingly, by some accounts Iran has emerged as Dubai’s biggest trading partner. 4 Despite persistent tensions over 

the disputed islands, therefore, relations between the two remain generally amicable because of their economic and 

commercial ties. 

In many ways, Iranian-UAE relations are emblematic of Iran’s relations with its other 

Arab neighbors, whether Iraq or Saudi Arabia or, for that matter, the states of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) as a whole. A history of territorial and other disputes, 

often made all the more intractable by the advent of the modern state and by age-old 

cultural and linguistic differences, has resulted in deep-seated mutual mistrust and acrimony. 

At the same time, the two sides have convergent interests. Ultimately, pragmatic 

concerns and pursuits, rooted in ongoing assessments of Iran’s capabilities and needs, 

have guided the country’s foreign and national security policies, both in relation to the 

larger world and, particularly, insofar as the Persian Gulf region is concerned. 

With pragmatism as its primary guiding force, the substance and underlying logic of 

Iran’s relations with the GCC states, and with the outside world at large, have remained 

largely consistent since the mid- to late1990s. This is despite the tenure in office in Tehran 

over the last decade of two very different presidents, one championing the cause of “dialogue among civilizations” 

and the other a radical rhetoric reminiscent of the early days of the revolution. This begs the question of why, then, 

did Iran’s relations with the European Union and the United States deteriorate so dramatically during Ahmadinejad’s 

presidency despite the continuity of his policies with those of Khatami? The answer has to do less with Iranian foreign 

policy than with larger international developments occurring around the time of changing administrations in Tehran, 

particularly significant improvements in US relations with a number of European powers that had become strained in 

the run-up to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Meanwhile, Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s tactless speeches and his 


Dubai has emerged 

as perhaps the 

most significant 

entrepot used by 

Iranian businesses 

in their attempt to 

circumvent US and 

Western economic 

sanctions on Iran, 

with goods routinely 

re-exported from 

Dubai to various 

destinations in Iran. 

1. Sonia Verma, “Iranian Traders in Dubai Find Bush’s Rhetoric is Bad for Business,” The Globe and Mail, January 15, 2008, p. 

12. 

2. Sonia Verma, “Bush Rallies Gulf Allies Against Iran,” The Times (London), January 14, 2008, p. 35. 

3. Eric Lipton, “U.S. Alarmed as Some Exports Veer Off Course in the Mideast,” The New york Times, April 2, 2008, p. 1. 

4. Verma, “Bush Rallies Gulf Allies Against Iran,” p. 35. 

159

Kamrava... 

confrontational personality made it significantly easier to vilify Iran and to present it as “a menacing threat” regionally 

and globally. In fact, at times Bush Administration officials appeared far more concerned about Iran’s threat to its neighbors 

than the neighbors themselves. In short, it was not the substance and nature of Iranian foreign policy or its security 

posture toward the Persian Gulf that changed from Muhammad Khatami to Ahmadinejad. Rather, it was American 

foreign policy objectives, and with it the evolving nature of America’s relations with its allies in Europe and in the UN 

Security Council that underwent dramatic changes before and after 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq. 

Many regional actors 

also worry 

about the possibility 

that a warming 

of relations between 

Iran and the 

United States may 

lessen their luster in 

Washington’s eyes. 

The future of Iran’s relations with the GCC, therefore, cannot be examined without 

also considering Iran’s relationship with the United States. It is difficult to imagine US- 

Iranian relations darkening further than they had during the administration of George 

W. Bush. Any reduction of tensions between Iran and the United States is likely to be 

welcomed by the regional states, many of whom have worried, with good reason, about 

the potential fallout of any open conflict between Tehran and Washington. But many 

regional actors also worry about the possibility that a warming of relations between 

Iran and the United States may lessen their luster in Washington’s eyes. A domestically 

weakened and internationally castigated Iran may be the preferred option of its neighbors, 

but whether this is a more likely scenario than an Iran which is more integrated into the international community, 

perhaps led by a different president, depends as much on larger international developments as it does on Iran’s domestic 

politics and policy preferences. Changes are surely in the offing. What remain to be seen are their degree, intensity, and 

direction. 


Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal “Gamecocks?” 

Henner Fürtig 

Almost immediately after the triumph of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini 

and the new Iranian leadership turned against Saudi Arabia and its ruling family. Iran’s 

supreme leader accused the “House of Saud” of “distorting the Islamic spirit … The 

Saudi monarchy has totally turned into an American satellite and Saudi Arabia has been 

rapidly becoming Americanized in every respect.” Later, The New york Times quoted 

him as saying, “Mecca is now in the hands of a group of infidels who are grossly unaware 

of what they should do.” Yet, the chastised Saudis paid back in kind, calling the Iranian 

leadership on Radio Riyadh a “corrupt bunch of thieves” that had created a “slaughterhouse” 

in Iran and was degenerating Islam. The “Iranian butchers are a mentally distorted 

and ignorant gang, agents of Satan, who behave as [if they are] going nuts, as a fascist 

regime.” One might think of these statements as lapses of the early post-revolutionary 

period; otherwise both governments would still be insulting each other today. 

Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, Khomeini’s successor, did not tire of calling on “all of the oppressed 

people of the world such as those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Africa and America” 

to follow the Iranian example and get rid of their oppressors. Such comments have 

triggered Saudi accusations that Iranian-backed militias have been behind the unrest 

in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, the Gulf region, and Lebanon. Saudi Foreign Minister 

Saud al-Faisal frankly told reporters in May 2008 that “Iran’s actions support the 

violence in Lebanon.” When traditional Arabian-Persian dualism, the Sunni-Shi‘a dichotomy, 

discordance in trade and economy, differences in foreign policy orientation, 

and other matters are considered alongside these mutual accusations, a picture of Iran 

and Saudi Arabia as “eternal” rivals, as tireless gamecocks, emerges almost inevitably. 

Yet, is it accurate? 

We should remember the 1960s and 1970s, when Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and 

the Saudi kings Faysal and Khalid — united by the interest in ensuring a stable flow of 

oil — developed a staunch partnership in the fight against leftist and radical-nationalist 

influences in the Gulf region. Additionally, from 1968 onwards, both countries became 

cornerstones in US President Richard Nixon’s attempt to appoint “deputies” for certain 

strategic areas of the world (the Nixon Doctrine). Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were 

suitable, as they both were conservative and anti-communist. In addition, they had the 

potential — although in different ways — to assume regional leadership functions. Ultimately, 

Iran and Saudi Arabia formed two solid pillars, together supporting a conservative 

and pro-Western policy in the region. There was no place in the world during the 


Dr. Henner Fürtig is a senior 

research fellow at the GIGA 

Institute of Middle East 

Studies in Hamburg and a 

professor at the University of 

Hamburg. 

161

Fürtig... 

1970s where the Nixon Doctrine was more evident than in the Gulf. More importantly, the relationship between Iran 

and Saudi Arabia was never as friendly as between the years 1968 and 1979. 

However, if 1979 was the year in which the Iranian-Saudi relationship took a turn for 

The Iranian revo- 

the worse, then the Islamic Revolution was the linchpin. Similar to all “great” revolulutionaries 

claimed 

tions in modern times, the Iranian revolution developed a strong universalist approach 

that the Al Saud 

— assuming the role of a model for the world’s Muslims and demanding a leading led only an isolated 

position within the umma. This directly challenged the core identity of the Saudi state sect and were there- 

and ruling family. The Al Saud did not fear Shi‘a ideas and visions as such, but were fore not worthy to 

extremely upset about the fact that the competition had now primarily shifted to the secure the safety 

field of religion, an area previously seen as their monopoly. The Iranian revolutionar- of Islam’s holiest 

ies claimed that the Al Saud led only an isolated sect and were therefore not worthy places. 

to secure the safety of Islam’s holiest places; that Arabs acknowledged Iran’s spiritual 

primacy as the “Redeemer Nation;” and that Iran was more committed to Islam and was more capable of interpreting 

it. These claims must have been seen as an attack at the heart of the Al Saud’s pretension to rule — an attack more dangerous 

than republicanism, nationalism, or socialism had been. Without doubt, by making religion the most important 

tool in the struggle for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, the Iranian leadership had hit the bullseye. To make things even 

worse for the Saudis, Ayatollah Khomeini stated several times that Islam and a monarchy were mutually exclusive and 

that a monarchy was a deviation of Islam’s content and intention. 

The war between Iran and Iraq (1980–88) worsened the situation. During the conflict, Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic 

relations with Tehran, supported Iraq, and helped create an Arab alliance against Iran. The experience of being besieged 

and isolated by the Arab camp — which was decisively influenced by Saudi Arabia — has affected the Iranian leadership 

ever since. 

Considering the fact that the basic nature of both regimes did not change throughout the 1990s, the remarkable détente 

between Tehran and Riyadh during this decade must come as a surprise, or even as disproof of previous assessments. 

Diplomatic relations were restored in 1991, and negotiations between both governments, ranging from political and 

economic to security matters, became commonplace. Yet, two distinctive developments have to be taken into account. 

First, Saddam Husayn’s Iraq, by occupying neighboring Kuwait and directly threatening the Saudi Kingdom in 1990, 

turned out to be a more acute enemy of Saudi Arabia than Iran had been in the previous decade. Saddam’s aggression 

led the Saudis to close ranks with Iran. Second, a more pragmatic leadership had taken power in Iran after the de facto 

defeat in the war with Iraq and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Internationally isolated and even confronted 

with the danger of extinction, the new leadership around Supreme Leader Khamene’i, President ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi 

Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister ‘Ali Akbar Velayati concentrated their efforts on the reconstruction of Iran and put 

national interests above matters of religion or the “export of the revolution.” It was President Mahmud Ahmadinejad 

who tried to reverse Iran’s overall foreign policy direction after 2005 by proclaiming a “Renaissance of Imam Khomeini’s 


Fürtig... 

ideas.” Relations with Saudi Arabia promptly deteriorated. 

The periods of more or less “normal” relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia prove 

that enmity between both countries is not inevitable, but is rather due to specific circumstances. 

If an aggressive hegemonic pretension is dressed in a religious or ideological 

garment, the rivalry is especially tense, whereas in periods where “normal” national 

interests prevail, the political system in the Gulf region has achieved a balance. The 

Third Gulf War (2003) has severely disturbed the triangular balance between Iran, Iraq, 

and Saudi Arabia by considerably weakening Iraq. Thus, détente and stability in the 

Gulf is not only a concern for Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also for Iraq. Yet, this is another 

story. 


If an aggressive hegemonic 

pretension 

is dressed in a religious 

or ideological 

garment, the rivalry 

is especially tense, 

whereas in periods 

where “normal” 

national interests 

prevail, the political 

system in the Gulf 

region has achieved 

a balance. 

163

The Global Arena 


The European Union and Iran 

Walter Posch 

European governments initially reacted to Iran’s Islamic revolution by a careful testing 

of the ground with the new regime. But relations deteriorated quickly, as Iran accused 

some European countries of siding with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and Iranian agents 

killed Iranian opposition figures in European capitals. 

Not until the 1992 Edinburgh European Council did the European Union (EU) decide 

to look for new ways to organize their relations with the Islamic Republic. Hence the 

idea of a “critical dialogue” was born. However, EU-Iranian relations deteriorated again 

in 1995. Only after the surprise election of the malleable Muhammad Khatami and the 

commencement of Iran’s reforms did the EU re-engage with the Islamic Republic in a 

“comprehensive dialogue.” 

EU negotiations with Iran continued even after a secret Iranian nuclear facility was 

disclosed in summer 2002. There were two reasons for this: first, the Europeans were 

still confident that their engagement with the Islamic Republic would strengthen the reformists 

and thus further de-radicalize the regime, and second, the international community 

was already preoccupied with the Iraq crisis. 

In summer 2003 the EU’s foreign policy apparatus was still too cumbersome to act 

quickly and imaginatively. Hence the Foreign Ministers of the EU’s “big three” — Germany, 

France, and the United Kingdom (E3) — took the initiative, travelling to Tehran 

in order to convince their Iranian counterpart to cooperate more closely with the IAEA 

and to sign the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

After an initial understanding with the Iranian side, the E3 involved the EU’s foreign 

policy czar, Javier Solana, who quickly became the main negotiator with the Iranians, 

in cooperation with the E3 Foreign Ministers and, it can be conjectured, with some 

backchannel involvement from the US. By 2004 all EU policies towards Iran were coordinated 

by the E3 plus Solana (the so-called E3/EU format), with the Council secretariat 

playing a central role as the clearing house and main policy “driver.” 

Iran’s nuclear file came to dominate the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the EU 

(though this did not mean that other issues such as human rights, economic relations, 

and security interests were neglected). The now famous Paris Agreement of November 


Dr. Walter Posch, Senior 

Research Fellow, European 

Union Institute for Security 

Studies in Paris. He has a 

PhD in Iranian history from 

Bamberg University, Germany 

and a MA in Turkish 

studies from the University of 

Vienna, Austria. 

165

Posch... 

2004 obtained Iran’s voluntary (Tehran insisted on the phrasing “legally non-binding”) suspension of uranium enrichment, 

which lasted for almost two years and was widely understood as a goodwill gesture and confidence building 

measure on behalf of the Iranians. By spring 2005 there were legitimate reasons for optimism that a mutually acceptable 

agreement could be reached. Yet, positions were, in the end, irreconcilable as Iran insisted on the “right” to uranium 

enrichment, which it saw threatened by seemingly endless negotiations with the EU, whereas the Europeans were concerned 

about the potential military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. When the EU finally presented its offer (shortly 

after the Iranian elections but before the new president was sworn in), the Iranians furiously rejected it. 

Tehran criticized the offer as too vague and too demanding, and most importantly 

saw the EU as being incapable of obtaining a security guarantee from Washington. 

The outlandish remarks of the newly elected Mahmud Ahmadinejad on the Holocaust 

shocked the EU deeply, scarred Iran’s image in Europe, and destroyed the fine web of 

cultural and university relations between the EU and Iran that had been carefully built 

up during the Khatami years and before. 

Contrary to the regime’s 

propaganda, 

the EU never denied 

Iran’s right to modern 

nuclear technology, 

but objected to 

its potential military 

aspects. 

European decision-makers were careful not to allow their outrage to determine the outcome of the nuclear negotiations. 

They stuck with their belief that there is no military answer to Iran’s nuclear file. Contrary to the regime’s propaganda, 

the EU never denied Iran’s right to modern nuclear technology, but objected to its potential military aspects. Hence it 

was willing to offer the Iranians an acceptable package deal. On the other hand, in the case that there was no movement 

on the Iranian side they were also ultimately willing to refer Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council. This was less a 

gesture towards the US, where the EU’s continued engagement with Iran did not have many supporters, than a logical 

consequence of the Europeans’ effort to allow the international community to play a significant role with regard to the 

Iranian file. 

In 2006 EU-Iranian negotiations reached an impasse and consequently the Europeans referred Iran’s nuclear dossier to 

the UNSC. This meant that the same policy — offering the Iranians economic and political cooperation on one hand 

and going for sanctions when the Iranians stall, was transferred to a higher political level. As a result the EU’s Iran policy 

became intertwined with the UNSC’s Permanent 5 (China, Russia, USA, France, and the United Kingdom). This new 

international consensual format (P5+Germany+EU, or E3/3+EU) was from now on the main framework to engage 

with Iran. Javier Solana was tasked with the continuation of talks with his Iranian counterpart and he delivered the letters 

written on behalf of the international community to Iran. (This happened in 2006 with the new offer and in June 

2008 with the final package.) Ever since, the international community — and with it the EU — has been awaiting Iran’s 

answer. 

Since 2007 the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear file has put all other EU policies with Tehran on hold. Internally, there have 

been critical voices bemoaning the “nuclear centric” nature of the EU’s Iran policy. It has been suggested that the focus 

shift to European energy security instead, where the increasing reliance on Russia has become a major concern. This 


Posch... 

debate continues to this day although there was never (and will never be) a real chance that Iran’s nuclear file would 

become just one issue among others in the EU’s relations with Iran. The main reason is that the EU has simply invested 

too much prestige and effort to find a mutually acceptable negotiated solution. 

Internal differences notwithstanding, the European position towards sanctions has 

been clear from the beginning. Brussels never thought of sanctions as a tool for regime 

change nor as some kind of economic warfare. Rather, the EU insisted that sanctions 

must focus on enterprises and individuals involved in the Iranian nuclear program and 

should aim to bring Iran back to the negotiation table. In fact, targeted sanctions have 

imposed a cost, and Tehran hides its nervousness behind the smokescreen of stark 

polemics. 

Although Iran continues to muddle through, mere survival was not the aim of the regime. 

Rather Tehran wanted to achieve international acceptance and legitimacy for its 

presumably peaceful nuclear program. This also poses a domestic problem for Tehran 

because the regime has preferred to frame any critique of the conduct of its nuclear file 

as “Western aggression” against the progress of the Iranian nation. Therefore, acting in a 

consensual manner with Russia and China counters the regime’s basic argument. If for 

nothing else, the EU must be credited for having been able to keep the enlarged P5+1 

together and functioning, thus making it clear to the Iranian public that the regime is acting in defiance of the international 

community, and not of the “imperialist” West. But most of all, it put the ball firmly in Iran’s camp; after all, there 

is an offer on the table and Tehran is free to reengage any time. 

The P5+1 format will remain intact should direct US-Iranian talks indeed materialize, if only as some kind of a safety 

net should the talks fail. As a consequence for better or worse, EU-Iranian relations remain dependent on the development 

of Iran’s nuclear file, and thus are likely to deteriorate. 


If for nothing else, 

the EU must be 

credited for having 

been able to 

keep the enlarged 

P5+1 together and 

functioning, thus 

making it clear to 

the Iranian public 

that the regime is 

acting in defiance 

of the international 

community, and not 

of the “imperialist” 

West. 

167

Iran and France: Shattered Dreams 

Pirooz Izadi 

When Iran’s 1979 revolution took place, many Iranians predicted that relations between 

Iran and France would improve in an unprecedented way. Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, spent the last four months of his 14-year 

in exile in France. The revolutionaries in Tehran lauded French leaders for being hospitable 

toward their spiritual leader. They had no hatred of France, which lacked colonialist 

aspirations regarding Iran. 

However, several factors hindered the improvement of relations between the two countries 

and in some cases even led to the suspension of their relations: conflicting worldviews; 

France’s Arab policy; EU constraints; clashing interests in the region; and the US 

“factor.” 

THE FIRST PERIoD: 1979 To 1989 

Especially after the fall of the transitional government of Mehdi Bazargan, France saw 

revolutionary Iran as a destabilizing force — seeking to subvert conservative Arab governments; 

spreading its influence in the Islamic world through fostering radical groups, 

especially Shi‘a in Lebanon and hardline Palestinian factions; and supporting violent 

actions against Western interests everywhere in the world. France believed that these 

efforts could threaten the secure and free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, as well as 

the stability and security of the Middle East and the West. 

Such views made France suspicious of Iran’s intentions. These suspicions culminated in 

the “War of Embassies” in September 1986 following the bombings in Paris that killed 

or injured 100 people. French officials accused Iranian diplomats of being involved in 

these attacks. At the same time, other events, such as France’s decision to give political 

asylum to Iranian dissidents and opposition leaders, provoked Tehran’s suspicion of 

France. 

Similarly, the US hostage crisis led France to join other Western countries in imposing a 

series of sanctions on Iran. Here, the US factor played a major role in orienting French 

policy with respect to Iran. 

During the Iran-Iraq War, France provided significant military aid to Iraq. In fact, 

France’s Arab policy (Politique Arabe de France, or PAF) — that of seeking Mediter- 

Dr. Pirooz Izadi is Senior Research 

Fellow in the Foreign 

Policy Department of the 

Center for Strategic Research 

in Tehran. 


Izadi... 

ranean profondeur (depth) as a means of counterbalancing Germany in Europe and the Anglo-American relationship 

across the Atlantic by developing close ties with Arab states — was the main factor responsible for tilting Paris toward 

Baghdad. Not surprisingly, this fuelled Iran’s mistrust of France. 

Finally, on February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued his famous fatwa condemning Salman Rushdie for his book 

Satanic Verses, which was considered a horrendous insult to Muslims. Following this fatwa, Britain severed its diplomatic 

relations with Iran, and other European Community (EC) members recalled their ambassadors. In this case, constraints 

imposed on France resulting from its commitments to the EC were partly responsible for the downturn in its relations 

with Iran. During this period, almost all of the abovementioned factors influenced bilateral relations in some way. 

THE SECoND PERIoD: 1989 To 1997 

The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the beginning of reconstruction efforts by the Iranian 

government led to some changes in Iran’s foreign and economic policies. At the same 

time, the collapse of the Soviet empire created major change in international politics. 

Iran tried to adopt a kind of détente policy towards its Arab neighbors and Western 

countries. 

Iran sought foreign loans, credits, and investments with which to pursue reconstruction. Europe, especially France, was 

regarded as an important potential source of these funds, since US sanctions were still in force. For the Europeans, including 

France, Iran was an attractive large market and a source of energy supplies. 

During this period, when both Iran and France explored an expansion of their ties, two major events shaped the Iranian-French 

bilateral relationship: the freeing of French hostages in Lebanon through Iran’s mediation efforts; and the 

contract made between the French oil company Total and the Iranian government, which took place despite US sanctions 

against foreign companies investing in the Iranian oil industry. 

Iran’s rapprochement with Arab countries removed one of the obstacles to the improvement of Iranian-French relations. 

At the same time, European countries, including France, tried to resolve their differences with Iran, which were 

mostly related to their conflicting worldviews by beginning a “critical dialogue” with Iran. In their opinion, interaction 

with Iran could be more effective in moderating Iran’s behavior than imposing sanctions. 

This period witnessed an overall improvement in political and economic relations between Iran and France. But in the 

latter part of the period, the killing of four Iranian Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant, known as the “Mykonos 

affair,” produced another setback, as European ambassadors were once again recalled and critical dialogue was suspended. 

Constraints related to France’s membership in the EU along with conflicting worldviews were involved in these 

developments. 


For the Europeans, 

including France, 

Iran was an attractive 

large market 

and a source of energy 

supplies. 

169

Izadi... 

THE THIRD PERIoD: 1997 To 2005 

With the coming to power of a reformist government in Iran in 1997, there was much hope in Paris and other European 

capitals that the new government in Iran would display a moderate version of Islam, making possible a kind of compromise 

between their conflicting worldviews. 

The level of contacts between Iran and France heightened, with President Muhammad 

Khatami visiting Paris. The volume of trade soared to an unprecedented level. And 

“comprehensive dialogue” with the EU began. However, political circles in Iran came 

to believe that France did not take adequate steps to take advantage of the opportunity 

provided by a moderate government in Iran. In this case, some considerations, including 

residual suspicions resulting from different worldviews, hindered closer relations. 

In 2003, Iran’s nuclear dossier became a controversial subject in the UN’s International 

Atomic Energy Agency. EU-3 foreign ministers (including the French Foreign Minister), 

seeking a solution to the problem, reached an agreement with Tehran on October 

21, 2003 to suspend its enrichment program. France, as a state possessing nuclear 

weapons, did not agree with the enlargement of the nuclear club, but at the same time 

did not want to impose sanctions on Iran. For this reason, France supported negotiations 

with Iran. 

THE FoURTH PERIoD: 2005 To THE PRESENT 

The policies adopted 

by Sarkozy in the 

new environment 

of the Middle East, 

Iran’s nuclear program 

and the radical 

positions taken 

by the Iranian president 

against Israel, 

led to confrontation 

between the two 

countries. 

In 2005, Iran, which was dissatisfied with the results of negotiations with the EU-3, resumed uranium enrichment activities. 

Soon thereafter, a new government headed by Mahmud Ahmadinejad came to power. Meanwhile, the balance 

of power in the Middle East drastically changed, especially in Iraq and Lebanon, increasing Iran’s influence. As a result, 

the conflict of interests between Iran and France emerged once again at the regional level. 

In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as the new French President. He intended to pursue a foreign policy more 

convergent with the US in order to increase France’s freedom of action and influence throughout the world. He also 

tried to establish closer links with Israel. 

The policies adopted by Sarkozy in the new environment of the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program and the radical 

positions taken by the Iranian president against Israel, led to confrontation between the two countries. Here again, factors 

such as the United States, a conflict of interest at the regional level, and conflicting worldviews were responsible for 

aggravating the situation. 


Izadi... 

CoNClUSIoN 

Conflicting worldviews have been influential in all periods. It even may be assumed that the two other factors, EU 

constraints (which were influential during the second and third periods) and the US (which was very influential in the 

first and fourth periods) are indirectly affected by conflicting worldviews. On the other hand, the factor of France’s Arab 

policy, although it only gained prominence during the first period, continued to be an irritant during the subsequent 

periods. One can expect that conflicting worldviews will continue to play an essential role in the relations between the 

two countries. 


171

The Spectrum of Perceptions in Iran’s Nuclear Issue 

Rahman G. Bonab 

The relationship between Iran and the West has been marked by mutual mistrust and 

confrontation for the past 30 years. Iran’s nuclear standoff with Western countries is 

currently regarded as the main symbol of that confrontational relationship. Iran insists 

that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, while Western countries are suspicious 

of Tehran’s intentions. There are polarized and incompatible views about this complicated 

and multidimensional issue. The main source of incompatibility is that this issue 

is seen from different perspectives. 

Skeptics argue that Iran has the technological capability and a sufficient amount of Low 

Enriched Uranium (LEU) to make a nuclear bomb within six months if it were to withdraw 

from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Others remind us of the legal 

and political difficulties of using Article 10 of the NPT regarding withdrawal from this 

treaty and the negative impact this would have on Iran’s national interests. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not given Iran a clean bill of health despite 

nearly five years of intrusive random and regular inspections. During this time, inspectors 

have not been able to find satisfying evidence of Iran’s diversion from peaceful nuclear 

activities. The latest IAEA Safeguard Report says that this watchdog organization 

does not have any document related to a military dimension of Iran’s nuclear activities 

other than the UF4 (uranium tetrafluoride) document. Iran is continuing uranium 

enrichment and sanctions have not been able to persuade the country to suspend its 

enrichment activity. 

Since 2003, the Western media have frequently said that Iran is very close to make a 

nuclear bomb. None of these predictions has been realized yet, and we have not reached 

a “point of no return” in using diplomacy. If the latest assessments were not accurate 

and scientific, then it is time to review the recent policies. The current stalemate in Iran- 

IAEA cooperation may be an opportunity in this context. In its recent attempts to exert 

pressures on Iran, the United States has given documents related to Tehran’s alleged 

studies to the IAEA in order to show the hard copies to Iran for the first time since 2004. 

The United States has not explained the authenticity, source, and accuracy of these socalled 

Laptop documents, although Iran denied their veracity. 

A mutual lack of confidence is the main obstacle to reconciliation between Iran and the 

West in the nuclear issue. The constructivists are right to say that a perception of threat 

Department of International 

Studies, Center for Strategic 

Research (CSR), Tehran 


Bonab... 

is more important than the threat per se. The West is sure that even a nuclear Iran is not able to pose an existential threat. 

Meanwhile, Iran is aware that without Western help, it won’t be able to realize its development plans. However, Iranian 

decision-makers are suspicious of Western countries’ intentions. One of the reasons for this distrust may be a lack of 

cognition between the two sides. While the West and, to a lesser extent, China and Russia see Iran’s nuclear activities 

within the framework of a neo-realist approach, Iran’s decision-makers comprehend it mostly via domestic and local 

criteria. 

A neo-realist approach supposes that Iran has sufficient motivations to make a nuclear bomb in order to be confident 

of its survival in an anarchic and unipolar post-Cold War world and a war-burdened and unstable region. Iran’s security 

environment is the dominant analytical concept in this approach. According to this approach, the Bush Administration’s 

offensive and provocative polices have intensified the sense of insecurity among Iran’s political elites and have encouraged 

them to pursue nuclear deterrence. 

Proponents of this view ignore the realities of nuclear reversals in the last decades and 

the complexities of nuclear decision-making. Comparative studies of various nuclear 

decision-making systems demonstrate that security concerns are not the most important 

variables in nuclearization or nuclear reversal. Furthermore, having a fuel cycle 

does not automatically lead to making bombs. Japan, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Argentina 

all have uranium enrichment capability, but they have not decided to withdraw 

from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and make bombs. 

Inside Iran, political elites apprehend Iran’s nuclear issue mostly through the prism of 

domestic politics and the West’s long-standing double standards in dealing with the Islamic 

Republic of Iran during the last 30 years. According to them, accepting the Western 

preconditions on the nuclear issue would only be an introduction to being forced 

to comply with the West’s intrusive demands in other areas, such as human rights, terrorism, and Israel. Furthermore, 

history plays an indisputable role here. The outcome of the last 30 years of interactions between Iran and the West cannot 

be neglected by either side, at least in the short term. 

Both sides have tested many policies vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear issue, and they have implicitly admitted that Iran’s nuclear 

game is not zero-sum. The legitimacy of the Iranian regime is deeply reproduced by the political mobilization of people, 

and the nuclear issue will have considerable impact on the mobilization policy. The 5 + 1 group and especially the 

Obama Administration should pay attention to this basic fact in dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue. It seems that the main 

assumption of polyheuristic theory in foreign policy is correct here: The concerns of Iranian policy makers are domestic 

rather than foreign. The main characteristic of Iran’s decision-making system is delaying, not recognizing. The West 

has not paid balanced attention to these two important aspects of the Iranian decision-making system. It looks at the 

outcome rather than the process of decision-making. In March 2005, Iran proposed a package of objective guarantees 


While the West and, 

to a lesser extent, 

China and Russia 

see Iran’s nuclear 

activities within 

the framework of 

a neo-realist approach, 

Iran’s decision-makerscomprehend 

it mostly 

via domestic and 

local criteria. 

173

Bonab... 

and even accepted permanent inspections of its nuclear activities and ratification of the Model Additional Protocol. The 

EU-3 missed this historic opportunity. 

The present deadlock on the nuclear issue may encourage the West to reassess its policies. 

Iran’s nuclear issue is an opportunity for the West to recognize the capacities of 

Iranian political system, especially in domestic politics. The reproduction of distrust 

during the last years has made it too difficult to find a face-saving and middle solution. 

Here the role of academics is important. Instead of spawning this atmosphere and 

sticking to theories, they should try to help decision-makers deepen their knowledge 

of both sides. We have learned from diplomats that it is possible to find solutions, even 

in apparent deadlocks. Going beyond stereotypes is a prelude to finding a solution to 

this problem. 

Iran’s nuclear issue 

is an opportunity 

for the West to 

recognize the capacities 

of Iranian 

political system, especially 

in domestic 

politics. 


Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Its Future 

Abbas Maleki 

As one of the most important events of the past three decades in the Middle East, 

the Islamic Revolution not only has sustained itself, but the Islamic Republic which it 

spawned celebrated its 30th anniversary in February 2009. 

Regime sustainability despite different internal crises and foreign threats underlines the 

fact that Iran enjoys a relatively rational decision-making process. The central slogan of 

the Iranian Revolution was “Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Republic.” Today, Iran 

is an independent state, as it does not belong to an Eastern or a Western bloc. Although 

the country has not realized its ambition of economic independence, the revolution has 

provided economic welfare. Rural development has improved people’s lives by providing 

villages with water, electricity, and infrastructure. The essence of independence also 

referred to the specific relations between the Iranian monarchy and the United States. 

The US-sponsored 1953 coup against the popular Muhammad Mosaddeq government 

made Iran an American client state, leading to Iranian dependence in all aspects. 

Iran has 1% of the world’s population and about 7% of global mineral resources. 1 Yet, 

the country’s post-revolutionary economic performance has remained well below its 

actual potential, due to war and regional crises as well as internal problems such as 

mismanagement and other ills. Nonetheless, in recent years, Iran has witnessed a period 

of sustainable growth with GDP growth rates above the world average — a trend that is 

likely to continue. 

Over the past three decades, Iran’s foreign policy has moderated significantly and meaningfully. 

Whereas Tehran initially rejected the prevailing norms of the international 

system, today the government largely benefits from opportunities emerging from the 

international system. Despite President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, he participates 

at UN General Assemblies, meets with other leaders, and gives interviews to the 

US media. In seeking to project its influence and protect its interests, Iran has increasingly 

yielded to realist principles. 

To predict the future of the country, one could look at new driving forces, rationales, 

plots and scenarios. What follows is a summary of some important and discernible 

trends in Iran and projections about the country’s future. 

1. Including 10% of proven oil and 16% of natural gas resources. 


Dr. Abbas Maleki is Chairman, 

International Institute 

for Caspian Studies; Associate 

Professor on Energy Security, 

Sharif University of 

Technology; and Associate 

Researcher, Belfer Center for 

Science and International 

Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 

School of Government. 

175

Maleki... 

In terms of domestic political developments, state decision-making will become broader and more complex. Younger 

institutions, such as the Expediency Council and Supreme National Security Council will gain in significance. Some 

look at the “Chinese model” as the way forward; that is, economic reforms and cultural liberalization alongside political 

orthodoxy. However, differences between Chinese and Iranian cultures and history would impede the application of 

this model. The Islamic Republic enjoys the loyalty of many ordinary people (mainly the rural population) who have 

benefited from the post-revolutionary improvements. However, economic problems (e.g., inflation, unemployment, 

brain drain, underdevelopment of non-oil sectors, etc.) overshadow the overall development. As such, the main threat 

against the regime is from within, especially fed by economic and social dissatisfaction. The growing urban middle class 

and its interdependence with socio-political stability will make a violent upheaval impossible, but the regime could 

theoretically collapse. Though unlikely, given high oil prices, severe economic problems could lead to an acute paralysis 

leading to an implosion. Therefore, a growing number of stakeholders will focus on providing the basis for continued 

economic growth. 

With regard to energy sector developments, Europe’s need for energy diversification is 

an opportunity for Iran. In a bid to reduce dependency on Russia, the European Union 

(EU) is looking for new energy resources, especially in natural gas. There is substantial 

potential for energy cooperation between Europe and Iran, the holder of the world’s 

second largest gas reserves. Growing global energy consumption has imparted great 

importance to Iran, which has a combined oil and gas reserve of 315 billion BOE. 2 With 

footholds in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Iran has the potential of becoming a major energy player. Due to 

the depletion of its oil resources and the desire to remain a strategic oil and gas exporter, Iran feels an urgent need to 

develop nuclear energy. The current tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program could ease if Tehran were to adopt a 

three-pronged strategy: normalizing its nuclear file through greater cooperation with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA); carrying out cost/benefit analyses for its nuclear industry; and using public diplomacy more effectively 

to present its intentions and performance. 

Concerning foreign policy, it is important to emphasize that is geo-strategically located in the Middle East, the Persian 

Gulf, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. Iran’s foreign policy is therefore regionally focused. However, Iran’s own 

internal problems, compounded by US efforts to isolate Iran, hamper investments in the region. For the first time since 

1979, Tehran is positioning itself to be an economic and technological power. Facing continued challenges, Iran sees 

“survival in becoming a regional power.” Therefore, regionalism will be the main component of Iran’s foreign policy for 

decades. Without exaggerating Iran’s role, it is fair to say that Tehran has contributed to the region’s economic development 

and political stability — a trend that will continue, even though modestly on the economic level. While Iran’s 

regional engagement has not led to any loss of sovereignty, Iranian officials recognize that in order to derive the benefits 

of regionalism, Iran will have to join its neighbors in introducing governance mechanisms between the global and the 

2. BOE = barrels of oil equivalent. 

Facing continued 

challenges, Iran 

sees “survival in becoming 

a regional 

power.” 


Maleki... 

national levels. Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to reduce its concern over military and security 

threats from two sources — the Taliban-style extremism and radicalism as well as the American military presence 

in the region. However, the SCO cannot diminish US threats against Iran. 

Specifically concerning US-Iran relations, it is open to question how long Iran can go 

As in the past, 

without a diplomatic breakthrough. Some argue that the objective of economic prog- Iran’s future will 

ress necessitates at least economic relations with the United States. Others argue that determined by the 

it will be the United States that will need Iran, especially in the light of the current complex interplay 

financial crisis. Some believe that re-establishing ties with the US would lead to the between key do- 

collapse of the Islamic Republic. They argue that the pillar of this regime has been anti- mestic political and 

Americanism; therefore, the regime would face many challenges relations to resume. economic factors on 

Others believe good relations with Washington would not bring prosperity and de- the one hand, and 

the country’s relavelopment 

for third world countries perforce. Furthermore, Iran’s economic, political, 

tions with its neigh- 

and social problems are rooted in cultural and historical trends which would not be 

bors and with the 

resolved overnight through a resumption of relations. The hardliners in Iran state that United States. 

America’s power is in decline and that Tehran should take advantage at this juncture. 

However, they leave two questions unanswered: First, will American power diminish before it can damage Iran? Second, 

will the end of American dominance coincide with the appearance of a new unipolar power or with the creation of a 

multipolar world system? If the latter, will Iran be prepared for a multipolar environment? 

There is a lively debate among Iranian intellectuals on these very questions. Emerging from this debate is the suggestion 

that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has survived 30 years without ties with a superpower and 

which has withstood various sanctions, would probably be more stable should it decide pursue a rapprochement. As in 

the past, Iran’s future will determined by the complex interplay between key domestic political and economic factors on 

the one hand, and the country’s relations with its neighbors and with the United States. 


177

Maps 


Van Gölü 

(Lake Van) 

Maku 

ARMENIA 

AZARBAYJAN- E GHARBI 

AZERBAIJAN 

Sal'jany 

Krasnovodsk 

Nebit-Dag 

Van 

TURKEY 

Khvoy 

AZARBAYJAN-E 

Marand 

KHAVARI 

Tabriz 

Daryacheh-ye Orumiyeh 

Astara 

Ardabil 

Orumiyeh 

(Lake Urmia) 

Maragheh 

Miandowab 

Mianeh 

GILAN 

Rasht 

Gonbad-e 

Qabus 

Mosul Mahabad 

Arbil 

As Sulaymaniyah 

Kirkuk 

Zanjan Rudbar 

Saqqez ZANJAN 

Qazvin 

KORDESTAN 

Sanandaj 

Sakht Sar 

'Amol Sari 

MAZANDARAN 

TEHRAN 

Tehran 

Gorgan 

Shahrud 

SEMNAN 

HAMADAN 

Hamadan 

Saveh 

Semnan 

Qasr-e Shirin Kermanshah 

KERMANSHAH 

Malayer 

MARKAZI 

Qom Daryacheh-ye 

Namak 

Dasht-e Kavir 

(Salt Lake) 

Borujerd Arak Kashan 

Baghdad 

LORESTAN 

Ilam 

Khorramabad 

ILAM 

Aligudarz 

Najafabad ESFAHAN 

Al Kut 

Karbala' 

Al Hillah 

IRAQ Al 'Amarah 

As Samawah An Nasiriyah 

Al Basrah 

Esfahan 

Dezful Shahr-e Kord 

Masjed-e CHAHARMAHAL Qomsheh 

Soleyman VA-BAKHTIYARI 

KHUZESTAN 

Ahvaz 

Abadeh 

Bandar-e BOYERAHMAD 

VA-KOHGILUYEH 

Mah-Shahr 

Yasuj 

Ardakan 

Yazd 

Bafq 

YAZD 

Rafsanjan 

Euphrates 

ISLAMIC REP. OF 

IRAN 

Tigris 

Araks 

Aras 

ARDEBIL 

Karkheh 

KUWAIT 

D e z 

Khorramshahr 

A badan 

Kuwait 

Qezel O wzan 

SAUDI 

ARABIA 

Borazjan 

Badar-e 

Bushehr 

CASPIAN 

SEA 

Khersan 

Shiraz 

BUSHEHR 

Marv Dasht 

FARS 

Firuzabad 

Jahrom 

TURKMENISTAN 

 

Bojnurd 

Sabzevar 

Kashmar 

Gonabad 

Ashkabad 


Mand 

P E R S I A N G U L F 

Hamun-e 

Jaz Murian 

Sirjan 

Zarand 

Kavir-e Namak 

Kerman 

Jiroft 

Bam 

Tedzhen 

Torbat-e 

Heydariyeh 

KHORASAN 

KERMAN 

G ULF OF OMAN 

Birjand 

Namakzar-e Shahdad 

(salt waste) 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 

IRAN 

 

 

Mashhad 

Tayyebat 

Zahedan 

 

Mary 

 

Zabol 

 

Herat 

 

Zaranj 

SISTAN VA 

BALUCHESTAN 

 

AFGHANISTAN 

 

 

PAKISTAN 

National capital 

Provincial capital 

City, town 

Airport 

Ad 

Dammam 

International boundary 

Provincial boundary 

Main road 

Al Hufuf 

Secondary road 

Railroad 

The boundaries and names shown and the designations 

Lar HORMOZGAN 

Bandar-e 'Abbas 

Bandar-e 

Minab 

Langeh 

Strait 

BAHRAIN 

of Hormuz 

Manama 

OMAN 

QATAR 

Ra's al Khaymah 

Jask 

Doha 

Dubayy 

UNITED ARAB 

EMIRATES 

Abu Dhabi 

Iranshahr 

Hamun-e 

Jaz Murian 

Nikshahr 

Bandar 

Beheshti 

0 100 200 

Gwadar 

300 km 

used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 

acceptance by the United Nations. OMAN 

0 100 

200 mi 

Map No. 3891 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS 

January 2004 

All maps from the US governement unless otherwise noted. 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

Cartographic Section 

 

179



181



183


Caspian Region Oil Pipelines (U) 

MOLDOVA 

CHISINAU 

ROMANIA 

BUL. 

KIEV 

Yuzhnyy-Brody 

180,000 to 240,000 b/d 

Black Sea 

Major crude oil export pipeline 

Oil pipeline planned, proposed, 

or under construction 

ANKARA 

Oil, gas, and condensate field 

0 100 200 Kilometers 

0 100 200 Miles 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Ceyhan 

UKRAINE 

Sea of 

Azov 

Novorossiysk 

Tikhoretsk 

Western Early 

115,000 b/d 

Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan 

(planned) 1 million b/d 

TURKEY 

SYRIA 

Sup’sa 

Erzurum 

RUSSIA 

Caspian Pipeline 

Consortium (CPC) Project 

560,000 b/d (first stage) 

GEORGIA 

Northern Early 

100,000 b/d 

Horasan 

ARMENIA 

AZERBAIJAN 

IRAN 

Caspian 

Sea 


IRAQ 

Makhachkala 

T’BILISI 

YEREVAN 

Atyrau-Samara 

300,000 b/d 

Kashagan 

Aqtau 

(Aktau) 

BAKU 

Karachaganak 

Karachaganak-Atyrau 

(planned) 180,000 b/d 

Atyrau 

Azeri 

KAZAKHSTAN 

Tengiz 

Guneshli 

Deep 

Chirag 

TEHRAN 

Neka Port 

Boundary representation is 

not necessarily authoritative. 

Kazakhstan-China 

(proposed) 

UZBEKISTAN 

TURKMENISTAN 

Neka-Tehran 

50,000 b/d 

(first stage) 

Aral 

Sea 

Kazakhstan-Iran 

(proposed) 

759738AI 4-02 

185


Statistics 


187

All statistics from the UN unless otherwise noted. 

Demographics 



189


Economy 


191



193



195

GWh 

IEA Energy Statistics 

200 000 

180 000 

160 000 

140 000 

120 000 

100 000 

80 000 

60 000 

40 000 

20 000 

© OECD/IEA 2007 

Energy 

Evolution of Electricity Generation by Fuel from 1971 to 2005 

Islamic Republic of Iran 

Statistics on the Web: http://www.iea.org/statist/index.htm 

0 

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 

Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydro Comb. renew. & waste Geothermal/solar/wind 

For more detailed data, please consult our on-line data service at http://data.iea.org. 


Thousand Tonnes 


80 000 

70 000 

60 000 

50 000 

40 000 

30 000 

20 000 

10 000 


ktoe 

Evolution of Oil Products Consumption from 1971 to 2005 


0 

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 


350 000 

300 000 

250 000 

200 000 

150 000 

100 000 

50 000 


Heavy Fuel Oil Middle Distillates Aviation Fuels Gasoline LPG* Other Products 

* Includes LPG, NGL, ethane and naphtha. 




Evolution of Total Production of Energy from 1971 to 2005 



0 

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 



197

ktoe 


180 000 

160 000 

140 000 

120 000 

100 000 

80 000 

60 000 

40 000 

20 000 

Evolution of Total Primary Energy Supply* from 1971 to 2005 


0 

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 

* Excluding electricity trade. 





IEA Energy Statistics Statistics on the Web: http://www.iea.org/statist/index.htm 

Share of Total Primary Energy Supply* in 2005 


Gas 50.4% 

Oil 47.5% 

Hydro 0.9% 

Comb. renew. & waste 

0.5% 

Coal 0.7% 

162 504 ktoe 

* Share of TPES excludes electricity trade. 

Note: For presentational purposes, shares of under 0.1% are not included and consequently the total may not add up to 100%. 




Gender 


199


Political Power Structure 


201

Assembly of Experts 

Electorate 

President 

Supreme Leader Council of Ministers 

Expediency Council 

Head of Judiciary 

Elect 

Radio and TV 

Police and 

Armed Forces 

Appoint 

Confirm 

Screen/Vet 

Appoints 6 members 

Appoints 6 members 

Council of 

Guardians 

Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards Corp 

Regular Military 

Chief of General Staff of 

Armed Forces 

Law Enforcement Forces 

Parliament 

Head of Supreme Court 

Chief Public Prosecutor 

All charts adapted from Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? (2001). 


Head of State 

President 

Mahmud Ahmadinejad 

Vice Presidents 

Planning and 

Budget Organization 

National Security 

Council 

Office of the 

President 

Council of Ministers 

Executive 

Confirms 

First Vice President 

Parviz Davudi 

Atomic Energy 

Qolam Reza Aqazedeh-Khoi 

Cultural Heritage and Tourism 

Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie 

Environmental Protection 

Qolam Reza Aqazedeh-Khoi 

Executive Affairs 

Ali Saidlu 

Legal and Paramilitary Affairs 

Mohammad Reza Rahimi 

Management and Planning 

Mansur Borqei 

Martyrs and War Veterans 

Hosein Dehqan 

National Youth Organizations 

Ali Akbari 

Physical Education 

Mohammad Ali-Abadi 

Chief of State 

Supreme Leader 

‘Ali Khamene’i 


Agricultural Jihad 

Mohammad Reza Eskandari 

Commerce 

Masud Mir-Kazemi 

Communication and IT 

Mohammad Soleimani 

Cooperatives 

Mohammad Abbasi 

Defense and Armed Forces Logistics 

Mostafa Mohammad Najar 

Economic Affairs and Finance 

Shams-ed-Din Hoseini 


Ali Reza Ali-Ahmadi 

Energy 

Parviz Fatah 

Foreign Affairs 

Manuchehr Motaki 

Health 

Kamran Baqeri-lankarani 

Housing and Development 

Mohammad Saidi-Kia 

Industries and Mining 

Ali Akbar Mehrabian 

Intelligence and Security 

Qolam Hosein Mohseni-Ejei 

Interior 

Sadeq Mahsuli 

Islamic Culture and Guidance 

Mohammad Hosein Safar Harandi 

Justice 

Qolam Hosein Elham 

Labor and Social Affairs 

Mohammad Jahromi 

Petroleum 

Qolam Hosein Nozari 

Roads and Transportation 

Hamed Behbahani 

Science, Research, and Technology 

Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi 

Welfare and Social Security 

Abdol Reza Mesri 

Armed Forces 

203

Executive 

Leader’s Representative 

assigned to each 

of 22 ministries 

Military and 

Security Services 

Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards Corp 

Basij Militia 

Law Enforcement 

Forces 

Regular Military 

(army, air force, navy) 

Combined General Staff 

of the Armed Forces 

Supreme Leader 

‘Ali Khamene’i 

Office of the Supreme Leader 

Foreign Relations 

Cultural offices in the 

embassies 

Islamic centers in 

major foreign cities 

Fifteenth of Khordad 

Foundation 

Imam Reza 

Foundation 

Special Clerical 

Court 

Major newspapers 

Friday Imams 



governor of the 28 

provinces 

Organizations 

headed by Leader’s 

Representative 

Society for Reconciliation 

among 

Islamic Sects 

Assembly for the 

People of the House 

of the Prophet 

Haj and Welfare 

Organization 

Foundation for the 

Oppressed and 

Disabled 

Islamic Propaganda 

Organization (STE) 

Friday Imams 



governor of the 28 

provinces 


Office for the 

Qom Seminary 

Directory of 

Mosques 

Council of Friday 

Prayer Leaders 

(Qom) 

Martyrs Foundation 


From the pages of The Middle 

East Journal’s “Chronology:” 

Iran in 1979 


205

Since it began publication in 1947, each issue of The Middle East Journal has contained a section chronologically 

detailing events of note in the region for the preceding three months. Today, this section is dubbed the “Chronology,” 

although in the earliest issues of the Journal, it was called “Developments of the Quarter.” The Chronology is organized 

by country and issue, with each section providing a day-by-day account of the relevant events and developments. Mirroring 

the Journal, the Chronology’s coverage of the region spans from North Africa in the west to formerly Soviet 

Central Asia, to Pakistan in the east. 

Given the longevity of The Middle East Journal, the Chronology is an indispensable resource to those interested in the 

politics and history of the modern Middle East — in the pages of the Journal, readers can essentially read a daily accounting 

of the events in a particular country from 1947 through today. Entries for the Chronology are written as they 

occur and represent a real-time window not only into the events of the region, but into the overall context of the time 

and place in which they occurred. 

The following pages contain reproductions of the Chronology entries written for Iran during 1979, as the Islamic Revolution 

unfolded. They provide a unique and detailed look into a series of events that have left an indelible mark upon 

the region. 



207



209



211



213



215



217



219



221


Selected Bibliography 


223

I. General Works on Modern Iran and the Islamic Revolution 

Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008. 

Afshar, Haleh, ed. Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil. Albany: SUNY Press, 1985. 

Axworthy, Michael. A History of Iran. New York, Basic Books, 2008 

Barthel, Guenter, ed. Iran: From Monarchy to Republic. Berlin (GDR): Akademie-Verlag, 1983. 

Cleveland, William L., and Martin P. Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009. 

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Nobari, Ali-Reza, ed. Iran Erupts: Independence: News and Analysis of the Iranian National Movement. Stanford: Iran- 

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225

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227

U.S. Policy Toward Iran, January 1979. Hearing: January 17, 1979 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign 

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Takeyh, Ray. 2003. “Iran at a Crossroads.” The Middle East Journal, v. 57, no. 1: 42-56. 

Seifzadeh, Hossein S. 2003. “The Landscape of Factional Politics and Its Future in Iran.” The Middle East Journal, v. 57, 


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Ebrahimian, Laleh. 2003. “Socio-economic Development in Iran Through Information and Communications Technology.” 


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Master Theses and Doctoral Dissertations 

Alianak, Sonia. Hierarchical Dissonance in Values and the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Texas at 

Austin, 1987. 

Alidoost-Khaybari, Yadollah. Religious Revolutionaries: An Analysis of the Religious Groups Victory in the Iranian Revo- 

lution of 1978-79. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Michigan, 1981. 

Alinejad, Mahmoud. Iran: Religion & Revolution. Thesis (M.A.)—University of Technology, Sydney, 1991. 

Amjad, Mohammad. Social origins of the Iranian Revolution: Role of the State and Social Classes. Thesis (Ph. D.)— 

University of California, Riverside, 1986. 

Bakhtiari, Bahman. A Comparison of the Ideologies of Ali Shariati and the People’s Mojahedin in Iran. Thesis (M.A.)— 

University of Virginia, 1981. 

Barahmand, Heather Harir. Colonial Effects: Women, the Nation, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Thesis (M.A.)— 

UCLA, 2004. 

Bibiyan, Debbie Dokhi. International Factors in Revolution: The Cold War Bipolar Actors at the System level and the 

Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of California, Los Angeles, 2001. 

Bohlinger, Scott Robert. Paradigms of Nationalism and Iran’s Revolutionary Elite: Iranian Nationalism in the Bazargan 


295

Period. Thesis (M.A.) — American University, 2006. 

Boles, Elizabeth Mary. out of the Woodwork: The Challenge of Revolutionary Change to U.S. Foreign Policy. Thesis (Ph. 

D.)—University of California at Berkeley, 1989. 

Chehabi, Houchang Esfandiar. Modernist Shi’ism and Politics: The liberation Movement of Iran. Thesis (Ph. D.)—Yale 

University, 1986, . 

Dahan, Laila. The Iranian Revolution’s Anti-Shah Movements: Why Khomeini’s Movement Won. Thesis (M.A.)—Georgia 

State University, 1990. 

Daheshiar, Hossein. Social, Economic and Political origins of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University 

of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1995. 

Doost-Mohammadi, Ahmad. The line of the Imam. Thesis (Ph.D)-Claremont Graduate School, 1984. 

Dorraj, Manochehr. Islamic Populism and Dissent: A Theoretical Study of Shi’i Militancy in Iran from Early Islam to the 

Revolution of 1979. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Texas at Austin, 1984. 

Eshghipour, Kourosh. From Monarcy to Theocracy— a Comprehensive Study of the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (M.A.)— 

San Francisco State University, 1994. 

Fajri, Nurul. The Role of Religious Symbols in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Thesis (M.A.),—McGill University, 1992. 

Firouzbakhch, Homa. Population Dynamics in the Revolutionary Process: A Historical Interpretive Approach to the Ten- 

sion between Social Structure and Ideology, the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph. D.)—Dept. of Sociology, University of 

Utah, 1994. 

Garratt, Steven. The Carter Administration and the “loss” of Iran. Thesis (M.A.)—University of Missouri-Columbia, 

1992. 

Gates, Barbara Glendora. The Political Roles of Islamic Women: A Study of Two Revolutions—Algeria and Iran. Thesis 

(Ph. D.)—University of Texas at Austin, 1987. 

Gava’hi, Abd al-Rahim. Islamic Revolution of Iran: Conceptual Aspects and Religious Dimensions. Thesis (Ph. D.)—Upp- 

sala University, 1987. 

Geary, Brent M. Jimmy Carter and the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (M.A.)—Ohio University, 2002. 


Gerard, Joseph T. The Impact of Ideology on the Iranian Military in the Iran-Iraq War 1980-88. Thesis (Ph. D.—Politics)— 

Catholic University of America, 2002. 

Ghods, Mahmood Reza. A Comparative Historical Study of the Causes, Development, and Effects of the Revolutionary 

Movements in Northern Iran in 1920-21 and 1945-46: The Political History of Iran from the Constitutional Revolution to 

the Islamic Revolution. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Denver, 1989. 

Harlan, Natalie B. The Iranian Revolution: A Theoretical Approach to leadership. Thesis (M.A.)— Flagstaff: Northern 

Arizona University, 1989. 

Harrison, Amanda, and Housain Asad. Catalysts and Components: A View of the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (M.A.)— 

Northeastern Illinois University, 1995. 

Hudson, Aaron E. Minority Repression and Reconstituting the State: The Case of the Baha’is and the Tudeh in Iran. Thesis 

(M.A.I.S.)—University of Washington, 1999. 

Kassaie, Parvin. Politics of Exile: The Attitudes and Actions of Iranians in los Angeles. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of 

Southern California, 1987. 

Kherad, Nastaran. The House of My Bibi: A Memoir of Growing Up in Revolutionary Iran. Thesis (M.A.)—California 

State University, Long Beach, 2005. 

Kirk, John Miller. An Analysis of the Ethiopian, Iranian and Nicaraguan Revolutions from the Perspective of United States 

Involvement. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Texas at Austin, 1985. 

Kurzman, Charles T. Structure and Agency in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of California, 

1992. 

Malekzadeh, Abbas. The New york Times, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph. D.)—American 


Manafy, Abbass. Critical Reflections on Theories of Revolution: A lesson from Iran. Thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Texas 

at Austin, 1987. 

Masch, Donald George. The Iranian Revolution and Its Impact on the Future of Soviet-Iranian Relations An Assessment. 

Thesis (M.A.)—U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1980. 

McMillan, Michael J. Echoes of Revolution: Iran’s Path into the Modern World. Thesis (M.A.)—Naval Postgraduate School, 

1998. 


297

Meskill, Constance Marie. American Diplomacy in the Iranian Revolution, 1976-1981. Thesis (M.A.)—University of 

Texas at Austin, 1995. 

Moaddel, Mansoor. A Sociological Analysis of the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph.D.)—University of Wisconsin—Madi- 

son, 1986. 

Nayebagha, Hassan. The Role of Islamic Ideology and leadership in the Iranian Revolution of 1978. Thesis (M.A.)— 

United States International University, San Diego Campus, 1980. 

Nodjomi, Mohssen. Dictatorship and Rise of Popular Movement: The Case of Iran. Thesis (Ph. D.) — City University 

of New York, 1986. 

Palma, Mark C. The 1979 Iranian Revolution A Study in the Role of Culture in the Modernization of Traditional Societies. 

Thesis (M.A.)—University of Western Ontario, 2000. 

Rehimi, Rafic M. Khomeini and the Arabs: A Regional Perspective. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Boston University, 1994. 

Roberts, Mark Jonathan. The Iranian Revolution: A Case Study in Coercive Power Consolidation. Monterey, Calif: Thesis 

(M.A.)—Naval Postgraduate School, 1994. 

Saidabadi, Mohammad Reza. Iranian-British Relations Since 1979. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Australian National University, 

1998. 

Schick, William P. The Withdrawal of American Support As an Accelerator of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Thesis (M.A.)— 

University of South Florida, 1999. 

Shahidian, Ali M. Hammed. The Woman’s Question in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Brandeis 


Shahrokhi, Shapour. Consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thesis (M.A.)—San Jose State University, 1990. 

Sheibani, Khatereh. Revolution or Evolution?: A Comparative Poetics of Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema. Thesis 

(Ph.D.)—University of Alberta, 2007. 

Smith, John M. Where Was the Shah’s Army? Thesis (M.A.)—U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1980. 

Sorensen, Kenneth. The 1979 Iranian Revolution: Searching for the Primary Cause. Thesis (Ph.D.)— Zagreb: University 

of Zagreb, 1990s. 


Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. The Power of Tradition: Communication and the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph.D.)— 

Columbia University, 1985. 

Staudinger, Daniel B. Factors of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Thesis (M.A.), 1990. 

Tassviri, Ali.Differences Expressed by the American Press Concerning the Iranian Revolution. Thesis (Ph.D.)—United 

States International University, San Diego Campus, 1984. 

Tehrani, Mohammad Hassan Tajalli. The Causes of Revolution A Case Study of Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. Thesis 

(M.A.)—North Texas State University, March, 1982. 

Tom, Bruno. Diplomatic Efforts in Iran Prior to the Hostage Crisis. Thesis (M.A.)—San Jose State University, 1996. 

Vakili-Zad, Cyrus A. The Sociology of the Shi’ite Mosque in Iran: The Cultural and Institutional Basis of the Iranian Revo- 

lution of 1978-79. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Boston College, 1987. 

Wells, Matthew Craig. Democratic Transitions and the Weber/Freud Connection: The Cases of the First French Republic 

(1789-1799), Weimar Germany (1919-1934), and Islamic Iran (1979-Present). Thesis (Ph.D.)—Kent State University, 

1999. 

Yavari-Issalou, Farahad. The Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Temple University, 1995. 

Yetiv, Steven A. The U.S. Strategic Position in the Persian Gulf, 1978-1990: The Impact of the Iranian Revolution, the Af- 

ghanistan Intervention and the Iran-Iraq War. Thesis (Ph.D.)—Kent State University, 1990. 

Zandpour, Freidoun. Advertising in Iran: The Relationship between American Advertising and the Revolution of 1979. 

Thesis (M.A.)—University of Portland, 1980. 

Zibakalam-Mofrad, Sadegh. The Historical Genesis of the Islamic Revolution. Thesis (Ph.D.)—University of Bradford, 

1989. 


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